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Questioning the Rhetorical Eclipse of Philosophical Leisure
Preface
The advent of technology into society has saturated how human beings conduct
daily communication (Postman 16; Winter 14). Technology has pushed leisure even
further from our grasp, which reduces the human connection in our relationships as we
have become driven by work and technology, instead of by human interest. The advent
and subsequent saturation of technology ushered in a moral crisis in human
communication.
The moral crisis in human communication is an obscuration of the human
element, meaning human beings often find it difficult to have a deep, thoughtful, and
interested conversation with others. This obscuration has manifest into a culture of
narcissism (Lasch, Narcissism 27; Kristeva 7) and a sense of existential homelessness
(Arnett 229; Nietzsche 127). As a result of this moral crisis, human communication has
degenerated into phatic conversation, small-talk, or meaningless chatter (Rorty, Mirror
372).
This study calls for a rediscovery of philosophical leisure as one approach to
human engagement. Philosophical leisure enables human beings to contribute valuable
ingredients to idea-laden conversation. Contributing to conversation, or engaging the art
of conversation, occurs when human interest envelops the conversational experience.
Acknowledgments
This research has been interesting, exciting, and time consuming. Understanding
philosophical leisure is an important contribution to the study of human communication
because philosophical leisure is communicative praxis. Philosophical leisure is a
theoretical interest that has been considered by most significant thinkers responsible for
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contributing to the development of Western thought. But philosophical leisure is not only
grounded theoretically, it is something human beings ‘do.’ Therefore, communication
scholarship can find bountiful paths to explore in theory and practice of philosophical
leisure. This study can re-open the conversation about philosophical leisure from a
communication perspective and invite cross disciplinary studies to enrich the
conversation for a consummated examination.
I must express my appreciation to my dissertation director, Pat Arneson, and my
dissertation committee, Ronald C. Arnett and Richard Thames. Their direction and
insight have been valuable and vital to the development of the ideas that follow. During
the course of my doctorate study I studied Latin with Dr. Lawrence Gaichas, in the
Classics Department, McAnulty College, Duquesne University. In the writing of this
study I needed to revisit my Latin grammatical understandings with Dr. Gaichas. I am
extremely grateful for his time and his consideration of my work and my questions. I
thank my husband, Dennis, for putting up with my research and writing schedule that so
often did not synchronize with his schedule. I thank my parents, Bill and June, for
reading chapters for clarity and readability. I am extremely grateful to my daughters,
Michele and Christina, who were the gatekeepers of every revised chapter document
throughout the whole writing process. Finally, to Emily, who patiently and diligently
watched as I typed away instead of rubbing her belly, thank you.
One final note of gratitude. English words cannot fully express my appreciation
to my dissertation director, Pat Arneson. Therefore, inter nos, labores nostrae, otium
mihi dulce. Ab īmō pectore – gratiae. Amīcus certus in rē incertā cernitur. ☺
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Abstract
Human communication in our postmodern era has degenerated into phatic
communication. Phatic communication, appropriate in some circumstances, used
unreflectively limits the ability for the development of healthy, idea-laden conversation.
The phatic nature of communication represents a loss of human interest in human
communication. Philosophical leisure can help to recapture the element of human
interest in conversation, which recuperates an over-abundance of phaticity in human
communication. Recuperation of communication occurs when ideas drive conversation.
Philosophical leisure can help human beings to find substance for those ideas. This study
considers how philosophical leisure can enrich human communication.
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Chapter I
Communicatio Humanus Quaestio
(The Problem in Human Communication)
People commonly seek luxuries to make life efficient and easy – yet we often hear
the comments “I’m busy,” “I’m tired,” or “I need more time!” People try to catch up
with their work load and seemingly find themselves more behind than when they started.
People say they need a vacation immediately after taking a vacation. People work to
provide greater security for their future. The Western world is aggressive, competitive,
and materialistic. All this work and material gathering is temporal and responsive to the
societal environment in which one lives.
The industrial revolution induced people to use mechanical and subsequently
technological means for increasing efficiencies and ease of life. Human communication
often reflects this contemporary shortcut to the good life. The progression toward this
lifestyle foregrounds a material gathering of ‘things’ responsive to their immediate
environment, which directs one’s attention in the world away from a meaning-laden life.
Contemporary conversation is often self-oriented or about other people, which
characterizes conversation as either monologic or gossip. Good conversation, that is,
conversation with a human element, can nourish the mind because the focus of attention
is on ideas rather than on the self or gossip about others. Ideas are open to spontaneity
and therefore generate depth and novelty in conversation. Talking about the self or about
others is often flat and narrowly focused, which disables depth and novelty. Nourishment
from ideas invites contribution to conversation. The degeneration of conversation
focused on the self or gossip about others interferes with the emergences and
1
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development of ideas. Therefore, this study looks for an alternative approach to
refocusing attention toward a healthier aesthetic conversational ground.
Leisure allows individuals to re-focus their attention in the world. Leisure,
colloquially, has been misconstrued by many people for idleness, relaxation,
entertainment, and other similar non-activities. One must also consider that historically
leisure has meant different things to different microcultures. Leisure was a source of vice
for the Puritans, a sign of privilege for egalitarians, and surplus to those Marxists elites
(Pieper, Leisure xi). In 2004 human beings frequently mistake leisure for relaxation and
entertainment. These historically shifting definitions of leisure have shifted our focus of
attention in the world and in relation to other human beings. This alternate understanding
is otium obscurum1 (an eclipse of leisure), which in turn can cause the quality of human
communication to diminish or depreciate. This study examines the rhetorical eclipse of
leisure to better understand the relationship between philosophical leisure and human
communication.
This chapter first considers the problem of a communication eclipse as a moral
crisis. This moral crisis is defined as an obscuring of the ability to engage in idea-laden
conversation because of the lack of ground from which people make good decisions. A
discussion follows considering how a therapeutic culture of psychologism and the
saturation of technology in the Western world have invited a culture of narcissism and a
sense of existential homelessness that now impede the ability to participate in an ideacentered conversation. Second, the research approach to this study is discussed. Third,

1
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consequences of the problems pervasive in human communication; narcissism (Lasch,
Narcissism 31) and “existential homelessness” (Arnett, Existential, 229) are identified.
Both of these manifestations invite a communication eclipse among human beings.
Fourth, supportive terms significant to understanding the eclipse of human
communication such as; common center, loss of faith, and soul are also defined. The
work begins by addressing a therapeutic culture of psychologism and the technological
revolution.
The Problem in Human Communication
In the 1950s, social scientists predicted that by the end of the century we’d
all be living the lives of leisure. Technology would free us from dull timeconsuming tasks and allow us to work four-hour days, twenty-hour weeks,
maybe less. Why do you think that so many of our colleges and
universities during this period began setting up departments of recreation
administration and leisure studies? It wasn’t because they needed special
classes for their football teams. It was to help us figure out what to do
with all the predicted spare time we would be experiencing.

Of course, that prophesized age of leisure has not materialized.
I recently caught myself hovering over my fax machine in a state of high
anxiety, gesturing wildly at the paper coming out of the slot, and saying
out loud in a voice of frustration, ‘Faster! Faster! (Morris, 14-15).
Psychologism is a term that refers to a therapeutic culture in which the practice of
revealing motives and intent is a primary focus for understanding (Palmer 88-89). One of
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the early modern thinkers to consider the significance of psychologism in human
communication was Thomas Hobbes who believed that the human being was an integral
part understanding the natural order – not only a human being’s body but also the mind
(Randall 312). Hobbes would argue against a critique of psychologism as posited by this
study.
To psychologize something we seek out an individual’s reason for committing an
action. Along with motive and intent, psychologizing also suggests the justification or
rationalization of a particular act (Palmer 95). This therapeutic focus on the individual is
deceptive and misleading (Dostal 272; Schrag, Praxis 127).
To find meaning in text or conversation is not found by delving into “a spate of
psychological conditions” (Schrag, Praxis 127). Rather, meaning in conversation
happens through the experience of the communicative event, communicative praxis.
When examining communication, the avoidance of psychologism is necessary because
communication driven by psychologism can shut down the possibilities for contributing
to or enriching a conversation. Through psychologizing, meaning is found solely within
one author rather than from “examination of the contribution of meaning from other
quarters” (127). Conversation is diminished when it focuses solely on the self or other
(gossip). Continuing the conversation becomes difficult because the focus is on an
individual instead of the idea. This focus impedes the ability to contribute to an ongoing
conversation. Technology, like psychologism, has also had a similar effect on human
communication.
The advent of technology into society changed how human beings conduct their
daily communication (Postman 16; Winter 14). We may have thought technology would
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free us from work but, instead, technology has saturated society and pushed leisure even
further from our grasp. This serves to repose our relationships with one another because
we have become driven by work and technology instead of by interest in the other. This
saturated interiority has transformed how human beings communicate (Habermas,
Structural 156). Technological saturation altered society as we are now aware of multiple
narratives, which is one of the characteristics of a postmodern world (Lyotard 66; Rorty,
Contingency 44).
The advent and subsequent saturation of technology into society ushered in a
postmodern condition of human communication that I describe as a moral crisis. A moral
crisis in communication is exhibited by two symptoms: narcissism, which is
characterized by a devaluation of the self (Lasch, Narcissism 27; Kristeva 7), and
existential homelessness2, characterized by living at a time when uncertainty and mistrust
are pervasive in human relationships and Western culture (Arnett, Existential 229;
Nietzsche, Genealogy 127). These consequences happen when human beings are unable
to identify appropriate ground from which to engage human communication – a moral
crisis – the inability to communicate from one’s ground.
Narcissism and existential homelessness are characterized by “false
communication” – when conversation degenerates into small talk or meaningless chatter
(Rorty, Mirror 372). This study asks the question: how can the rediscovery of leisure
nourish the ground of conversation? Understanding more about the problem of losing the
art of conversation can help to situate the significance of this research question. Working

For the purpose of this study the term ‘home’ refers to the private realm. It is “a
feeling of being psychologically ‘at home’” (Arnett 231). “Existential homelessness”
happens with the loss of a “common center” (Buber, I-Thou 163; Paths 135).
2
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from the assumption that the therapeutic culture of psychologism and the saturation of
technology in Western culture have caused problems in human relationships and human
communication (Postman 16; Winter 14), the symptoms of this problem can now be
considered through a constructive hermeneutic.
Research Approach
This study observes problems inherent to human communication in
postmodernity. Dominant social trends that inform how people get along-in- the-world
tend to eclipse idea-laden communication. This author offers an alternative perspective
to communicative praxis consistent with Aristotle’s philosophical leisure that redirect the
dominant morés. Grounding the rhetoric of leisure in Aristotle is not without problems.
Aristotle presupposes that there is a natural order hierarchy, indicating that some human
beings were born free and others were born slaves. For this work, the existing
presuppositions include the grounding of a rediscovery of leisure in an Aristotelian
framework and the presupposition that leisure has not been obliviated but is eclipsed
behind the postmodern condition of narcissism and existential homelessness. This study
presupposes equal access to a leisure framework and that class, gender, or age, and so
forth, do not impose or deter one from the engagement of leisure. Additionally, this
project considers presuppositions of the human condition, leisure, and the rhetorical
eclipse of leisure through each historical period. Revealing the eclipse of leisure and
redefining leisure through contemplation, reflection, and play, this work proposes a
constructive way to enhance conversation.
The primary focus of this inquiry considers human communication in the
postmodern world and investigates possibilities for the reconstruction of fertile ground
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for conversation. An interpretive approach traces ideas to their origins and development,
and assesses popular contemporary attitudes towards these ideas (Mailloux 147). This
project takes a constructive hermeneutic approach to the rhetoric of leisure which allows
leisure to be excavated from antiquity. Leisure is traced through historical time periods
and historical themes up to the present contemporary rhetoric of leisure. This process
begins by deconstructing ideas by definition, analogy, and assessment. This
deconstruction is done by examining coherence, comprehensiveness, thoroughness,
contextuality, appropriateness, agreement, and potentiality of text (Madison 29). The
interpretive process penetrates deeper into a written and social text by examining
meaning and intent, rather than viewing a flat, one-dimensional approach. Hermeneutic
interpretation allows the absence of the aesthetic to be revealed through the lack of the art
of conversation. A constructive hermeneutic provides a way to rebuild after the initial
deconstruction of text and ideas.
This work examines historical texts that define leisure. The textual lens will be
limited to writings within the Western tradition. Examination by analogy will be
conducted through the work of Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas, where both writers
consider a transformation of public and private realms. Leisure is considered analogous
to Arendt’s “social” (Arendt 38) and Habermas’ “saturated private sphere” (Habermas,
Structural 158). The assessment of contemporary literature is considered and how this
literature presents the practice of leisure in contemporary society. Assessment also
occurs through the evaluation of the catalysts of the contemporary eclipse of leisure,
including psychologism and technological saturation.
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Using definition, analogy, and assessment to examine texts requires considering
the coherence of text and arguments, the comprehensiveness and thoroughness of
historical arguments, and understanding the context in which text, social morés, and
communicative action occur. Also, this phase of deconstruction includes consideration of
the appropriateness, agreement, and potentiality of text studied in relation to how it
informs the study of leisure and future applications to human communication (Madison
29).
Following a thorough deconstruction of the rhetoric of leisure from a Western
perspective is considered, this study provides an alternative approach to human
communication through a discovery of philosophical leisure. This alternative approach
provides one remedy to the communication eclipse inherent in contemporary human
communication.
This work points toward recuperating communication to once again add to the
everyday art of conversation. Richard Rorty considers the art of conversation in his
discussion of the difference between epistemology and hermeneutics. He argues that an
epistemological approach to communicative understanding is no longer effective in a
postmodern age because epistemology begins with a set of terms and boundaries that
guide the inquiry (Mirror 318). Rorty asserts this not acceptable in a postmodern age
because set terms impede one’s understanding; they set the parameter or assume a
starting place. Juxtaposed to epistemology, Rorty argues hermeneutics offers an open
beginning and serendipitous stroll to understanding that meets and is responsive to a
historical moment (322-323). Therefore, while Rorty does not say that an
epistemological approach is always incorrect, he argues that it is no longer a viable
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means of study (325). In a postmodern age we ought to begin without a set of terms and
proceed responsively.
A constructive hermeneutic approach to the rhetoric of leisure suggests the
importance of the act of interpretation in its most relevant critical forum to the most
contemporary ongoing arguments. These discussions must be situated within our
rhetorical tradition and the interpretive act placed in relevant social practices of human
communication (Mailloux 134). This study is situated within the contemporary Western
world which is open to new and helpful ways of re-situating philosophical leisure into our
culture and addressing the challenges in human communication in the postmodern world.
Announcing existing presuppositions and the perspectives that came before them by an
examination of text, social morés, and historical action (147), will provide a textured
discussion that will enhance our current understanding of leisure. The next section
discusses the problem of a moral crisis in human communication that announces the
communication eclipse described by Rorty as a “degeneration of conversation” into small
talk (Mirror 372).
Moral Crisis as Communication Eclipse
A moral crisis occurs when human communication is unreflective, obscured, or
hidden behind “false communication” (Rorty, Mirror 372). False communication is
communication focused on the self or disguised communication, fostering
communication imposters. False communication happens when conversation degenerates
into small talk and/or meaningless chatter (372). False communication is disingenuous
communication because the communicative event provides an illusion of human interest
that is actually empty communication. The moral crisis of this communication eclipse
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does not pertain to one or two human beings but instead, it represents the state of human
communication in general.
Many philosophers pointed to the moral crisis of this eclipse and discussed it in a
variety of ways. Emmanuel Kant pointed to this moral crisis in his responses to early
Enlightenment thinkers and their focus on empiricism and the scientific world. Kant
suggested that David Hume’s defense of empirical principles, judgments, and negation of
a priori propositions calls “metaphysics a mere delusion, whereby we fancy ourselves to
have rational insight into what, in actual fact, is borrowed solely from experience, and
under the influence of custom has taken the illusory semblance of necessity” (Kant,
Reason VI. b20 55). Kant was pointing toward a disenchantment with conclusions that
rely on the senses. Kant advocated enlarged thought which negotiated the metaphysical
realm that is open to multiple possibilities and a priori judgments, while dissuading the
reliance upon synthetic judgments (II. B4. 44-45). There is a risk of becoming a
communicative imposter or engaging communication through posturing if human beings
rely upon synthetic judgments for communicative guidance. This false communication is
a symptom of the fractured spirit that has permeated human communication in the
postmodern era.
Immanuel Kant argued that ultimate destiny of humanity is to achieve the greatest
moral perfection, which could only be reached through human freedom (Ethics, 252).
This place of moral perfection is the only place where human beings can find true
happiness (252). Happiness cannot be found outside of one’s self. Kant argued that true
morality only occurs when one makes one’s self happy, it begins within one’s self (252).
Kant suggested this self-happiness is not achieved due to independence or from a lust for
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power. However, happiness can be achieved through education, either at home or at
school (253). A rhetorical eclipse of communication occurs when one cannot reach
moral perfection because one cannot truly experience happiness. Kant suggested moral
perfection is hopeful but distant. Turning from this inward reflection and happiness, this
study considers the human relationship with the other.
A social relationship that invites responsibility for the other is grounded in human
interest. Human interest nourishes conversation, thus, enabling conversation to continue
and develop. As the conversation continues, ideas play, and human communication is
connected organically. Without the human element, conversation can become technical
and disconnected from a humanness that eventually can become less meaningful.
Ground for conversation can eliminate the insecurity that human beings feel, or it
can provide security at a time when we sense more loss than contentment in our lives.
Fertile ground gives human beings idea-rich conversation that penetrates beyond the
superficialities of phatic communication. Contentment is often obscured from human
beings because our approach to living is filled with phatic conversation. Conversation is
thus dependent upon res (things), rather than people. Additionally, moral crisis is evident
given the increase in violence around the world, and one way to fight back or to feel more
secure is by not allowing the possibilities of such a threat to interfere with daily living. If
there is a disruption in one’s life, one can move forward and bring one’s life back to
contentment.
Central to a moral crisis is the rhetorical eclipse of communication that raises
disillusionment and cripples discourse. Both public and private spheres suffer in a moral
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crisis because human beings lack the ability to define boundaries and communicate
responsibly within boundaries. Arendt argued:
The social realm, where the life process has established its own public
domain, has let loose an unnatural growth, so to speak, of the natural; and
it is against this growth, not merely against society but against a constantly
growing social realm, that the private and the intimate, on the one hand,
and the political […] on the other, have proved incapable of defending
themselves. (Human Condition 47)
Arendt explains that the realm of the social has killed off the realms of the private and the
public, which are essential to human communication. As human beings negotiate their
experience in the world, they use a variety of frameworks for participating in
conversation. The public and private realms each have a different framework for
communication. If that framework is not clear or consistent, human communication may
suffer and degenerate into less genuine or less meaningful content. Therefore,
communication in the realm of the social must be approached cautiously, as meaning is
often misrepresented or misunderstood. Arendt’s communicative moral crisis is situated
in the realm of the social because the social emphasizes the achievements of progress not
human beings. The social has changed the content of the public realm “beyond
recognition” (49). The realm of the social destroys the public and private spheres.
Arendt argued that human beings no longer recognize the boundary or difference between
a public and private sphere. She proclaimed the death of the distinguishable public and
private realms by the emergence of the social realm (68).

Questioning the Rhetorical Eclipse of Philosophical Leisure

13

Like Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas has similar concerns. He addresses the
problems of a saturated private realm with public concerns. Habermas called this a
“disappearance of the private” (Structural 153). The disappearance of the private realm
occurred with the disillusionment that the interior realm intensified in scope but it
actually “shrunk to comprise the conjugal family only insofar as it constituted a
community of consumers” (156). Without demarcating the boundaries of the public and
private spheres, guidance for appropriate human communication is obscured. With this
move toward an ambiguous private realm, the private sphere weakened in authority over
the public realm and created the illusion of a perfect private sphere where leisure
activities could be the “externalization of […] the innerlife” (159). The idea of a
saturated interiority disabled the distinction between public and private life. This is
especially evident in the middle class, as leisure activities became an affordable
replacement to interior cultivation. An inability to distinguish between what is
appropriate for public and private spheres contributed to the communicative crisis
discussed in this study.
Communication situates differentiation between the rhetorical spheres of science,
aesthetics, jurisprudence, religion, and morals. This differentiation offers no common
place from which to formulate an “overarching vision of the human good” (Benhabib 75).
For example, Heidegger argued that not all people should contribute to the public sphere
(224). However, a Habermasian public sphere invites voices of all human beings
(Habermas, Theory vol. II 161; Structural, 55; Myerson 31). Habermas suggests any
moral act “must have in some way a universal character” (Theory vol. II 92). Therefore,
a moral act is not a private affair but a public or universal affair. “A thing that is good
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from a moral standpoint must be a good for everyone under the same conditions” (93).
So, Habermas’s sense of moral crisis is a public, communal occurrence.
Seyla Benhabib asserts that Jürgen Habermas’s public sphere is too ideal and
inclusive, Heidegger’s public sphere is to limiting and exclusive, and Arendt’s
incomplete doctrine of judgment and free will is too confusing (124), therefore, human
beings remain in a static state of moral crisis. These disjunctions demonstrate that
philosophers of communication have not reached an understanding for addressing this
moral crisis of a communication eclipse. This disjunction enables a dissonance in a
moral crisis precipitated by a technological saturation and a culture driven by
psychologism. The dissonance fuels this moral crisis situated within a culture of
narcissism (Lasch, Narcissism 27) and sense of “existential homelessness” (Arnett,
Existential 230). Lasch pointed to a communication eclipse in his study of the culture of
narcissism (Narcissism 239-240) and Arnett’s existential homelessness points to an even
broader communication eclipse (230).
Christopher Lasch notes the postmodern Western world continues to struggle with
discomfiting realities of “a deeper failure of morale,” a collapse of “traditional values,”
and the “emergence of self-gratification” (Minimal 23). The end of the twentieth century
was significant to the Western world because “American know-how, it appears, no longer
dominates the world” (23). Crippling productivity in the marketplace, an undermined
American enterprise, and weakened competition in the global marketplace led to a
weakened morale for human beings (24). There is a general sense of insecurity as human
beings in the Western World live their lives and encounter the other. This insecurity has
obscured the art of conversation, leaving it limp and purposeless. What seems to be
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missing in communication is the human element that nourishes the conversation and
keeps it going. This is the social relationship that Levinas considered in his discussion of
the face of the Other (Levinas, Philosophy 110).
Uncertainty and mistrust are prevalent in the human population. One’s distrust of
his/her everyday experience is fueled by rapid changes in the marketplace and/or private
realm (Arnett, Existential 230). Human beings that experience this disruption, mistrust,
or loss of narrative, can experience a psychological feeling of “homelessness” – a feeling
of no longer being able to be at home (240) or of “losing one’s common center” (Buber,
Paths 135). This “common center” (Buber, Paths 135) is essential for one to feel
connected and part of a whole, while providing an “active philosophical and practical set
of assumptions and actions that guide a people” (Arnett, Existential 231).
The person questioning life’s meaning as well as having a concern for a future
feels the loss of a “common center” (Buber, Paths 135), the veil of mistrust, the
“disembedded self” (Benhabib 152), and the lack of a place to call home3. This shift in
focus makes it difficult to have hope for one’s place in the world. The concern for a
“common center” (Buber, Paths 135), narcissistic human communicative engagement
(Lasch, Narcissism 27), and the condition of “existential homeless” (Arnett, Existential
229), all point to a problem in the world today. This problem is a test of dialogue
between human beings (Arnett, Existential 238; Arnett and Arneson 16). Even at times
of fundamental conflict between human beings, if trust is present, people can

“Home” is consistent with Michael Hyde’s definition of home as, “an abode or
dwelling place whose inhabitants ought to know, no matter how bad things become, there
still exists a haven of shelter and forgiveness” (177). Additionally, it is a place where one
should not worry about “being oneself” (177). I argue that this dwelling place can be a
structure as well as a metaphysical place of comfort and certainty.
3
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communicate (Arnett, Existential 238). Narcissism and existential homelessness are two
ways in which this moral crisis can be considered.
Existential homelessness signifies the lack of trust and uncertainty in human
communication. An individual looking toward the self for direction finds that the self
“no longer [is] adequate to meet the changes challenging stable taken-for-granted values”
(Arnett, Existential 239). Human communication can be impeded when we are over
reliant on the self, living in a world that is no longer reliable and responsive to the self.
Arnett asks, “without havens of trust to move us toward the arena of dialogue with others,
the question is what or will or can sustain the impulse or desire to be in dialogue
[conversation] with others?” (240). Engaging philosophical leisure as a guide for human
communication can redirect or point the individual to a reflective mode of
communication that moves away from the condition of existential homelessness and
narcissism.
Narcissism
The human condition of a fractured spirit 4 is one of the contributing factors
leading to a culture of narcissism. The ability for one human being to communicate with
other human beings is influenced as he/she finds one’s life imbued with uncertainty. For
many people this means an inability to engage the other as a unique moral human being
with a genuine connection to the greater sphere of others. Thus, the communicator is
superficial and responsive only to self-survival, lacking the nourishment needed to

A “fractured spirit” “harbors many ironies, contradictions, and perplexities”
(Benhabib 1) where the democratic metanarratives become themselves suspect,
producing “an intellectual climate profoundly skeptical toward moral and political ideals
of modernity, the Enlightenment, and liberal democracy” (Benhabib 2).
4
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engage idea-rich communication. This is narcissism; the result of modernity’s fractured
spirit.
A simple definition of narcissism is one who loves one’s self (Merriam 772).
Scholars develop a denser understanding of this concept. According to Christopher
Lasch, a narcissist is a person steeped within great anxiety and fear of the future while
being too crippled to move forward in a positive way (Narcissism xv). The culture of
narcissism is a response to competitive individualism and the myth of progress. The
narcissist is haunted by anxiety and an unending search for meaning in life (xvi). The
narcissist is competitive for approval but distrusts competition because competition itself
is destructive. For the narcissist, there is no interest in the past or future, rather all
concern is directed into the present. A society that creates this narcissistic culture is a
society of abandonment, where there is internal poverty and nothing to look forward to
(xvii). A narcissist constantly looks for ways to hide or return to a broken past because
he/she understands that meta-narratives no longer make sense. The narcissist’s search is
futile and he/she may not be aware of one’s own futility.
Narcissism implies a devaluation of the personal realm (Lasch, Narcissism 27).
The lack of esteem for one’s self is the hallmark of the narcissist. This inhibits one from
ethically engaging others because narcissism is also the antithesis of loving one’s
neighbor. Human beings engage narcissism as a way of survival. But this way of
survival is just as fractured as the spirit of modernity for which it is a symptom. To
continue in narcissism would be ensure one’s communicative death. One must find
alternative ways of living with the self so that one can live better with others.
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Martin Buber’s existential philosophy argued this very ideal, that in order for a
human being to live better with others, he/she must first be right with the self (Way 30).
In other words, Buber suggested that human communication cannot begin externally with
others. Rather, human communication must begin with the reflection of the self. Buber
privileged the personal/private realm as the starting place for all communicative events
because this is where reflective engagement begins. Beginning at any other point would
weaken one’s initiative and distract him/her from the communion at hand (Buber, Way
28). A narcissistic culture is the antithesis of Buber’s Way because the personal or
private realm is devalued and ignored. A narcissistic culture does not find value with the
inward reflection that Buber suggests because the individual does not find any value in
him/herself. The narcissist lives in the present focused on the self, and is unable to
see/grasp the past or the future.
The narcissist – in a perpetual state of seeking meaning – predominately finds
him/herself in the realm of the social. The social is a place where the boundaries of the
private and the public realm are blurred (Arendt 38). The social is manifest in the
narcissist’s endless effort to “either to be at home in society or to live outside altogether”
(Arendt 39). The rise of the social may be a symptom of the culture of narcissism and
part of the cause of the rise of narcissism. Much like Sisyphus, no matter how hard the
narcissist tries, the ties to the past and the hope for the future seem futile. This overemphasis on the self is one of the contributing factors that leads to the feeling of
existential homelessness, a place previously revealed in one’s nightmares, but now an
often inescapable reality for many.
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Existential Homelessness
“Existential homelessness” is a metaphor used by Ronald C. Arnett in a case for
the importance of dialogue as a form of human communication (Arnett, Existential 229).
Arnett argues that we live in an era of significant uncertainty and mistrust, which is
problematic to human dialogue (229). A foundation of trust is essential for dialogue to
happen inter homines (between people). Human dialogue has a distinctive life in the
sign, the sound, or the gesture, but in the most genuine moments human dialogue reaches
beyond the boundaries of the sign (Buber, Between 20). Genuine dialogue has trust
embedded within it. The life of dialogue is the mutuality of the “inner action” (25) [or
interaction]. The idea that trust is needed as a foundation for human communication is
consistent with the work of Christopher Lasch who argues that havens of trust have been
lost in human relationships (Lasch, Haven 178). Arnett also argues that trust is “in short
supply” (Arnett, Existential 230). Turning toward another human being in “becoming
aware” of the other (Buber, Between 27) is central to the rebuilding of trust. This
becoming awareness is the beginning of trust and the possibility of being able to
contribute to the conversation.
Christopher Lasch refers to “havens of trust” as commonplaces that are imbued
with certainty and basic interpersonal trust (Haven, 3; Arnett, Existential 230). Both
Lasch and Arnett concur that this trust is no longer present or it is an imposter, which can
cripple human communication, inhibit the art of conversation, and generate a world of
imposters – increasing the paranoia, futility, and insecurities around all human beings.
Even Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality warned of these “impostors” (109). These
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imposters, emerging out of progress, caused misery on the human race and impeded the
ability for human beings to engage communication (109).
Some of the contributing factors to this sense of “existential homelessness”
(Arnett, Existential 229) are the rapid changes we experience in society. For example,
when one approaches life in a fast-paced manner, it is often devoid of extended
reflection. This includes quickly moving from one activity to the next, obsessing over
and purchasing the most recent technology as it is introduced into society, and
dissatisfaction with gadgets we consistently purchase and replace. This lack of
appreciation is unreflective and the results can only be temporal. Usually, human beings
become bored with res (things) before the things depreciate themselves. Living in an era
that can not provide res that one can count on propels the experience of existential
homelessness. The uncertainty of res and the experience of existential homelessness are
consistent with Friedrich Nietzsche’s examination of human beings and their experience
in the world. Nietzsche’s conclusion that the world is uncertain and untrustworthy is a
prophetic description of a postmodern world.
In Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique on morality, he re-evaluates the human self, the
law, and justices which human beings encounter. He begins his critique by noting, “We
are unknown to ourselves, we knowers, we ourselves, to ourselves, and there is a good
reason for this. We have never looked for ourselves – so how are we supposed to find
ourselves?” (Genealogy 3). The human being is described as strange and confused in the
ability to find his/her place in the world (3). Nietzsche critiques the church and Christian
values and describes the priestly aristocracy as “unhealthy” (17). Existential
homelessness implies one can no longer trust in or count on the strength of tradition.
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Nietzsche’s sense of homelessness was revealed with his pronouncement “God is dead”
(Zarathustra 6, 83; Genealogy xi). In this case, the church represents tradition and
Nietzsche expressed skepticism toward the foundation of Christianity. He explained his
nihilistic position:
Today we see nothing that wants to expand, we suspect that things will
just continue to decline, getting thinner, better-natured, cleverer, more
comfortable, more mediocre, more indifferent, more Chinese, more
Christian – no doubt about it, man [woman] is getting better all the time
[…] in losing our fear of man [woman] we have also lost our love for him
[her], our respect for him [her], our hope in him [her] and even our will to
be man [woman]. The sight of man [woman] now makes us tired – what
is nihilism today if it is not that? We are tired of man [woman].
(Genealogy 27)
Friedrich Nietzsche’s perspective that human beings have caused their own suffering
shows a human being’s will to suffer. He argued that this suffering is meaningless. The
suffering itself is not bad but there is no longer meaning to anything anymore, which is
worse than the actual suffering (Genealogy 127). This suffering describes the state of
“existential homelessness” that Arnett posits (Existential 229).
Medieval scholar, Josef Pieper, argued for contemplation, happiness, and leisure
to be the basis for culture. This provides a solution to the moral disrepair in the fabric of
human existence (Pieper, Leisure 35-36). The ability to have otium (leisure) is a gift of
the human soul. Leisure can “uplift one’s spirits in festivity […] and win contact with
those super human, life-giving forces that can send us, renewed and alive again, into the
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busy world of work” (35-36). Pieper’s discussion of philosophical leisure revealed a
communication eclipse that suggested an inability for human beings to engage
conversation and move toward a more meaningful communicative experience.
“Existential homelessness” (Arnett 229) is pervasive in our human condition.
Human communication has suffered because of the lack of certainty and trust in human
relationships and society. Understanding our human condition as homelessness and
acknowledging the loss of a “common center” (Buber, Paths 135) enables us to seek
alternative approaches to everyday living. This communication eclipse can be better
understood through an analogy to Arendt’s realm of the social (49).
Communication Eclipse and an Analogy to the Social
The moral crisis that this study illuminates is a communication eclipse between
human beings. Communication eclipse means that communication is obscured – that
communication either cannot occur or that the communication that does occur is false or
inauthentic. The missing component in this communication eclipse is the element of
human interest between human beings.
A communication eclipse is the result of this loss of a “common center” (Buber,
Paths, 135). This loss is not a tangible artifact that can be precisely calculated and
compartmentalized. A communication eclipse is something that cuts to the core of what
it means to be a human being. This crisis is a threat to one’s mode of existence because it
is not a technical function but a communicative function of society. We can better
understand the danger of this moral crisis though an analogy to Arendt’s realm of the
social.
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The social is a place of ambiguity and bleeding boundaries which seem to make
human communication uncertain and confused. Thus the interlocutors become more like
‘imposters’ who spend so much time ‘posturing’ that communicative meaning can be
obstructed or impaired. The understanding of leisure in the postmodern age is like
human relationships existing in the realm of the social. Leisure is often approached as if
it were entertainment or relaxation – a brief hiccup in one’s daily existence – with no
long-term effects to the quality of one’s life.
Like the social, a misunderstood idea of leisure can result in a false sense of
satisfaction and nourishment. Reaching back to Buber’s idea that one must be morally
reflective within one’s self (inside) before engaging others (outside), we see a similar
theme. A misunderstood idea of leisure is just as dangerous to human communicative
engagement, as living in the realm of the social has to human relationships.
A misunderstood leisure activity is short-term and unable to nourish a person as a
philosophical leisure activity would nourish one’s inner self. This lack of nourishment
may disable one’s ability to be able to effectively communicate with others because of an
unreflective approach to the engagement of life. Living in the social realm also disables
one’s ability to understand one’s place in the world because the boundaries between
public and private are not visible or clear.
Hannah Arendt provides an example of the social realm in which she considers a
telephone conversation with a psychiatrist on a cellular phone in a public restaurant, the
issues of doctor/patient confidentiality may become blurred if bystanders hear the
conversation. In a court of law, the information heard by the bystander might no longer
be held private because what is discussed between a patient and doctor is typically held in
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the private realm. Once the conversation is held in a public realm the question of
confidentiality becomes ambiguous. Likewise, leisure, approached in a noncontemplative, unreflective, and erratic manner can not be considered philosophical
leisure because the soulful nourishment can not be obtained. Therefore, leisure
approached aphilosophically is akin to Arendt’s idea of the social; it most often leads to
confusion, ambiguity, or uncertainty.
The term ‘rhetorical eclipse’ seems to aptly describe most human communication
in this postmodern era. There is an overwhelming sense of ‘imposters’ engaging in
‘posturing.’ Posturing refers to an imitative communicative understanding and
presentation. Posturing can be a defensive or a deceptive mode of human
communication, or both. The idea of a rhetorical eclipse implies there exists an
obstruction to the reality of communication. This implies issues consistent with Sir
Francis Bacon’s Idols, which are empty words or overall communicative ideas that
simply happen for the sake of happening but contain no real ideas or information. As
human beings, we are fooled by these Idols – our communication is eclipsed – we are
eclipsed.
This hermeneutic inquiry next examines by definition some key terms that will
enrich and texture understanding of the communication eclipse. These terms – common
center, loss of faith, and soul – provide coherence, comprehensiveness, and thoroughness
for better understanding the communication eclipse.
Supportive Terms
To better understand the depth of this problem, the terms “common center”
(Buber, I-Thou 115), loss of faith, and soul are considered in relation to the
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communication eclipse. Martin Buber’s “common center” (115) offers the perspective of
what is missing in human communication. Considering the ‘loss of faith’ through Jean
Paul Sartre provides texture in our understanding of the contemporary state of human
communication. Finally, providing insight into how this study considers the ‘soul’ will
inform one’s understanding of the idea that philosophical leisure can be nourishment for
one’s soul and communicative abilities.
Common Center
Another way to understand the symptoms of the rhetorical eclipse is to recognize
the loss of a “common center” (Buber, I-Thou 115). Buber argued:
[T]he authentic assurance of constancy in space consists in the fact that
men’s [women’s] relations with their true Thou, the radical lines that
proceed from all points of the I to the Center, form a circle. It is not the
periphery, the community, that comes first, but the radii, the common
quality of relation with the Center. This alone guarantees the authentic
existence of the community. (I-Thou 115)
Buber’s common center is sought during times of uncertainty (Paths 129). A common
center is “never a mere attitude of mind” rather it is a feeling of an “inner disposition”
(134). Martin Buber argued that the real essence of a community is found in its common
center (135). A common center does not need to be a place or location but is a “living
togetherness, constantly renewing itself” (135).
A common center in the art of conversation is the life lived between persons
(Arnett and Arneson 129). To communicate from a common center means there is a
place of trust that can bring interlocutors together (Buber, I-Thou 115). A common
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center is embedded in a trust that allows for organic communication to happen and
endure, although finding a common center is often blurred by the temporality of the
unreflective approach to life that is often the case in a modern framework.
Common centers are often linked by moral stories that guide one’s life. Moral
stories are a necessary part of the social fabric of life because they provide human beings
with a sententia (reason – thought) for life. These common centers or moral stories
provide hope and direction for human beings who are lost in a sea of confusion and
mistrust (Arnett 232). The idea of having a finis (aim) is a basic human need (Arnett,
Existential 233; Aristotle, Ethics III.2). In our postmodern era, difference is celebrated
and the multiplicity of voices compete for an audience. The ability to find a common
center or to hear and apply the direction of moral stories to our lives becomes more
difficult and demanding. Thus, at times this leaves human beings hopelessly confused.
Arnett described this directional confusion as being similar to feudal Europe or the Soviet
Union. When the common center was removed, people were left to scramble for a
connection with something common to themselves. Ethnic groups became strictly
divided subcultures, however, without a common center that would link all groups
together, a broad sense of “existential homelessness” for all peoples emerged (Arnett,
Existential 233). Existential homelessness is grounded in a loss of common center or
moral story. A communication crisis occurs when people can no longer trust what they
hear.
The realization that one can no longer trust what one hears reveals a “fractured
spirit of modernity” (Benhabib 1) and loss of faith in the postmodern world.
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Loss of Faith
The phrase ‘loss of faith’ represents a general state of humankind that is
embedded in postmodernity’s uncertain and sometimes unfamiliar landscape. To have a
loss of faith is to feel no trust in one’s condition or place-in-the-world. A ‘loss of faith’
can be understood by considering the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Jean Paul Sartre.
Along with the “fractured spirit of modernity” (Benhabib 1), postmodernity
reveals a loss of faith and a crisis of western culture exhibited in misunderstanding and
political bankruptcy (Lasch, Culture xiii). Science, once thought to be sufficient to dispel
superstitions and provide answers to basic human questions, is no longer satisfactory to
instill faith and trust in the world.
The realization of the ‘myth of progress’ (Lasch, Haven) may have led to what
Nietzsche called “bad conscience” (Genealogy 38). “Bad conscience” is a culture of
forgetfulness, the suppressing of experience. People live through experience not to digest
it, but to aimlessly ingest it (38). This culture of bad conscience is a culture of empty
communication or human imposters that are imbued with a loss of guilt and shame in
daily human interactions (45). This failure impairs and impedes human communication
as it promotes a culture of narcissism, which is an appropriate response to the growing
despair and distrust that is now pervasive in the Western world.
Another falsehood we might experience in this loss of faith is the idea of “bad
faith” (Sartre 83). “Bad faith” happens when an individual deceives oneself by holding a
false notion of one’s self (350). An individual allows him/herself to hide from
him/herself by appropriating or accepting a false set of patterns (posturing) in daily
aspects of life (96). This aspect of engaging “bad faith” describes an individual who does
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not reflect or contemplate inward and continues to do so knowingly (92). Jean Paul
Sartre would describe the individual engaging in bad faith, as disintegrating in the heart
of their being (116).
Bad faith can be considered a consequence of this communication eclipse. Jean
Paul Sartre identifies three stages of bad faith. The first stage happens when one realizes
he/she is in a relationship with the “lived world” (Sartre 735). This world impinges upon
our options for living, which is imposing upon human beings (461). The second stage is
one’s retreat into conscious reflection. This reflection ultimately reveals to the individual
that there is no guide to help make decisions (68). The third stage in this futility is where
the individual realizes that situated within one’s self is non-being, having no guide or
options to encounter the other (321).
The reflection that Jean Paul Sartre posits is “not a subject-object dyad […] its
being does not depend on any transcendent consciousness; rather its mode of being is
precisely to be in question for itself” (323). This reflection is not the deep contemplative
play posited by philosophical leisure,5 instead it is a reflection of being that “nihilates
itself in its being and which seeks in vain to dissolve into itself as a self” (323).
Compared to Aristotle’s contemplation, Sartre’s reflection is an escape from being and
not a mode of play with ideas. With mistrust and uncertainty in the world, this escape
through bad faith is one option or alternative to being-in-the-world. Deep contemplation
cultivates the soul. Bad faith recognizes a nihilation of the soul.

Contemplation of philosophical leisure is defined thoroughly in Chapter 2. For
the purposes of this chapter, contemplation is a seeing into the soul rather than a
recognition of the nihilation of the soul.
5
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Loss of faith or having bad faith touches the soul, although, the soul of human
beings cannot be concretely considered. Yet, while we often take for granted that we do
not understand the soul in relation to human communication, the human soul permeates
the human world. The following section will consider the human soul and its relatedness
to human communication.
Soul
This author does not claim to know exactly what the soul is or where it resides.
The intention is not to provide an interpretive study of what makes up the soul. However,
this study asserts that philosophical leisure nourishes one’s soul and suggests that the
nourishment of one’s soul can help to generate the art of conversation. This study does
not assume that all readers will have the same understanding of how the term ‘soul’ is
used and what its value is to this study. Therefore, a lens that this study uses to frame the
anima (soul) will come from Aristotle, Seneca, and Julia Kristeva.
Aristotle considered the question, ‘what is the soul of man [human beings]’ in
his essay, entitled De Anima (On the Soul). He argued that the anima (soul) is one of the
most difficult things for the world to know (I. 1. 402a. 10). He suggested that the anima
is the principle of animal life (I.1. 402a. 5). He provides a sort of literature review of
writings on the anima, which considered whether the soul is divisible, whether it makes
movement or whether it is moveable (I. 1. 404a. 5, I. 1. 404a. 25). Aristotle also
considered whether the anima is harmony or spatial (I. 2. 407a. 5; I. 2. 408a. 30).
Aristotle disagreed with most of the claims about the soul that preceded his inquiry.
After refuting several lines of argument about the nature of the anima, Aristotle

Questioning the Rhetorical Eclipse of Philosophical Leisure

30

concluded that the soul is potentiality of life (II. 1. 412a. 20). Anima is the “essence” of
res (things) (II. 1. 412b. 10).
In his discussion on the anima (soul), Aristotle argued the anima is inseparable
from its body, although he indicated that some body parts do not need anima, other body
parts do (II. 1. 413a. 5). The anima, according to Aristotle, is the giver of life. His
discussion of naming or describing the anima concluded abruptly with the words, “This
must suffice as our sketch or outline determination of the nature of the soul” (II. 1. 413a.
10). Aristotle continued the conversation de animi (of the soul) specifically pertaining to
the nourishment of the soul (II. 2. 416a. 10).
Aristotle argued that food is essential for the anima because that is the only way
to “maintain being” (II. 4. 416b. 10). Aristotle maps the processual nourishment of the
soul, which includes not only what and how an anima is fed but also the idea that the
feeding helps to generate other beings (II. 4. 416b. 20-25). This generative ability is what
contributes to the art of conversation. If philosophical leisure is nourishment for the soul,
then it has the ability to generate the art of conversation and keep the conversation going.
A prolific Latin author, Seneca, contributed much to what remains of our Latin
literature. In a collection of moral essays, Seneca offers de Otio (On Leisure) and de
Tranquillitate Animi (On Tranquility of Mind), among other similar type essays. His use
of animi for mind suggests that mind and soul may be considered the same thing.
Although, many Latin words have several distinct meanings, the content of de
Tranquillitate Animi focuses on the nourishment of one’s inner mind (II. 3). Seneca
considers leisure to be secreted away from dailyness of everyday living and be devoted to
“studies” (III. 3-6). This suggests that nourishment de animi (of mind or soul) is worthy
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and helps to build society (III. 2. 6). This building of society is not a physical building,
but an aesthetic building, which is the ‘art of conversation.’
Contemporary scholar, Julia Kristeva, considers the same questions that Aristotle
pondered: what is a soul and do human beings have a soul (3). Kristeva considers
different models de animi (of mind or soul), identifying Greek, Christian, and a
psychological/Freudian model (5). Kristeva was concerned with the psychological model
of the soul, the psychic life. She argued the psychic life involves language, which allows
one to access one’s own self and others. She asserted that because of the soul, one is
capable of taking action (6). Therefore, if the soul leads to action, then the soul will need
nourishment to enable the action (7). In Kristeva’s description of the modern human
being, she argued that people are stress-ridden and eager to spend money, have fun, and
die. The problem she identified is that people are neglecting their soul. They have
neglected to provide nourishment for their souls. If the soul is nourished, the psychic life
is nourished and people would then be enabled to engage in life actions and find meaning
rather than engage in “imminent abandonment” which has replaced the interpretation of
meaning (7). Kristeva suggested that people are not taking the time to consider their
psychic life, which in her case, is how one might nourish the anima. The life that does
not take time to consider the psychic life is “artificial” and “empty” (9).
The anima (soul), whether considered to be the essence of one’s life, one’s mind,
or one’s psychic life, requires nourishment. Without nourishment human communication
can be rendered meaningless. This nourishment can be seen as the edifying philosophy of
leisure, which can help to generate human communication and save it from degenerating
into small talk. Nourishment de animi (of the soul) can contribute to conversation
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because if conversation is generated by ideas, then the possibilities of ideas will increase
and reshape into other or new ideas. Nourishment can save the art of conversation from
degenerating into false communication. Nourishment of the soul allows for the life of
conversation to evolve.
Conclusion
This chapter began with the question, “Can the rediscovery of leisure nourish the
ground of conversation?” Through a constructive hermeneutic approach, as described
earlier in this chapter, a discussion of the art of conversation and the current state of
human communication is explored. One presupposition this study engages is that
philosophical leisure can be an edifying philosophy (Rorty, Mirror 377). An edifying
philosophy differs from a systematic philosophy “to keep the conversation going rather
than to find an objective truth” (377). Leisure as an open and edifying way to engage
other human beings sees “human beings as generators of new descriptions” rather than
being confined to a set of terms in an objective fashion (378). Rorty would argue that we
can contribute to the conversation but we can not do this based on a predetermined
method. Rather, as generators of conversation we must be open to possibilities and to a
transcendent seeing that the search for an objective truth is absurd (377).
Narcissism and existential homelessness characterize a communication eclipse
within the human community. This eclipse began with industrialism and dependency on
production of the market rather than production of the home, led to the addiction to overconsumption as a way of life (Lasch, Minimal 27). Human beings now depend on the
external market for their sense of home, instead of their own abilities to forge a way of
life. The “American Dream” (Decker 79-80; Tebbel 3) can no longer support what it
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claims, as “downward mobility, social upheaval, and chronic economic, political, and
military” crises continue to deeply weaken the Western world (Lasch, Minimal 23).
These claims of crises reveal the nature of human communication in our historical
moment.
The loss of a “common center” (Buber, I-Thou 115), the veil of mistrust, the
“disembedded self” (Benhabib 152), and the lack of a place to call home, may leave an
individual questioning life’s meaning as well as having a concern for a future. This shift
in focus makes it difficult to have hope for one’s place in the world. The concern for a
“common center” (Buber, I-Thou 115), narcissistic human communicative engagement
(Lasch, Narcissism 37), and the condition of “existential homeless” (Arnett, Existential
229), all point to a problem in the world today. This problem tests the potential for
dialogue between human beings (Arnett, Existential 238; Arnett and Arneson 16). Even
in times of fundamental conflict between human beings, if trust is present, the
conversation can continue (Arnett, Existential 238). The principle of leisure has shifted
across the centuries. This shift is otium obscurum (an eclipse of leisure). The contention
of this work is that communicative trust can be rebuilt not in the existential self, rather in
the phenomenological soul. Trust can be rediscovered through a philosophical
engagement of leisure, which an individual nourishes his/her communicative spirit and
acknowledges the face of the other.
While Richard Rorty warns of epistemological approaches that set terms and
confine inquiries, this study had to set the stage by defining the problem. These
parameters are not intended to limit the discussion. This chapter situates the main
definitions so that the conversation does not become misdirected. As misinformation and

Questioning the Rhetorical Eclipse of Philosophical Leisure

34

misunderstanding are peeled away, a clearer understanding can be found and the aesthetic
can be revealed (Gadamer, Truth 472-473). The intention is to understand philosophical
leisure and to consider how leisure as an edifying philosophy can regenerate fertile
ground for conversation. This study reveals the ‘imposter leisure’ and replaces it with an
aesthetic ‘philosophical leisure’ connected to the classical understanding of what it means
otio esse (to be at leisure). The next chapter advances perspectives of aesthetics that
begin with judgments of beauty and move toward aesthetics as a social relationship – an
aesthetic co-experience. These perspectives reveal a connection between the aesthetic
activity of philosophical leisure and communicative praxis. Understanding the aesthetic
experience of philosophical leisure as communicative praxis offers one approach to
recuperate human communication.
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Chapter 2
Sententiae de Aesthetics
(Perspectives on Aesthetics)
Philosophical leisure is one hermeneutic entrance into understanding the aesthetic
experience. Examining philosophical leisure as part of aesthetic theory is important to
the engagement of communicative praxis. This chapter offers a historical overview of
aesthetics by examining the aesthetic in historical settings.
Historical Overview of Aesthetics
Aesthetic is a dynamic and multidimensional branch of philosophy. The history
of aesthetic thought can provide an amplitude of considerations from which to better
understand philosophical leisure. This overview is constructed diachronically, beginning
with the ancient world.
The Ancient World
Aesthetics have played a significant role in philosophical inquiry throughout
history. The original Greek word, aisthetikos, means “sensitive.” A reflection on the
‘beautiful’ was considered a reflection of the aesthetic in the classical world. Initially,
the aesthetic was used to designate the philosophy of the beautiful (Bosanquet 1).
Aesthetics as a reflection of the beautiful were engaged before the time of Socrates, but in
a very limited capacity. First examples of the aesthetic were depicted in the oral
tradition. For example, Homer described the shield of Achilles as being made of gold
and that it was “a marvelous piece of work!” (Homer 467). Scholars are unable to agree
whether or not this is an aesthetic judgment, but it is one of the first statements whereby
an evaluation is made regarding the appearance of an object (Beardsley 23).
35
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The history of aesthetic theory “is a narrative which traces the aesthetic
consciousness in its intellectual form of aesthetic theory, but never forgets the central
matter to be elucidated is the value of beauty for human life” (Bosanquet 2). To the
ancients, aesthetics meant beauty connected with notions of rhythm, symmetry, harmony
and unity (4). The beginning noted that aesthetic inquiry was not limited to an aesthetic
system but was contained within an aesthetic consciousness, which means it was, is, and
will be.
The first written documentation of aesthetics occur in Plato’s work (Beardsley
24). Plato spoke in “heightened language, in words that moved and dazzled, with an
inexplicable magic power” (25). This also marks the implicit transfer of aesthetics and
the beauty of an object to the beauty of language and communication. The first and most
explicit indication where Plato looked into the aesthetic is in his use of techne which
means “art” (32). In the Symposium, Socrates argued that “of anything whatever that
passes from not being into being the whole cause is composing or poetry” (204b). The
value of the aesthetic is most clear when Plato presents this dialogue:
Whoever shall be guided so far towards the mysteries of love, by
contemplating beautiful things rightly in due order, is approaching the last
grade […] beginning from these beautiful things, to mount for that
beauty’s sake ever upwards, as by a flight of steps, from one to two, and
from two to all beautiful bodies, and from practices to beautiful learnings,
so that from learnings he may come at last to that perfect learning
which is the learning solely of that beauty itself, and may know at last that
which is the perfection of beauty. There in life, and there alone […] is life
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worth living. (Symposium 211b)
Plato established that techne has a value unto itself, unlike the Egyptians who used their
objects of beauty for a utilitarian purpose. Plato extended this beauty to language in his
dialogue Gorgias. He stated that pseudo crafts or the arts of flattery are not genuine
(Gorgias 463-465). Flattery or cookery, Plato’s accusation against the sophists, makes
things look good but is deceptive and full of pretense. Language is aesthetic and words
can distinguish between cookery as ugly, and justice as beautiful (463-65).
Whether in matter (object creation) or in language (verbal creation), Plato’s
dialogues indicated that “absolute Beauty […is] not seen with the eyes but is grasped
conceptually by the mind alone (Phaedo 77e-79c). Plato also inquired into the nature of
aesthetic enjoyment by considering the relationship between the nature of pleasure and
the nature of the good. As a result, Plato placed the notion of morality within the realm
of the aesthetic as related to the common good (Philebus 51 bc). This is exemplified
clearly when he instructs the custodis (guardians) to avoid stories containing “any
suggestion of the permissibility of immoral conduct [as they] must take into account the
all-important ends and values of the whole society” (Beardsley 49). For the Greeks, art
and the aesthetic realm engaged social influence and had social responsibilities. All
citizens had the potential to be exposed to aesthetics, making the study of aesthetics
essential to the common good (Beardsley 51).
Aristotle addressed aesthetics in his Poetics and in his Metaphysics. He
distinguished three types of thought, which were “knowing (theoria), doing (praxis), and
making (poiesis) (Metaphysics VI. e.I; Topics Vi.vi). Aristotle suggested that making
something is imitation or representation. He identified two types of art, which are
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imitating visual appearances by coloring or drawing and imitating human actions through
song, verse, and dance (Poetics 223-224). Aristotle placed the aesthetic in the creation
(invention) of the imitation or representation.
Aristotle linked aesthetics to emotions. Aesthetic imitations can arouse fear and
pity in audiences (Poetics 240). In Beardsley’s consideration of Plato and Aristotle’s
aesthetics he suggested that Aristotle believed the emotions evoked from a work of art are
both painful and painless but neither impact the ability to give pleasure to the audience or
aesthetic seer (59). Aristotle placed his aesthetics in the space between the type of
thought and the reception of a listener or seer. This space concerned Plato because he
(Plato) wanted to censure things that might be morally questionable to the observer.
Aristotle disagreed with Plato. Aristotle meant even as art is morally questionable, so is
man. The art is simply representing man’s state of being. Aristotle believed man ought
to see himself and be offered the opportunity for reflection. Plato felt that all morally
questionable art ought to be removed from the sight of man (Beardsley 67).
This distinction between Plato and Aristotle suggests Aristotle found the aesthetic
to be helpful toward the attainment of morality and justice through aesthetic excellence.
Aesthetic considerations were initially shaped by the ancient polis. The paradigm shift
from secular to sacred in the medieval world pointed aesthetics in another direction. As
the metanarrative of Christianity became strengthened, its influence in the development
of aesthetic consciousness also strengthened.
The Medieval World
Medieval philosophers spent much time reflecting upon interesting things. They
did not much concern themselves with working out a theory of art, because the
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understanding was not as important to them as the artful categories they created
(Beardsley 105). For them art meant either the mechanical (servile), the liberal (trivium
and quadrivium), or the theological arts. A dominate belief in the medieval world was
that everything in the visible universe is in some way a counterpart of something
invisible. Aesthetics incorporated a symbolic meaning, which suggested that images
were representations of both the visible and the invisible (113).
The aesthetic consciousness of the medieval period evolved around the church,
formative art, and the sense of beauty (Bosanquet 120). St. Thomas Aquinas (b. 1227),
discussed the nature of beauty in his magnus opus, Summa of the Summa. Aquinas
argued that senses are the bearers of the aesthetic. “Sicut in sibi similibus” (Bosanquet
147) translated as “the senses are charmed with things duly proportioned as analogous to
themselves” (Aquinas 93). He clearly stated that beauty is derivative of God and has an
affinity to intellect (Bosanquet 147). The most explicit example of Aquinas’s aesthetics
is in the Summa when he describes the holy trinity:
Species or beauty has a likeness to the property of the Son. For beauty
includes three conditions: integrity or perfection since those things which
are impaired are by that very fact ugly; due proportion or harmony; and
lastly, brightness or clarity, whence things are called beautiful
which have a bright color. (93)
How Aquinas uses language in this passage is suggestive and rich. Beauty, for Aquinas,
was not a single common beauty for everything but it is a whole family of qualities
(Beardsley 105).
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Aesthetics are a gift from God and sometimes difficult to judge, because one
cannot explicitly recognize how aesthetics can provide a conception of a transcendent
universal (Bosanquet 150). This transcendent notion of the aesthetic was not recognized
by all but eventually moved into the realm of theoretical recognition (150). Aquinas
found the aesthetic to be divine and untouchable, yet knowable through the imagination
and through abstractions (Summa 81; Bosanquet 149).
Essential and fundamental to Aquinas’s metaphysics is unum, verum, and bonum
(one, true, and good). Aquinas added two other concepts of res (things) and aliquid
(any/some), which means some(any)thing. Aquinas argued that res and aliquid are
convertible and predictable of everything real (Aquinas, Summa 145; Beardsley 100).
Aquinas placed the aesthetic into a category of good and beauty. He argued bonum is
either befitting or useful describes the “movement of appetite” (Aquinas 93). He
continued that the aesthetic is sought after for its own sake, “it is the virtuous” (94).
Aquinas explicitly states that beauty and contemplation are based upon form and that
they are the same thing (qtd. in Beardsley 101). So Aquinas situated the aesthetic within
a transcendent realm. His perspective is more clearly related to contemplation, than his
philosophical predecessors, evidenced by the church’s influence.
Reflecting upon conceptions of aesthetics in both the ancient and the medieval
world reveals some commonalities. These reflections allow the aesthetic realm to be
partly tangible with objects and matter but also allow for a realm of abstractness.
Understanding the aesthetic as being a plurality of existence is one that will follow
through the next two historical periods. A transcendent aesthetic allows language to
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remain abstract yet tangible. The balance between abstractness and tangibility in
aesthetics becomes imbalanced in the modern world.
The Modern World
The Modern Era spans approximately between about 1500AD and the mid
twentieth century and includes the Renaissance era and the Age of Enlightenment. For
the purpose of this inquiry into aesthetics, the modern era will be limited to the
metaphysical speculation of Immanuel Kant. His theory of aesthetics is described in the
first part of Critique of Judgment. For Kant, aesthetics include three things: a natural
order, a moral order, and compatibility between the natural and the moral (Judgment 7).
Kant asserted that theoretical knowledge limits understanding (Pure 177). He suggested
that aesthetic judgment can be an alternative to theoretical judgment. Aesthetic judgment
softens the boundaries for a broader window of understanding (Bosanquet 261).
According to Immanuel Kant, the power of judgment happens in the connection
of sentential a ratio, (understanding and reason) (Judgment 38). Additionally, the power
of judgment must be reflective in nature and conform to our cognition. As a result, the
feeling of pleasure is produced (27). This pleasure moves our aesthetic judgment to bring
conformity between the perception of the object and the faculties of the subject (46).
Since there are no theoretical limits to understanding, judgment is formed out of the free
interplay between the natural and the moral order. The experience of awareness is the
result of the operation of the cognitive faculties – in free play, in the imagination, and in
the understanding, and the harmonizing of the experience (Crawford 28). Kant
considered judgment as the mind in a “free play of the imagination and the
understanding” (Judgment 64-65). Kant was able to link judgments of taste and
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judgments of pleasure as being “imputed to everyone […] as a duty” (Crawford 28).
Again for Kant, the aesthetic transcendental is the only place for reflexivity in judgment.
Immanuel Kant’s aesthetics can be divided into two distinct meanings. First,
aesthetics refers to the “science of a priori sensibility” (Pure 82). Second, the aesthetic is
the “critique of taste,” (Judgment 45). Prior to Kant’s work, the aesthetic was connected
to pleasure, often creating a solipsistic framework for understanding the aesthetical. Kant
tried to localize his aesthetic into a doctrine of sensibility (Caygill 53). This doctrine
dealt primarily with pure forms (54). Kant argued that there are two such pure forms;
sensible intuition and space and time, space being the outer form and time being the inner
sense (Pure 65-67).
The main argument in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment is that aesthetics
are not conceptual judgments about “things in the world but are reports on the relation
between an object met with in experience and a feeling of pleasure in the judging
subject” (Crawford 26). Kant claimed that judging something beautiful has been
critiqued as a judgment of taste not pleasure (Judgment 58; Crawford 27). Kant argued
against the axiom that judgments of pleasure have more to do with subjective experience
and can claim no universality. Kant suggested the principle that underlies all of
judgment, sensus communus (collective experience), is experience (Judgment 64).
Immanuel Kant’s aesthetic theory has four subdivisions or “moments.” The
moments are qualitative, quantitative, relational, and modal (Judgment v-vi). Each
moment considers judgment from different perspectives. Qualitative and relational
moments are considered grounds of aesthetic judgment. Quantitative and modal
moments are considered grounds of epistemological status (Crowther 51).
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First, discussing the qualitative moment, Kant argued that:
In order to distinguish whether anything is beautiful or not, we refer to the
representation, not by understanding to the object for cognition, but
by the imagination […] to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or pain
[… ] the judgment of taste is therefore not a judgment of cognition, and is
consequently not logical but aesthetical, by which we understand that
whose determining ground can be no longer other than subjective. (Kant,
Judgment 45)
For Kant, aesthetic taste is not concerned with the existence of an object. Rather, taste is
determined by what one makes of the representation in himself or herself (47). This is a
disinterestedness necessary for the determination of taste. “An entirely disinterested
satisfaction,” is beautiful (55). Judgment, for Kant, involved a disassociation of the
object from its context.
Second, discussing the quantitative moment, Kant argued that judgment of taste
according to quantity considers the beautiful being separate or apart from the concept.
Kant asserted, “the beautiful is that which pleases universally without […requiring] a
concept” (Judgment 55). In other words, because of the disinterested satisfaction that
comes from the non-attachment to a judgment in private conditions, “it must be regarded
as grounded on what he [she] can presuppose in every other person” (56). Because
judgment is not private, Kant notes that a disinterested judgment of taste presupposes a
universal satisfaction (59). Universal satisfaction is found in a judgment of taste – not in
a judgment of pleasure (61). A judgment of pleasure would involve a private
interestedness particular to the object and the viewer.
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Third, discussing the relational moment, Kant asserted that “beauty is the form of
the purposiveness of an object […] without any representation as a purpose” (Judgment
73). No subjective purpose can ground the judgment of taste because taste requires
disinterested satisfaction. This third moment concerns the “relation of the representative
powers to one another, so far as they are determined by the representation” (69). This
relation is determined by the feeling of pleasure that is declared in the process of the
judgment of taste. Therefore, the relational moment is nothing but a subjective purposive
consideration of the representation.
Fourth, discussing the modal moment, Kant addressed satisfaction. Aesthetic
judgment is “not an objective cognitive judgment […and] cannot be derived from definite
concepts” (Judgment 91). Aesthetic judgment cannot be apodictic but must be responsive
to the modality of human interest. In this last moment, judgment is serendipitous.
Immanuel Kant’s major points suggest “judgments of taste are a special form of
reflective judgment where in the subjective conditions of cognition (imagination and
understanding) are in a harmonious accord which is conducive to cognition” (Crowther
59). The psychological complexity of these judgments suggest that human faculties can
only recognize feeling through the pleasure the object brings about, which occurs in
formal qualities such as form or appearance of design. Finally, the pleasure generated is
disinterested in relation to the real existence of the object (59).
Kantian aesthetics involves the notion of ‘free play’ of our imagination in
response to the object (Judgment 64). This is how we organize data (Rogerson 1).
Essential to Kant’s theory is this internal reflection that allows us this ‘free play,’ later to
be addressed by Gadamer. In the end, Kant is recognized as a formalist who opposes a
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theory that emphasizes content or context of beauty, rather one must consider more
important what the object itself conveys (1).
After looking at the Ancient World, Medieval World, and the Modern World,
three conclusions can be drawn. First, the metaphysical interpretation of fine art was
initially inferior to that of reality because utility was a priority in fine art. Second,
moralistic criticism was originally confused with aesthetic or practical interest and
eventually evaporated by Kant’s time. For Kant, there was only a “trace of moralism
[that] remains in as far as the permanent value of the beautiful […] exclusively to its
representation of moral ideas and moral order” (Bosanquet 283). Third, unity and variety
in aesthetics transformed into the principles of expressiveness, characterization, and
significance. These attributes are not tangible but they reside in the transcendent realm,
allowing for rhetorical interplay and growth.
The space of the aesthetic rhetorical interplay invites human growth as
philosophical leisure enhances human interest through aesthetic free innerplay and
interplay. Innerplay and interplay is a catalyst for nourishing and developing idea-laden
conversation.
Postmodern World
The final part of this historical overview discusses Hans-Georg Gadamer and
Mikhail Bakhtin’s work with aesthetics. Both Gadamer and Bakhtin wrote during the
modern and postmodern eras. Nevertheless, their aesthetic insight foregrounds a
postmodern aesthetic.
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Hans-Georg Gadamer
Philosophical hermeneutics opens Hans-Georg Gadamer’s aesthetic theory.
Gadamer’s aesthetics are concerned with “play,” “interplay,” and “innerplay” (Truth
109). Gadamer’s aesthetics modulate to move between the author and the audience
(102). Some may argue with Gadamer and suggest that mens auctoris (authorial intent)
is important to art, however, Gadamer limited aesthetics to the task of understanding art.
In the aesthetic bridge, mens auctoris is left behind as an understanding of the art
transcends. For Gadamer, in order to not limit understanding of aesthetic, he argued
against a dictated aesthetic canon. Gadamer believed that once there is a set, established,
agreed upon canon for the study of aesthetics, the discussion of aesthetics would close
down.
Hans-Georg Gadamer suggested that the aesthetic can never clearly be
encountered. He suggested one always consider the aesthetic with a fuzzy clarity
(Hermeneutics 103). For Gadamer, the “being of the aesthetic has emerged for us as
play” (Truth 129). The aesthetic transcends of the being of play and is not the object or
subject of play. Play in the aesthetic is “independent of consciousness of those who play”
(Gadamer 102). When the player is no longer one-dimensional and task-driven one is
unaware of one’s interestedness in the act-in-itself. This is transcendence into the
aesthetic realm of consciousness. Play does not have its being in the player’s
consciousness or attitude, but on the contrary “draws him [her] into its dominion and fills
him [her] with its spirit” (Truth 109). Play, then, is a becoming of something and that
process of becoming is aesthetic for Gadamer.
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Hans-Georg Gadamer experienced the aesthetic through “aesthetic
differentiation” (Truth 135). He suggested:
we can experience every work of plastic art ‘immediately’ as itself –
i.e., without needing further meditation to us […] But inasmuch as certain
subjective conditions obtain whenever a work of sculpture is accessible,
we must obviously abstract from them if we want to experience the work
itself. (Gadamer, Truth 134-135)
Gadamer used an example of a photograph. He argued a photograph is not “tied to a
particular place but offers itself entirely by itself by virtue of the frame that encloses it”
(135). A photograph is not the actual object and you do not look at the actual object, the
photograph is removed from the object. But the photograph does represent the object,
detached from life and the particular condition that of which we would approach to it. A
photograph represents the aesthetic consciousness – the aesthetic dimension “develops
the concept of art and the artist as a way of understanding traditional structures and so
performs aesthetic differentiation” (135). The aesthetic conception of the photograph
“shows the ontological inseparability of the picture from what is represented [… and] it
distinguishes the representation as such from what is represented” (139).
Gadamer argued that “plastic art” shut down understanding and interpretation but
the “intellectual universality of language […] remains open to all kinds of imaginative
elaborations” (Truth 143). Gadamer revealed his conception of play to represent the
“proper art” (144). He argued that aesthetic consciousness (the photograph) is situational
and we cannot understand a work of art because “meaning and contents are determined
by the occasion” (144). Aesthetic consciousness is situated in the occasion, which limits
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the understanding of the picture. Aesthetic differentiation is needed to understand the art.
Gadamer noted an example that “aesthetic differentiation may judge the performance
against the inner structure of sound read in [a] score, but no one believes that reading
music the same as listening to music” (148). Aesthetic differentiation separates the art
from its occasion to offer a fuller understanding of the experience. Bakhtin’s aesthetic in
“answerability” can augment Gadamer’s aesthetic differentiation.
Mikhail Bakhtin
Bakhtin developed his aesthetic theory through a negation of traditional aesthetic
theories. Bakhtin argued that expressive aesthetics is “the outward expression of an inner
state” (Hero 62). Aesthetic value “is actualized at the moment when the contemplator
abides within the contemplated object” (63). Bakhtin said that aesthetic value cannot be
maintained from beginning to end. Bakhtin’s critique of aesthetics asserted that
expressive aesthetics cannot account for the whole of a work of art (64). Additionally, a
work of art is unable to “provide a valid foundation of form” (67). This negation of form
reduces expressive theory to pure expression.
The core of Mikhail Bakhtin’s aesthetic theory is form. He looked at language as
non-spatial (Hero 93). He suggested verbal creations do not produce “an external spatial
form for it does not operate with spatial material” (93). Unlike a painting or a vase,
verbal creations do not exist in material form. Bakhtin contends that language has an
inner spatial form that is artistically valid (94). Bakhtin argued the aesthetic object itself
is imaged through words. He added that words alone do not account for the aesthetic
value of language but that there exists an inner spatial form that is actualized through
visual representation or its equivalent, an emotional volition - a feeling-tone (94).
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Mikhail Bakhtin argued that form should aid a co-experiencing. Form does not
consummate content but expresses content (Bakhtin, Hero 67). This means that without
form there can be no expression. Bakhtin argued that expressive aesthetics places content
on the same plane with constituents, creating a form for itself as the expression of itself
(69). Thus ‘form’ is reduced to a flat expression that cannot be consummated and leads
to the destruction of the whole of the aesthetic object.
Mikhail Bakhtin sought to develop a theory of aesthetics that did not negate the
aesthetic object. For Bakhtin, aesthetic form is founded and validated from within the
other (Hero 91). Aesthetic form “is constructed on the basis of a given work of art but
does not coincide with that work, or it may be the form of the work of art itself, i.e. a
material form” (93).
Language is a verbal creation lived-in-the-world and consummated by the
aesthetic object not concrete and many-sided (Bakhtin, Hero 93). For a verbal creation to
be non-spatial, Bakhtin suggested that language does not operate like spatial material.
Rather, verbal creations have an insideness that is an inner spatial form. Bakhtin clarified
that this “visual inner form is experienced emotionally and volitionally as if it were
visually full and complete” (94). This emotional-volitional tone is the whole concrete
“once-occurrent” unity in its entirety. The emotional-volitional tone expresses the
fullness of the state of being at any given and yet to be determined moment (Bakhtin,
Toward 36). There is no isolation outside the “once-occurrent” event context of a living
consciousness, which is precisely the moment constituted by “myself-activity” in a lived
experience (36).
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Mikhail Bakhtin’s aesthetics concern itself with problems of consummation,
which is how parts shape together to make a whole (Art x). Bakhtin understood that
consummation is in the “eye of the beholder” (x). This wholeness is a creation and a
fiction and is created from a particular point of view (x). This wholeness has an aesthetic
value, whether of material form or of emotional tone.
Mikhail Bakhtin’s architectonics divides aesthetics into two types. First, “general
aesthetics,” which lay the foundation for all for all aesthetic events, and second, “special
aesthetics” that account for the distinctive qualities of the material form (Art xv). His
aesthetic has little to do with beauty, rather it deals more with concepts of isolation,
outsideness, and consummation (xv). Bakhtin’s aesthetics are more often dealing with
perceiving an object, text, or person as something fashioned into a whole.
Consummation is creative and aesthetic and can only be treated as an act of authorship
(xv).
Mikhail Bakhtin’s rhetorical theory and aesthetic theory both have a place for the
other. Bakhtin examined the role of aesthetics through the question, “what shall we make
of this gift of otherness?”(Art xix).

He described his aesthetic rhetorical theory as a first

philosophy or a moral philosophy toward the other. This obligation to the other is
manifested in Bakhtin’s work on “answerability,” which is the “actual acknowledgement
of one’s own participation in unitary Being-as-event” (40). The aesthetic occurs in this
realm of answerability, “where you exist, in the ought, your obligation of answerability
[…] the highest architectonic principle of the actual world of the performed act or deed
[…] it is the contraposition of I and other” (75).
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Being is distributed in Mikhail Bakhtin’s aesthetic. The distribution, for Bakhtin,
occurs between the “author,” the “hero,” and a “third party.” (Bakhtin, Hero 14).
Bakhtin’s author is the creator of an object or utterance. The hero is more complex than
the author and has a passive role in the aesthetic experience. An author occupies a space
outside the hero. The outsideness of the hero enables the author to concentrate on the
hero and to concentrate on the whole hero to complete an action. The author
consummates the hero and the aesthetic object, independently of the hero’s own life
(Bakhtin, Hero 14). The author is outside the hero or aesthetic object. Through aesthetic
activity in lived experience, the author creates the hero in form though utterances. The
superaddressee (discussed at length in chapter 4) is the third party that transcends
physicalness, yet is necessary for consummation of the author-hero relationship. The
author and the hero are nourished by the presence of this third party, which is God or
spirit (Bakhtin, Problem 126). This is how one can explain ‘feeling’ the presence of
another when he/she is not with you. This individual is situated in a story or narrative in
which one is consummated by the third party (126).
Mikhail Bakhtin’s aesthetics posits that the “aesthetic is found within the seeing,
it is the creation or process of the seer, within” (Art 75). Further, the aesthetic seeing that
occurs is nourished and cultivated by the third party. Consummation occurs and
sensation is driven by this very act. The whole of an experience is now larger than each
individual part.
Conclusion
Mikhail Bakhtin’s aesthetic theory considers the consummation of the form of the
work of art, the author, the viewer, the hero, and the superaddressee. Consummation of
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the aesthetic brings together an ethical responsiveness and awareness that invites the
development of human interest, considering the other. Aesthetics in a postmodern world
is significantly different from aesthetics in the ancient world. Aesthetics are dynamic and
responsive to living-in-the-world. The aesthetic historical overview suggests that
aesthetics have a vital role in human communication. Yet that role is still undefined and
often dubious. Chapter three provides an historical overview of the rhetoric of leisure
throughout historical periods. This identifies the otium obscurum (eclipse of leisure) and
describes how the human understanding of leisure modulated through time.

The chapter

follows the eclipse of philosophical leisure through a rhetorical journey that encounters
luxury, pleasure, recreation, relaxation, and entertainment. Implications for a
contemporary understanding of leisure suggest a manifestation within Hannah Arendt’s
social realm. Contemporary understanding of leisure is more akin to an aleisure
manifestation rather than a classical understanding of philosophical leisure.
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Chapter 3
Sententiae de Otio
(Perspectives on Philosophical Leisure)
This chapter traces historical perspectives on philosophical leisure6 beginning
with the Ancient World. Continuing through the Medieval Era, the Renaissance Era, the
Modern Era, and finally the Postmodern Era, this chapter identifies the otium obscurum
(eclipse of leisure) and the emergence of the communicative crisis. A discussion of the
implications for the eclipse of leisure in postmodernity follows. Consequences of the
problem of otium obscurum (the eclipse of leisure) to human communication are
discussed.
Across time there has been a divergence from philosophical leisure as posited by
Aristotle. This divergence is present in the colloquial understanding of leisure as a mere
interruption of everyday work. Philosophical leisure is long-term and nourishing to the
human soul. Otium obscurum (eclipse of leisure) is juxtaposed with relaxation and
entertainment/amusement.
Historical Overview of Philosophical Leisure
A contemporary understanding of leisure situates leisure somewhere between
entertainment and relaxation. Most of the time there is not much thought associated with
the engagement of leisure, which is often viewed as a side bar or post-script in everyday
life (Pieper, Leisure 150). This approach to the idea of leisure is symptomatic of
Arendt’s concept of the “social” sphere of society (Arendt 38). The social sphere blurs

The term ‘philosophical leisure’ is used to distinguish from a contemporary and
unreflective understanding of leisure.
6
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meaning. The engagement of activity or non-activity demonstrates a disconnect from a
philosophical understanding of leisure.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1699) once said leisure is the mother of philosophy (IV.
46). This is perhaps one reason why leisure is an open ended concept. Regardless of the
historical moment in which the thinker is situated, leisure is a concept repeatedly
encountered. The rhetoric of leisure is certainly embedded in religion, one of the
universal narratives of the Western world. Judaism, Islam, and Christianity share similar
stories in which leisure is embedded within the framework of creation, Levitical laws,
and practice. Many philosophers take time to address leisure and its significance to their
inquiry. Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Augustine, Aquinas, Salisbury, Hobbes, Bentham,
Mill, Kant, Pieper, Gadamer, Postman, and a multitude of others, have negotiated a
rhetoric of leisure. Leisure has been consistently situated as a fundamental philosophical
concept through documented time. The following sections texture this author’s
understanding of leisure through the historical time periods of the Ancient World, the
Medieval Era, the Renaissance Era, the Enlightenment Era, the Modern Era, and the
Postmodern Era.7
Ancient World
This study examines leisure through a Western perspective. Since Greek culture
is the cradle of the Western world, this study begins with Greek etymology and
philosophers. Leisure, from the Greek word, skole and from Latin word, scola, evolved
into the English word school. “The word used to designate the place where we educate

The philosophers chosen for this study were selected because they either wrote a
significant amount about leisure or their text was a seminal document from which others
began their inquiry of leisure.
7
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and teach derived from a word which means ‘leisure’” (Pieper, Leisure 20). This reveals
that leisure is not a non-activity involving no thoughtful component but is something that
involves learning – implying an organization and a sense of focus with social and cultural
benefits. Another form of the word leisure used in Roman antiquity is otium (noun - used
in ablative case, otio – at leisure). Otium has the “general meaning of being free from
action and from preoccupations that are the companions of activity,” it is the equivalent
of the quiet life (Petrarch xii). The Oxford Latin Dictionary also defines otium as being
free from action (1277-8). Additionally, the Oxford Latin Dictionary defines negotio, to
be at work or to negotiate a task (1168-1169). Otio8 is to ‘at leisure’ and neg negates the
term, meaning to be without leisure. Thus, one cannot be at work and at leisure
simultaneously. By 65 C.E. otium came to mean “a way of life leading to spiritual
enrichment,” not to be understood as rest or relaxation (Petrarch xii). Both the Greek and
the Latin understanding of leisure situate leisure as action.
Aristotle’s (384-322 B.C.E.)9 Politics discuss leisure quite thoroughly. He begins:
Nature herself, as it has often been said, requires that we should be able,
not only to work well, but to use leisure well; for as I must repeat once
again, the first principle of all action is leisure. (VIII.3.1338)
This leads to the question of what do you do when you engage in leisure? Aristotle
suggested that when one is at leisure (otio) one is not just amusing one’s self. He
continued that the action of merely amusing one’s self is the end of one’s life (Politics
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VIII.3.1338). Aristotle also argued that leisure must give one pleasure, happiness, and
enjoyment, which can only be experienced by people otio (VIII.3.1338). Like the people
whom are merely amusing themselves to death (Postman), Aristotle says that if one is
merely busy, then one cannot be otio. Therefore, Aristotle contended that in leisure our
study of form and structure is an intellectual activity. Leisure is a purposeful action with
value in its own sake, unlike things that are necessary for worldly existence
(VIII.3.1338).
Aristotle argued that mere relaxation and amusement are not good in themselves
but they are, in short, pleasant (Politics IV.1339). However, he suggested that music
“conduces virtue on the ground that it can form our minds and habituate us to true
pleasures as […] it contributes to the enjoyment of leisure and mental cultivation”
(IV.1339). So, Aristotle argued that the benefits of being otio (at leisure) are
transforming, as they enable development of good judgments in other areas of our daily
life. However, this is untrue of relaxation and amusement as these may be considered
interruptions that temporarily ease situations rather than cultivate constructive responses
to them. In his discussion on virtue, Aristotle stated “happiness is thought to depend on
leisure, for we are busy that we may have leisure” (Ethics.X.7.1177b4-6). Nothing is
gained until one is otio. Otio esse (being at leisure) occurs in contemplation, an essential
element of leisure. For Aristotle, leisure was necessary for the development of virtue and
the political life (Politics VII.9.5).
Aristotle’s application of leisure implicitly oriented his philosophical leisure to
the class of people like him, as that was his audience. In his time and through his
ideologies, a natural hierarchy existed, which divided man from man, or the intellectual
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worker from the servile worker. Aristotle supported the natural idea of slavery, which
questions whether he intended for slaves to have access to leisure, or if in light of this
inherent position in society, they were automatically excluded from engagement of
leisure. This question is certainly far more appropriate for another inquiry and will not be
addressed here.
Cicero (106 B.C.E. – 46 B.C.E.) mirrored Aristotle’s work in a collection of his
experiences entitled, Anecdotes From Roman History, in which he told a story of Publius
Scipio, the first one called Africanus, who said, “numquam se minus otiosum esse quam
quum otiosus, nec minus solum quam solus esset” (II.1.5) (he was never less at leisure
than when he was at leisure and he was never less alone than when he was alone). This
suggested the truth of contemplation is not inaction but an action of the mind – which
means Publius Scipio was never more busy than when he was at leisure and he was never
more engaged than when he was alone. Cicero concluded that while being a successful
agent for the Roman Empire, Publius Scipio also found the value of contemplation
inherent in otio esse (being at leisure), as his words resonate “quae declaret illum et in
otio de negotiis cogitare, et in solitudine secum loqui solitum, ut neque cessaret umquam.
Et interdum colloquio alteris non egeret […] otium et solitudo” (II.1.10) (to be at leisure
one is free of business and that even when conversing with others, the thing to be carried
with one is the notion of leisure and solitude). One must hold a deliberate and particular
focus of attention to be at leisure.
Another Roman author considered leisure valuable to the cultivation of human
life. Seneca’s (4 B.C.E. – 65 C.E.) moral essays (volume 2) are devoted to the idea of
leisure. In De Vita Beata (On the Happy Life), De Otio (On Leisure), De Tranquillitate
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Animi (On the Tranquility of Mind), and De Brevitate Vitae (On the Short Life), Seneca
posited his view of the good life as imbued with leisure. He suggested that even in the
early years, leisure is the ability for human beings to surrender wholly to the
contemplation of truth, to search out the art of living, and to practice this in retirement.
(On Leisure, II.1-III 1). Seneca urged human beings to not wait until retirement years to
begin to engage leisure but to make time for it during their productive working years. A
striking analogy for this exhortation involves the metaphor of sailing. Seneca suggested:
some sail the sea and endure the hardships of journeying to distant lands
for the sole reward of discovering something hidden and remote. It is this
that collects people everywhere to see sights, it is this that forces them to
pry into things that are closed, to search out the more hidden things, to
unroll the past, and to listen to the tales of the customs of barbarous tribes.
(IV. v. 2-5)
Seneca appealed to the common sailor’s desire to forge new lands and seek out the
unknown. Attending to leisure is no different than engaging in the actions of the ancient
sailor. The desire for leisure is to seek the unknown. Seneca explained the advantages of
leisure as the seeking may “pass from revealed to hidden things and discover something
more ancient than the world itself – whence yon stars came forth, what was the state of
the universe before the several elements separated to form its parts” (On Leisure IV. v. 56) and other self-reflective ideals that one can only find by a reflective seeking.
Seneca argued that the contemplative life is not devoid of action – it is action (On
Leisure IV. v.7 – vI.3). In Seneca’s discussion De Tranquillitate Animi (On Tranquility
of Mind) he considered another analogy descriptive for seeking on land, rather than on
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sea. He suggested that wide-ranging travel and wandering over remote shores
demonstrated a discontent or an inability to be satisfied (On Leisure II. 12-16).
Wandering unreflectively ultimately leaves human beings unfulfilled. Seneca suggested
that this wandering is like passing the day in “seeking the sun and in exercise and care of
the body” (II.15 – III.3). However, Seneca warned that this may lead to ambition where
“chicanery so frequently turns into wrong […] and is always sure to meet with more that
hinders than helps” (II. 15 – III.3). Seneca advocated that before this unfulfilling action
happens, that man10 can hide away and “wherever he secrets his leisure, he should be
willing to benefit the individual man and mankind by his intellect, his voice, and his
counsel” (III. 3-6). Seneca’s concern was that without the leisure time to mend one’s
mind, time would be wasted and might lead human beings toward the wrong path.
Seneca used the word anima for his reference to the mind, which is also the Latin word
for soul. This is consistent with Aristotle’s call for leisure as one way to cultivate the
human/animal soul.
The Greek and Roman roots of leisure should inform contemporary understanding
of leisure, however, a gap has transpired resulting in otium obscurum (an eclipse of
leisure). From the perspective of writers of the Ancient World, leisure is more a
reflective questioning than a time to not do work. The idea of philosophical leisure
emerges to distinguish between an early understanding of leisure and the contemporary

Up through the Renaissance period original text quotations have the original
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understanding of leisure. A review of leisure in the medieval era enriches the discussion
on the understanding of philosophical leisure.
Medieval Era
The medieval era contributes to a deeper understanding of philosophical leisure.
Relying upon Thomas Aquinas and John of Salisbury, the reflective foundation of the
action of leisure is consistent with the ancient philosophers understanding of
philosophical leisure. The Christian church guided most thought in the Medieval era.
Therefore, this section considers leisure through the lens of Christian philosopher,
Thomas Aquinas.
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 C.E.) suggested “because of the leisure that goes
with contemplation […] the divine wisdom itself […] is always at play, playing through
the whole world” (Commentary I.d.2; Pieper, Leisure 18). Leisure can play in both the
private and public spheres. Aquinas showed the contemplative aspect of leisure in the
private realm and how it manifests into the public realm as action in the world, playing in
the world and inter homines (to be among man).
Thomas Aquinas equated leisure with study, wisdom, and transformation.
Aquinas argued the contemplative life is the highest form of living non propre humana
sed superhumana (not properly human, but super human) (Aquinas, Philosophical 192).
He argued that human beings experienced leisure in taking time for study which released
them from other occupations. Essentially, Aquinas argued that people who studied the
arts and sciences did so as leisure. This kept them from work in the marketplace and
gave them great knowledge and wisdom. They would not have had this opportunity
without the leisure activity of study (10). Aquinas said this activity of leisure was
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superior to work and could lead to true wisdom (47). He suggested that leisure is a path
to virtue because of its contemplative nature. Busy-ness (business) attacks or acts
without contemplation; without contemplation virtue cannot be attained. This study
subscribes to the Aristotelian notion of virtue, the noble, the praise worthy, more simply
“that which is both desirable for its own sake and also worthy of praise; or that which is
both good and also pleasant because good” (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.9.1366.23). The
perspective of John of Salisbury offers texture to this examination of philosophical
leisure.
John of Salisbury (1163-1180 C.E.), a twelfth century Bishop, also agreed on the
importance of leisure. In his primary philosophical text, Policraticus, he discussed the
importance of letter writing to communicate ideas. He advocated that this contemplative
action of letter writing should not exist without the notion of leisure. Additionally,
Salisbury asserted without leisure in the action of letter writing there would be “death and
burial of every living man” (7). This argument is consistent with Salisbury’s concern of
the contemplative life and “man’s alienation from his true self by the ways of life found
in the higher ranks of society” (Liebeschutz 23). Whether Salisbury referred to private or
public foibles of a courtier or to the oppression of the common folk, his main concern
was for a “dangerous mode of human self-abandonment” (Salisbury 52). Salisbury
argued the only way to save man is through a path to virtue (Salisbury 54). Virtue is
Salisbury’s connection to philosophical leisure because the path to virtue can only be
tread upon through contemplation and the seeking of wisdom. For Salisbury, this path
toward virtue was through letter writing as it removed him from the daily toil of work
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with the courtiers and allowed him time for contemplation and solitude, essential for
philosophical leisure (Salisbury 7).
John of Salisbury equated idleness as the ignorance of leisure. He argued that his
letter writing transcends time as it draws people together and induces people to a
reflective virtue. Salisbury said leisure “triumphs over idleness and transmit[s] these
things to posterity” (3). His letter writing was a contemplative and a reflective action,
which he considered good for his soul, for others, and for the common good.
Thomas Aquinas and John of Salisbury understood what philosophical leisure
would provide for humanity. Grounded in Aristotle’s understanding of leisure, Salisbury
and Aquinas advocated and sought a life of leisure. This philosophical understanding of
leisure would continue through the Renaissance, however, with certain concern over the
misunderstanding of how to ‘do’ leisure.
Renaissance Era
A life without leisure is a life of idleness. Idleness is a state of being that
indicates a lack of growth. Philosophical leisure cultivates the soul and a purpose
emerges out of that cultivation. This emergence does not allow idleness to consume the
soul. This section illuminates Renaissance contribution to the understanding of
philosophical leisure, beginning with Montaigne.
In the 16th century Montaigne (1533-1592 C.E.) outlined his perspective on
leisure where he warned that human beings often do not seek leisure properly. He
pointed to an illusion where human beings “think they have left their occupations behind
when they have merely changed them” (267). People deceive themselves when they
believe they act in the engagement of leisure but in actuality they have simply
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unreflectively substituted one action for another. The result of this misperception is the
experience of a hiccup instead of a transformative experience.
Montaigne argued for leisure as part of life because evil cultivates minds without
leisure. He called for a cultivation of the human mind with solitude, the only defense
against evil (270). This cultivation in solitude is a contemplation of one’s self, “arresting
and fixing” one’s soul, which recognizes true, long-lasting benefits without any desire for
immortality or luxury (278). The turn away from solitude and contemplation can only
lead to a life of “drunkenness,” rapture of the body, exclusion of the mind (Montaigne
381). When the soul is without an aim or direction, “you are everywhere [and] you are
no where” (31). This lack of direction would be considered idleness. Montaigne’s
conception of leisure is consistent with the religious ideal of leisure addressed by
Petrarch.
During the Renaissance period, Petrarch (1304-1374 C.E.) referred to leisure as
“religious leisure” as indicated by the title of his work, De Otio Religiouso (On Religious
Leisure). Petrarch’s concerns were consistent with the perspectives of Thomas Aquinas
and John of Salisbury. In 1348, inspired by an overnight visit to a Carthusian monastery
to visit his brother, Petrarch wrote his treatise De Otio Religiouso (On Religious Leisure).
Before writing De Otio Religiouso (On Religious Leisure), Petrarch wrote De Vita
Solitaria (On Solitary Life), in which he pondered his contemplative life and his
everyday, work-a-day existence. In solitude, Petrarch studied literature and poetry while
considering fundamental questions of humanity. As early as 1200-1300 C.E.11 otium
(leisure) was beginning to break away from Aristotle’s influence. A few monks feared
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otium was mindless and wasteful because it did not produce immediate, tangible results
(an early illusion of progress) (Petrarch xiii). By the late 14th century the negative
implication of otium prevailed. Petrarch attempted to bring the sententia populus
(popular understanding) of otium back to the philosophical ideal of leisure. De Otio
Religioso was Petrarch’s attempt at a recuperative effort of leisure (xiii).
Petrarch’s ideal of otio (being at leisure) is grounded in contemplation and
reflection. He argued (consistent with this author) that “nothing” of the world is
satisfying (I.17). He posited that if human beings do not engage leisure, their ability
would be thwarted to chose the best path in life (I.17). Petrarch warned “we should say
more properly that men do not take time now, and therefore they will never have any
time at all” (I.17). Petrarch suggested that only by “taking time” can the soul become
wise (I.18).
Leisure stretches the intellect and can often seem difficult. Leisure can also be
joyous and transformative, unlike negotio (non-otium or work), that is grounded in
“carnal desires which defile and weaken our whole person from the visual lusts which
deflect us from the acquisition of knowledge” (Petrarch I.2.14). Petrarch asked the
question, “what benefit is it for a man if he should gain the whole world but suffer the
loss of his soul?” (I.2.15). For Petrarch, this question was avoided by human beings
because the soul is elevated, it is supra (above) each individual being. The resistance to
this question illuminated the nature of humanity – “swollen with temporal selfimportance and forgetful of the human condition” (I.2.16).
Petrarch distinguished leisure from entertainment and relaxation by describing
two leisures. The first leisure is “relaxed and indolent […] which weakens your minds”
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(I.7.64). The second leisure “is strong and […] religious and dutiful” (I.7. 64-65). He
exhorted human beings to manage leisure wisely and take time for it, otherwise, one risks
the human mind of becoming crowded with illusion and unsatisfied desires (I.7.65).
Petrarch described the first leisure as “evil under the sun” (II.I.82) because it
caused sweat and worry. Petrarch’s second leisure is less like direct sunlight and more
like a shade tree, a haven for recuperation, rebuilding, and transformation. Petrarch
called for human beings to “make the best of your leisure time and you will find
knowledge” (II.2.102). His requests – were a human being’s path toward salvation.
Leisure begins with contemplation and the movement away from daily tasks and
busy-ness. Petrarch argued that a human being ought to know one’s self and that when
one knows one’s self, the light illuminates the darkness, guiding one’s actions. Petrarch
was referring to the knowing of one’s ground and the ability to take action in the world
based upon that ground. As part of this self-guidance, human communication is
encountered. Petrarch would say that one’s inward reflective action is helpful for the art
of conversation because it presupposes that one already understands one’s standpoint,
which is necessary for communication between persons. This eliminates impostors or the
posturing that can cause disillusionment. Ultimately, this can guide and nourish public
communication for the common good.
False humanity cripples human communication. Francis Bacon (1561-1626 C.E.)
warned of such problems his Novum Organum. Bacon warned of Idols or illusions that
were apparent in human understanding during the Renaissance period. He argued that
these “Idols” have successfully blocked out a human being’s ability to encounter truth
(I.xxxviii).
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Francis Bacon described four Idols; Idols of the Tribe, Idols of the Cave, Idols of
the Market-place, and Idols of the Theatre (I.xxxix). An understanding of these Idols is
helpful to the understanding of a moral crisis as a communication eclipse. The “Idols of
the Tribe” refer to the human mind serving as a false mirror that distorts and discolors
information by importing its own nature to the information (I.xli). This can be seen in the
narcissist, focused on the present and unable to see the past or future, which distorts
perception and understanding. “Idols of the Cave” represent the individual as a human
being focused only on one’s self instead of the common world – again, like the narcissist,
an individual limited by one’s own pursuit. “Idols of the Market-place” have to do with
the empty meaning in words themselves. “Idols of the Theatre,” describe a
misunderstanding of philosophical grounding based upon errors in dogma (I. xliv).
Bacon warned of these idols as deceivers to humanity that will alter the horizon in which
one is situated. This is a falseness that appears unfalse yet regenerates the moral crisis.
Like the uncertainties of the hat rack that may distort or impair one’s ability to see
reality-as-it-really-is, the falseness of these Idols can misguide the actions of human
beings whom may never perceive their fate. Reasoning and human discourse is distorted
when impacted by Bacon’s Idols. Therefore, a moral crisis encounters these Idols or their
manifestation as narcissism and “existential homelessness” (Arnett 229).
Petrarch and Bacon were inspired by Aristotle, Seneca, and Aquinas, as they
foresaw a mass exodus from leisure and attempted to call back human beings to what
they saw as the right path. The divergence pointed to by Petrarch was only the
beginning. The Enlightenment period, while ushering in the Modern Era, saw the mass
exodus explode in response to the new age of science, technology, and reason.
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Enlightenment Era
The dialectical tension between leisure as a commodity and philosophical leisure
increased during the Enlightenment era. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804 C.E.) was asked the
question, “What is the Enlightenment?” His response came in the form of an essay titled,
“An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” Kant argued that the newly found
freedoms of science came with strings of responsibility for human beings. He suggested
that the “enlightenment is the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred minority”
(Kant, Works 17). Minority, for Kant, is the “inability to make use of one’s own
understanding without direction from another” (17). This minority is self-incurred,
meaning that human beings were lazy as a result of their enlightenment or new
understanding of science and progress. He argued that the responsibility should
accompany this new freedom. Kant argued that human beings did not accept the new
responsibility but did accept the new freedom (18).
The rejection of responsibility is a paradox of leisure. Enlightenment thinkers
could not have been enlightened without leisure. As a result of the enlightenment, leisure
was obscured or eclipsed behind false ideas of rest, relaxation, and entertainment.
Human beings became lazy (Kant, Works 17). This is consistent with Rousseau’s (17121778 C.E.) ideas on leisure in which he equated luxury with leisure. Rousseau critiqued
luxury as the activity of human beings who are greedy for their own comforts (151).
Rousseau argued that accumulation of luxury turned human beings into “impostors”
(151) as luxury “impoverishes everyone else and sooner or later depopulates the state”
(151). The excess of luxury creates imposters that kill the individual and can destroy the
populus through idleness of luxury.
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Immanuel Kant addressed the idea of idleness in his Lectures on Ethics. He
argued that we feel lifeless when we engage in idleness. He said that in idleness we can
feel fleetingly happy, but that happiness is short-term (160). He distinguished between
idleness and rest. Rest comes after a busy day, an interruption that can restore a mind
and body (161). These understandings represent Kant’s pietist upbringing. Kant’s focus
on active work and contribution to society was primary in his approach to life (Strathern,
Kant 11). Kant believed idleness to be contrary to work. At one point in his lectures,
Kant reduced idleness to that of laziness (Ethics 161). He discussed occupations as being
either work or play (neither being linked to idleness). Work has a purpose and play is for
its own sake (161). Kant’s approach to idleness suggested that idleness is not physically
or spiritually productive.
Immanuel Kant engaged an idea of leisure contrary to Aristotle’s representation
of leisure. Kant equated leisure with luxury. He suggested leisure can only be obtained
by those who have first met their necessities and those who have enough left over for
things they do not need (174). In a similar fashion as Veblen, although with less sarcasm,
Kant argued, “Man [Woman] becomes dependent upon a multitude of pseudo-necessities;
a time comes when he [she] can no longer procure these for himself [herself], and he
[she] becomes miserable, even to the length of taking his [her] life” (173). Kant
suggested that having leisure or luxury is mere idleness, and is sure physical or spiritual
death for those who are addicted to leisure. If one does not become addicted to leisure,
then leisure can be good or restful. At the least, leisure will not have such a negative
impact to one’s life. For Kant, an obsession for luxury is an infringement upon one’s
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morality (175). The danger that Kant focused upon suggested a certain moral, spiritual
death of any human being who has too much luxury or leisure.
Jeremy Bentham’s (1748-1832 C.E.) utilitarian philosophy was a test of the
“value of acts, and […] that acts are to be judged by their consequences – happiness or
unhappiness” (LaFleur xi). Bentham placed a value judgment on consequences (the end),
rather than the act itself. For Bentham, to be involved in busy-ness would be productive.
Bentham would be unable to quantify leisure and therefore would be tempted to equate
leisure with idleness.
Idle hands have been associated with the devil’s workshop. This is represented in
the concern that if we do not keep our children busy, that they may succumb to bad
influences (Werner 209). The argument here is that “having a vocation […] leads to
more fulfilling development of one’s social, moral, ethical, and spiritual being” (Werner
211). Idleness is more a symptom of an aleisure life. This argument presupposes that
leisure is one way of finding a vocation, which is devoid of bad influences. Philosophical
leisure is not offered here as an absolute remedy for the communication eclipse, rather it
is offered as one way to approach living that is revealed in and through communicative
praxis.
Enlightenment philosophers associated leisure with the attainment of happiness,
which in the long-run sequesters leisure from a contemplative activity (Mill, Political
Economy 758). John Stuart Mill’s (1806-1873 C.E.) Autobiography recounted his
unhappiness with a pure utilitarian framework that ultimately caused a divide (and a
breakdown) from his father’s pure utilitarian perspective. Recalling his nervous
breakdown early in his life, Mill may have been on the right track about removing oneself
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from busy-ness. The rhetoric of leisure continued to shape the growth of the marketplace
and capitalism.
In the achievement of wealth, Adam Smith (1723-1790 C.E.) asked the question
whether or not “the nation will be better or worse supplied with all the necessaries and
conveniences for which it has occasion” (Smith 1:1). Smith posited that man/woman
should not only earn what he/she needs but that if he/she wants to raise a family he/she
should earn a bit more beyond the necessity (1:76). In Smith’s critique of this overconsumption he admitted that the key for seeking a standard of living above natural
subsistence, to most men/women, was not for ‘wealth’ but for the approval of others, as
this was a sign of social status (50-52). This is similar to the conspicuous consumption
and pecuniary emulation which led to an inclusion and exclusion of classes. If you can
afford it, you are included – if you cannot afford it, you are excluded. This appearance of
wealth and inclusion did little to contribute to true happiness because people were never
satisfied (Stabile 686).
Adam Smith’s disdain for inclusion and exclusion outlined a theory of
consumption in which to address humans propensity for excessive spending and luxury.
Smith’s theory of consumption suggested that every member of society should earn at
least a subsistence wage, which is defined through the specific venues. Smith’s theory
also supported the idea that the desire to emulate or ‘keep up with the Jones’ was a
healthy attitude which inspired workers to produce. This would maintain the natural
circulation of money in the marketplace (Stabile 687). Smith believed in moderation,
taxes on luxuries, and improving the work environment for man/woman. His writing
reflected a concern for social values (687). While Smith did not approve of
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excessiveness in leisure/luxury activities, he did endorse the ability for a man/woman to
provide more than needed for his/her family so that one could engage in status-related
activities. Smith acknowledged that some people had more luxuries or leisure than others
but he did not approve of a lifestyle that endorsed this kind of conspicuous consumption.
The issue of people who did/did not engage leisure emerged during this
Enlightenment period. Inclusion and exclusion can be represented by productive
consumption and unproductive consumption. Productive consumption is a production
that produces capital; unproductive consumption does not produce capital and becomes
wasteful (Marx 1045; Rouner 46). Privileging the productive worker also identifies a
class orientation of people who do not consume to reproduce but are wasteful and
consume to consume. By the end of the Enlightenment period the marketplace began to
manipulate the idea of leisure away from a philosophical, contemplative engagement.
This digression impacted human communication in a way that would lead to a
degeneration of the art of conversation. This degeneration becomes manifest more
clearly in the Modern World.
Modern Era
The modern era witnessed a rapid growth of leisure activities embedded through
progress and technological advancements. In Thorstein Veblen’s (1857-1929 C.E.)
Theory of the Leisure Class, he distinguished between “those activities and moods that
are productive and useful and those that are ostentatious and honorific” (xiii). He
suggested that to a particular class of people, work “became irksome because of indignity
imbued to it; it had not become undignified because it was irksome” (xii). Veblen
critiqued a class of people he defined as the “leisure class” (21). He said these people
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were wasteful and flaunt their needless activity as work but it is really a waste of time
and things. One of the primary metaphors Veblen developed was that of “conspicuous
consumption” (42). The leisure class engaged in leisure for the sake of engaging in
leisure, so that others ut videant (see) the engagement of leisure (posturing). He posited
that this conspicuous consumption is a form of class superiority and exempts a class of
people from menial tasks (42). Veblen also argued that labor actually became
dishonorable (42). He critiqued this approach to life as being invidious and potentially
leading to dissent in other classes (44).
Thorstein Veblen’s understanding of leisure was associated with an elitism that
included a particular class of people who were less connected to the biological function
of work or people who needed to work for a living. This inclusion led to the immediate
exclusion of people who were not in the elite class. Veblen’s scorn for luxuries
suggested excessive consumption was simply wasteful (Stabile 685).
“Pecuniary emulation” was another pitfall Veblen identified in his critique of the
leisure class (33). The leisure class developed as a result of the growth of private
ownership, which led to an attitude of ‘keeping up with the Jones’s’ and only fueled the
disconnect between those included in the leisure class and those excluded from the
leisure class (33). Inclusion into the leisure class depended upon pecuniary privilege. To
be selected for this class would have been an honor but once initiated into it, one needed
to continue the pretense of flaunting money by spending just to spend, and to spend more
than anyone else was spending. Being a member of the leisure class required
conspicuous consumption and open only to those who had the pecuniary instruments to
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play. Consistent with Veblen, theistic scholars had the same critique of engagement of
leisure.
Josef Pieper (1904-1997 C.E.), a Medieval scholar, grounded his work in
Aristotle and Aquinas. Pieper argued that philosophers contemplate theory divorced
from the constraints of daily life. He argued that theory “can only be preserved and
realized within the sphere of leisure, and leisure, in its turn, is free because of its relation
to worship and to the cultus (cultivation of the mind/soul) (Leisure 18). The first step to
‘doing’ leisure occurs when deep contemplative thought is removed from constraints
inherent in daily life. Pieper posited that leisure is “a mental and spiritual attitude” (40).
Leisure is not simply the result of external factors, such as spare time, a holiday weekend,
or a vacation (40).
Simply put, leisure for Josef Pieper is “an attitude of the mind, a condition of the
soul” (Leisure 40). This aspect of leisure is developed in the private sphere. He warned
that if one remains preoccupied within his/her worldly realm, his/her true inner self which
is not bound or limited by worldly needs will cease to exist – extinguishing itself through
works, which are tasks married to the material realm.
Josef Pieper, writing in the United States during the post-World War II era,
claimed that most people did not want to hear about the notion of leisure. He suggested
“our hands are full and there is work for all. And surely, until our task is done and our
house is built, the only thing that matters is to strain every nerve” (Leisure 19-20). Pieper
was concerned that this preoccupation with work will be the destruction of humanity as it
will dismantle all that it builds. Human beings cannot engage in the toil of daily
existence without taking care of the soul through the contemplative nature of leisure.
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Pieper would say there needs to be plus studii ponendum est in curis animae quam in
curis corporis. Nam anima nostra est asterna; sed corpus nostrum non (more study
being put into the care of the soul than in the care of the body).
Josef Pieper was greatly influenced by Aristotle. The Aristotelian notion of
leisure signifies a distinction between artes liberals (the liberal arts) and artes serviles
(servile work) (Pieper, Leisure 21). These two notions are related in that we see the
liberal arts are connected to the notion of knowing for its own sake and the servile arts
connect knowledge to have a utility outside of itself (21). Artes liberales (liberal arts)
add value to one’s inner existence. If the inner existence is not cultivated there will be
nothing left for the outer existence. This outer existence is where the art of conversation
happens between human beings. The cultivation of the inner existence can help to
cultivate the art of conversation. Cultivation of inner existence happens through silence
and contemplation.
Josef Pieper suggested that leisure is a form of silence “the apprehension of
reality […] a receptive attitude […] a contemplative attitude […] steeping oneself in the
whole of creation” (41). Pieper did not mean tacitus (silence) in the sense of quiet but in
silentium (silence) in the sense of receptiveness, reflectiveness, or contemplative listening
with a power to answer the reality of the world (41). Silentium (silence) is a part of
leisure, as leisure is contemplative. In today’s vernacular, silentium (silence) would
imply a quietness or inward mentality, but the Latin means a state of preparedness for
something and what we do to facilitate that state. This is the opposite of work, as work is
not contemplative but active and task oriented. Silentium (silence) includes foreground
and background in the engagement of differing aspects of a phenomenological
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experience. Physical action in leisure occurs only as a by-product. In busy-ness the
driving force is of attack without contemplation. In philosophical leisure, contemplation
is the driving force or more aptly, the foreground.
Philosophical leisure can be considered an attitude of contemplative celebration.
Pieper argued that “celebration” is the very center of what leisure really means (Leisure
42). He said “leisure draws its vitality from affirmation […] it is not the same as nonactivity, nor is it identical with tranquility” (42). Rather, leisure as a celebration
“affirm[s] the basic meaningfulness of the universe and a sense of oneness with it” (43).
This celebration exhibits one’s intensity of and for life.
Philosophical leisure is not a social function, a break in one’s workday, a coffee
break, or a nap. These things are a part of a chain of utilitarian functions and cannot
refresh one’s Being. However, philosophical leisure is a much different matter, it is no
longer on the same plane or in the same realm. “Leisure […] is of a higher order than the
vita active” (Pieper, Leisure 43). The whole point of leisure is not to give human beings
a coffee break but to help human beings grasp the realization of “his [her] full
potentialities as an entity meant to reach wholeness” (44). Wholeness is what
man/woman really strives for and “is one of the fundamental powers of the human soul”
(44). In leisure, not exclusively but always, “truly human values are saved and
preserved” (44). From the theistic perspective, a human being’s soul is saved not through
work but in leisure.
Josef Pieper situated leisure in the public and the private realms. The private
realm reflects the contemplative action taken by the intellectual worker and the public
realm reflects where the individual demonstrates a value to the common good where one
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engages busy-ness. The by-product of the contemplative act demonstrates a value to the
common good, not intentionally, but organically. Therefore, leisure begins in the private
realm and as a by-product enables an action for the common good.
Hannah Arendt (1906-1975 C.E.) agreed the action of leisure occurs in both the
private and the public realms. Her writings addressed the realms of the public, the
private, and the social. For her, the public is for the vita active (active life), or “a life
devoted to public – political matters” (Arendt 12). She posited that the public is an
“active engagement of things in the world” (14). The private realm, the vitacontemplativa (contemplative life), is engaged when “freedom from the necessities of life
and compulsion by others” are not encountered (14). Arendt found value with both
spheres but considered the significance of the private sphere. She argued:
The primacy of contemplation over activity rests on the conviction that no
work of human hands can equal in beauty and truth, the physical kosmos,
which swings in itself in changeless eternity without any interference or
assistance from outside. (Arendt 15)
Arendt clarified that the “very discovery of contemplation as a human faculty” is
different from the Socratic school of thought and reasoning (16). She argued that the
public and private must “lie in an all together a different aspect of the human condition,
whose diversity is not exhausted in the various articulations of the vita active [active life]
and we may suspect, would not be exhausted” (16).
Hannah Arendt differentiates between Labour, Work, and Action. First, Arendt
described Labour as referring to the basic biological condition. For example, to breathe
is to do labour. Second, for Arendt, Work refers to worldliness – how we negotiate
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things. For example, what we do to earn a living is how we negotiate through the world.
Third, Arendt’s Action considers how we live with others (Arendt 16). For example, our
actions toward others guided by free will demonstrate how we live with others. Arendt’s
concern was one’s connection with the world. These metaphors are connected to Pieper’s
work – leisure is contemplative (private), while creating a by-product of something for
the common good (public).
Hannah Arendt’s biological understanding of labour comes with a warning. One
can survive without work and action, remaining a biological organism, but one would not
really be engaged and would be dead to the world (Arendt 176). In this case, the sole
concept of Labour is not good for the human condition. Labour, without Action and
Work is chaotic. Arendt sees the social exemplified in leisure, which is muertae homo
faber (the death of the human condition). Therefore, Arendt would see the reference to
leisure today as being merely relaxation and engagement in the social, reduced to a
biological organism, without work or action. Relaxation would be Arendt’s social, which
is dangerous because there is no transformation extended to the individual or the common
good. Arendt, writing in the middle of the 20th century, had philosophical insight to the
postmodern condition of human communication.
Postmodern Era
The postmodern era is a historical time period that follows the modern era and
represents different living in the world. Our postmodern understanding of ‘work’ covers
all of human activity, eradicating the notion for leisure leading man/woman away from
his/her contemplative mind (Pieper, Leisure 22). In postmodernity many people ‘attack’
life but do not really think about what it means to ‘do’ leisure, which first requires a
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mindful action and then contemplation, which is listening to res or rei (the essence of
things) (26). Today, this contemplative approach to res (things) is often forgotten. This
can be found in some of the popular self-help books for today’s readers. Many of these
books imply that if you attack any situation you encounter, whether work, leisure, or even
sleeping, that you should “whip” (Salmansohn 4) the situation to work for your benefit.
This self-help advice also advocates that a recess from work will help the overall work
process, yet this recess is merely changing a task, not engaging contemplation (220).
Leisure, or not work, for some self-help advocates, equates laughing, calling friend, or
reading a funny book (220). A postmodern idea of leisure is not the philosophical leisure
that Aristotle suggested. Today’s understanding of leisure is mere idleness or relaxation,
neither of which cultivates the anima (soul).
Some self-help books advocate teaching our children about leisure as “spend[ing]
their out-of-school time inventively, enjoyably, and wisely” but then “parents must seize
the opportunity to help their children choose something where they can become really
good” (Bergstrom 14). In this case, an outcome driven activity is selected for the child,
which prohibits contemplative action. As an example, in the author’s choice to practice
music, she contemplates first, the idea of practice. She does not practice for a desired
outcome primarily. She practices for the play of the notes and the interaction between the
notes in a piece of music. In philosophical leisure the outcome must be a by-product not
the intent.
A. Bartlett Giamatti, Renaissance scholar and former President of Yale
University, admits to being driven by leisure when he served as the Commissioner of
Major League baseball (Giamatti 113). Before his death in 1989, he argued that leisure is
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important and he advocated a return to the Aristotelian form. However, he failed to see
the transforming power of leisure. Giamatti believed the transformation from a leisure
activity to be temporal, like a coffee break at work, a break from toil, an intermission of
sorts. He suggested that leisure, and for him sports were his leisure, “creat[ed] a reservoir
of transformation to which we can return when we are free to do so” (15). While
Giamatti felt a shift in his mood, leisure did not truly transform him.
The absence of leisure today is cloaked in a concern over the technological
saturation in our society. Neil Postman warned of the advent of technology. Like a thief
in the night, technology has robbed our minds of the ability to think critically and make
good decisions (Postman 27). Postman claimed there is nothing wrong with
entertainment or relaxation. However, when human beings believe entertainment or
relaxation is more than it is, they are misguided and deceived. This impedes one’s ability
to effectively communicate with others. The inability to make good decisions is a result
of the lack of good information derived through the media (78). Postman claimed the
over-saturation of media and technology, the over production of information, and the
questionable quality of information available to the Western world, has rendered human
beings at a disadvantage in their ability to make good decisions and to communicate with
others (28).
One example Neil Postman provided to support his argument is the pollution of
electronic public communication. The surrounding landscape of pleasure oriented
communication, public discourse has questionable rationality (Postman 29). He argued
that today public discourse has great emotional power, which has limited benefits for the
human community. A total reliance upon the television is deceptive because it is
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orchestrated to shape one’s thoughts and directs a person to take a preferred action. Like
leisure, misconstrued as relaxation or entertainment, complete reliance on technology
provides an illusion that one can think for one’s self. The problem that Postman was
most concerned about was the idea that human beings think they ‘know’ something,
when they actually ‘know’ only what they are told (27). This renders decision-making
and most public discourse at risk of degenerating into bad decisions and small talk. Other
contemporary media scholars, such as Richard Winter, have similar concerns.
Richard Winter suggested that through over indulgences of entertainment, human
beings have acquired a “deadness of soul” (73). His work suggests that because human
beings engage entertainment rather than traditional leisure, they have become bored.
Winter argues for a closer examination of the religious quality of leisure as a way to
cultivate humanness and ultimately enable a better human condition (77). Winter argues
that boredom impairs human communication as well. Thus, if one cultivates a religious
leisure, the communicative crisis of leisure can be repaired (142).
This section reviewed leisure through a variety of philosophers from the Western
perspective, representing a diachronic engagement of the rhetoric of leisure. The next
section discusses the emergence of the otium obscurum (eclipse of leisure) and
implications for human communication and the art of conversation.
The Eclipse of Philosophical Leisure in Postmodernity
The eclipse of leisure in Postmodernity frames the communicative problem facing
human beings today. This section situates perspectives of leisure though the ideas of
philosophers in writing in Postmodernity.
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The modern era is generally agreed to have commenced with Enlightenment
thought. The early modern time period refers to the “broad period in history that
encompasses the rise of capitalism, science, and technology” (Sim 319). In the
eighteenth century, modernity was defined in opposition to a “traditional way of life,”
(320) and opposed arbitrary authority of rule and religious dogma. The Enlightenment
opened the path to modernization and by the nineteenth century, change, transformation,
and upheaval became the social norm (320). The doctrine of progress (which suggested a
linear movement toward a better end) industrial capitalism, and communism, came to
represent the modern historical time period (320).
John Herman Randall argued that the “idea of progress” came from a “spread of
reason and science among individual men [women] that the great apostles of the
Enlightenment hoped to bring about the ideal society of [hu]mankind” (381). The
metaphor of progress is more than an idea. Rather, according to Randall, the
Enlightenment was a “faith” in which human beings held destiny in their own hands and
erased what they thought was the “foolish errors” of the past – referring to religion (381).
Critics of progress, such as Christopher Lasch, argue it falsely provides the
expectation of the indefinite, or an open-ended improvement that can only happen
through human doing (Lasch, True 48). Progress does not promise an ideal society,
rather it rests on accumulation, never-ending achievements, self-perpetuating inquiry, and
certainties of scientific theory (48). Progress provides a society based on science and
unending expansion of intellectual horizons, seemingly reaching toward an unrealistic
immortality (48).

Questioning the Rhetorical Eclipse of Philosophical Leisure

82

The idea of progress is a “superstition” that has lost its grip on society (Lasch,
True 41). The recognition of a loss of progress is a collapse of utopia – leaving people to
scramble for some form of hope – yet no matter where they reach the illusion penetrates
their reality (41). Lasch discussed the idea of progress as a secular religion, referring to
progress as “a working faith of our civilization” (Dawson 1929 in Lasch, True 43).
Although progress did not originate in Christian eschatology, nevertheless, Lasch posited
that the idea of progress implies “the promise of steady improvement with no foreseeable
ending at all” (47).
The gateway year to the postmodern era, 1968, saw the assassination of Martin
Luther King, Robert F. Kennedy, student revolts, Watergate, and Vietnam, which seemed
to fracture the moral ground of America and the Western world. Benhabib describes
human communication in the postmodern era as having a “fractured spirit” (1). This
revised social reality does not destroy normative bases of human existence but it does
mean that human normative experiences are less stable (Benhabib 209). This instability,
whether real, exaggerated, or imagined, created a “mood of pessimism” and a loss of
faith in world leaders (Lasch, Narcissism xii). Distrust of the powerful elite led to a new
independence for human beings, but the capacity for individuals to help themselves was
crippled (xv). Human beings desperately seek to find the meaning of life only to find
they are unable to trust the future or the past as a guiding framework for
action/communication in a postmodern age.
Jean Francois Lyotard defined ‘modern’ as “any science that legitimates itself
with reference to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand
narrative” (xxiii). Postmodernity is a time after the modern era that is disenchanted with
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modernist thought (Benhabib 68). Lyotard pointed to this myth of modernity as he saw
temporal aspects of discourse replacing the permanent institutions of professional,
emotional, sexual, cultural, family, and political affairs. Lyotard suggested that the
institutions of the Western world that seemed all too immovable had been replaced with
uncertainty and change (66). Rorty concurred with Lyotard in the general sense that the
metanarratives of the 19th and 20th centuries had changed in the postmodern age (Rorty,
Mirror 44).
Cultural and political ideals of the “metanarratives of liberal democracies” are
questioned in the postmodern age (Rorty, Mirror 44). Postmodern thought is embedded
with skepticism and the idea that things are not what they seem to be. The historical
notion of progress is an illusion and there is no metanarrative of history on which human
beings can rely (Benhabib 69). This illusion may cause a fractured moral spirit because
it shatters the very ground upon which human beings stand.
The postmodern era is not the first time we see a critique of progress. Rousseau,
in the eighteenth century, responded to the rise of empiricism/modernity through his
claim that science would be the ruin of mankind, that progress was an illusion, and the
development of modern culture did not make human beings more happy or virtuous (25).
Rousseau argued:
[T]he progress of the human species removes man [woman] constantly
farther and farther from his [her] primitive state; the more we acquire new
knowledge, the more we deprive ourselves of the means of acquiring the
most important knowledge of all; and in a sense it is through studying man
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[woman] that we have rendered ourselves incapable of knowing him [her].
(67)
Rousseau believed human beings are naturally good but have become wicked,
melancholy, and rely too much on experiences, which has corrupted the essence of
humanity (147). This dependence on sense experience or the quest to understand humans
from ‘outside’ one’s personhood is the central point for Rousseau. He is cautious about
external foci as the mechanism keeping human beings from true contemplation and
understanding.
Philosophical leisure can nourish the phenomenological soul and yield
hermeneutic depth into communication inter homines (between human beings).
However, the way leisure is thought about today can impede this nourishment and depth,
resulting in an impaired human communicative environment. This impediment is
described in many different ways. According to Richard Butsch, leisure activities “have
become commercialized” (3). Butsch warns that there are no theoretical frameworks
from which to comprehend commercialized leisure, its development, and its implications
(6; Marrus 9). Butsch calls communication scholars to look for ways to “encourage
dialogue […and] rethink their theoretical concepts” (6). Unreflective leisure practices
have revealed social and communicative complexities. Power imbalances and issues of
social and political inclusion and exclusion have dramatically impacted human
communication. The study of leisure and its impact to the human condition is lacking
and needs to be addressed (7).
One reason why leisure has been often ignored by contemporary scholars is that
some people do not see leisure as a legitimate topic of inquiry (Marrus 1). The
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apprehension about leisure may be linked to its higher, or more important, purpose in life
(3). The emergence of leisure as a result of free thinking and cultural change invites an
understanding how leisure can create a harried class of people. A human being’s wish to
be free from authority moves one’s actions into the public eye, distorting motives,
behaviors, and expression. Leisure is no longer considered from a theistic point of view
– rather, leisure has become a secular aleisure activity (50).
The ignorance of philosophical leisure has produced a harried leisure class
(Linder 46). Approaching leisure without contemplative reflective engagement and
instead attacking it as strenuous activity, can only make the human body fatigued and in
need of rest. An interruption produces nothing other than an unsatisfying desire seeking
more rest (46).
George Cutten critiques the leisure class and suggested that the whole idea of
doing leisure is to show that you are doing leisure (5). Any activity that is engaged for
the appearance of itself is destined to be unproductive and distorts the reality of an
experience or a life. Today there is a blurring of leisure, recreation, relaxation, and
entertainment. Recreation, relaxation, and entertainment are mere interruptions in a busy
life. Leisure, however, is not an interruption but rather a structured engagement with
long-term effects, producing a transformation at some point, not intended to produce, but
nevertheless, a transformation organically occurs. The problem with recreation,
relaxation, or entertainment is that the activity is driven by an appearance or an end rather
than for the activity itself.
The idea that some people are excluded from leisure is a result of over-rapid
changes, which grew into an economic pessimism (Keynes 385). Because of this rapid
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improvement of the standard of living, there has developed a schism between people who
have leisure and people who do not have leisure. Rapid technological changes have also
contributed this schism (385). In his prediction for the future salvation of the
marketplace, Keynes argues that the West can solve the economic problem but that no
country and no people will be able to look forward to the age of leisure without an
abundance of dread (368). His inclusion and exclusion into the leisure class is articulated
through the language of the ordinary people and the language of the wealthy people.
Keynes argues that the accumulation of wealth will one day be no longer a social
advantage and that the lifestyle of the ordinary will be of a better status than wealth.
Keynes argues that the love of money will be negated and seen as disgusting (369).
Keynes assertions that the meek shall inherit the earth never fully reveal how his will
happen. Keynes seems threatened by this fast paced economy and disillusioned by the
ordinary versus the wealthy. He supports a way to balance a system that leaves some
people disconnected from the grand necessities of life.
Concepts of inclusion and exclusion in the leisure class indicate there is
something or someplace that separates people. In John Galbraith’s The Affluent Society,
he notes that production should serve a purpose for everyone, not be conspicuous for only
some (1). Galbraith argues that there really is enough to go around and we need to
considerably redistribute what we have. He finds more that society is not balanced, that
there is opulent supply for some and scarcity for others (251). Galbraith’s entire treatise
of affluence recognizes the inclusion versus exclusion of the leisure class and calls for an
elimination of this separation because the West really does have the means to redistribute.
Although his ideas are universal and grandiose, Galbraith spends less time discerning
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what social problems might arise if this redistribution actually does happen, than once it
does happen, the balance will need to be maintained. The tension between inclusion and
exclusion of a leisure class provides ground for the eclipse of communication.
Many of the marketplace representations of exclusion and inclusion of leisure are
simply the ability to buy leisure time or activities. This philosophy promotes a hedonistic
culture for the people who can afford it but not for everyone. Some people will be left
behind. This is not the idea that leisure represented to Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and
other classical thinkers. While we can deconstruct Aristotle’s natural hierarchy to
suggest that in his society there were still those included and those excluded, the fact
remains that for Aristotle the emphasis on leisure was not the fact that one could buy it,
flaunt it, and abuse it, but that one could engage in contemplative thought which will lead
to a better social action. While slaves may not (and we do not know for sure) have had
access to leisure, Aristotle lived life through contemplation. Certainly his slaves might
have seen the value in this way of life. Nevertheless, inclusion and exclusion of a leisure
class seems to have existed in all periods of thought, throughout the marketplace of
transactions. This inclusion and exclusion of a leisure class invites the rhetorical eclipse
of leisure and has shaped how leisure is defined today.
After examining leisure diachronically, this study suggests leisure has had many
faces and applications throughout the Western world. Certain themes erupt to suggest
that leisure is not toil yet it is a kind of work that is intellectual and physical. Leisure is
connected to philosophical thought (Walker 63). Leisure is connected to idleness but also
contrasted with busy-ness. Finally, there are implicit and explicit class implications
connected to leisure which divides people by social and economic lines.
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An implication of philosophical leisure to the communication eclipse is that
leisure can help to nourish the ground of conversation by nourishing the soul of humanity
(Ibrahim 9). People contribute to conversation and have the responsibility to ensure it
remains alive and growing. If people do not meet this responsibility, Rorty warns that a
degeneration of the art of conversation will occur. This would render the state of human
communication in disrepair. On the other hand, if human beings nourish their soul by
rediscovering philosophical leisure, they have already helped to shape the art of
conversation. This generation of conversation is a by-product of the philosophical
engagement of leisure. Like Richard Rorty’s edifying philosophy, engaging leisure for a
specific purpose of achievement is like engaging an epistemological inquiry, a search for
an objective truth. A philosophical engagement of leisure is more like engaging life
hermeneutically, deconstructing and reconstructing until growth happens. Philosophical
leisure warns against the rhetorical eclipse of leisure and allows for nourishment of the
ground upon which conversation can flourish.
Conclusion
Examining perspectives on leisure throughout the history of the Western world is
helpful to understanding the shifting emergences of leisure. Historical periods provide
multiple perspectives and inform how we understand leisure today. Leisure has
experienced a rhetorical shift or eclipse from original interpretations. This shift may be
considered as inevitable because of the historical unfolding of our modern and
postmodern world. Nevertheless, we can invite this approach to communication back
into humanity as one remedy to the crisis of human communication. Philosophical
leisure can enrich human interaction. An enriched experience is an aesthetic experience.
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To situate philosophical leisure as communicative praxis, this study considers the
aesthetics of philosophical leisure. Chapter four considers how the aesthetic experience
of philosophical leisure can provide the content for contributing to idea-laden
conversation. Through a consideration of the over-abundance of phatic communication
that limits ongoing idea-laden conversation, this chapter seeks a recuperative action for
ailing human communication. The works of Richard Rorty’s hermeneutics, Mikhail
Bakhtin’s aesthetic rhetorical theory, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s concept of play, and Sören
Kierkegaard’s aesthetical realm guide this discussion.
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Chapter 4
Otium: Fundus Colloquii
(Leisure: Foundation for Conversation)
Imagine that you enter a parlor. You come late. When you arrive, others
have long preceded you, and they are engaged in a heated discussion, a
discussion too heated for them to pause and tell you exactly what it is
about. In fact, the discussion had already begun long before any of them
got there, so that no one present is qualified to retrace for you all the steps
that had gone before. You listen for a while, until you decide that you
have caught the tenor of the argument; then you put in your oar. Someone
answers; you answer him [her]; another comes to your defense; another
aligns himself [herself] against you, to either the embarrassment or
gratification of your opponent, depending upon the quality of your ally's
assistance. However, the discussion is interminable. The hour grows late,
you must depart. And you do depart, with the discussion still vigorously
in progress. (Burke, Philosophy 110-111)
For Kenneth Burke, human communication is an unending or “interminable”
conversation (111). All of human communication occurs in the middle of a larger,
ongoing conversation. To be able to catch the tenor and proceed as a participant, one
must restrain from immediate interaction and listen/reflect upon what one hears. As one
listens, one is also considering and synthesizing the possibilities of engagement. Calvin
Schrag calls this “new humanism” (Praxis 197) in communicative praxis. To ethically
engage others, one must consider a fitting response; this required responsiveness is what
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makes up our moral character and our moral selves. We are obliged to enter this
conversation in a space of subjectivity (Schrag, Praxis 204). The rules of engagement for
Schrag involve transversal rationality, where three co-efficients are always at play with
each other, as one at a time emerges as the guidepost to human communication. Play is
the action of leisure in human communication. The action of play is nourished by leisure
as an edifying philosophy. This chapter first considers the state of human communication
through the lens of “maladies of the soul” in a leisureless world (Kristeva 3). This
discussion situates the problem of human communication inside the human being.
Second, this author considers contributing to conversation thought the works of Richard
Rorty, Mikhail Bakhtin, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Calvin O. Schrag. Third, the
significance of leisure to this ongoing conversation within humanity is developed by a
renewal of human interest as recuperative to the maladies of the soul.
Maladies of the Soul
Julia Kristeva opens the conversation with her concern for the human condition.
Her evaluation of the human condition is consistent with this author’s discussion of the
communication eclipse. Kristeva offers another perspective to this problem in human
communication.
“Maladies of the soul” are passions of the soul, that is, “sadness to joy and even
delirium” (Kristeva 3). Concerned over the state of human communication as
Christopher Lasch, Julia Kristeva also identifies the modern human being as a narcissist
who is “stress-ridden and eager to achieve, to spend money, have fun, and die” (7). She
argues that unreflective actions, or actions without contemplation, have an inherent
futility and have replaced contemplative actions of the soul. Without contemplative
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action, meaning is invaded by lustful pockets of illusion. The “culture of narcissism”
(Lasch 10) and sense of “existential homelessness” (Arnett, Existential 230) pervades
human beings, as well as human communication in general.
Julia Kristeva calls for a nourishment of these maladies of the soul. These
maladies thwart human communicative efforts and impede meaningful human
communication. Together with Burke’s idea that life is an ongoing communicative event
and that as human beings we are compelled to partake responsibly, Kristeva adds that we
do this through cultivation of the soul (9). She calls for a revitalized grammar and
rhetoric that will enrich those who “see” their condition. Kristeva argues that to nourish
the soul is to find meaning (9-10). This author argues that philosophical leisure is a way
to nourish the maladies of the soul.
Nourishment conversation is necessary for recuperative communication to engage
ideas. The art of “philosophical conversation” is the ability to express the content of
one’s ideas (Walker 34). Richard Rorty considers the significance of the art of
conversation to human communication. Contributing to the conversation is an infinite
exercise. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s work on play addresses Rorty exhorts. Mikhail
Bakhtin’s aesthetic rhetorical theory (ART) is employed in Gadamer’s play and we can
aesthetically ‘see’ how philosophical leisure can nourish human communication.
Understanding how leisure can help to nourish conversational ground invites a
regenerated perspective of the condition on human communication.
Phatic Communication
Kenneth Burke asserted that “only angels communicate absolutely” (Permanence
xlix). Human communication depends upon “conditions of time and place” (Burke,
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xlix). In a postmodern age the therapeutic culture of psychologism and the culture of
narcissism (Lasch, Narcissism 33) shape human communication. Communication is
often reduced to phatic encounters that are the primary genre of everyday human
communication. Phatic communication is a concept that “surfaced in semantics,
sociolinguistics, and general communication research” (Coupland, Coupland, and
Robinson 207). Phaticity suggests that a “speaker’s relational goals supercede their
commitment to factuality and instrumentality” (207). Phatic communication implies
superficiality. In other words, phatic communication is driven by emotional tendencies
and often contained within the boundaries of small talk. This exchange of small talk is
superficial and outside the I-other relationship (Bakhtin, Author 125).
Phatic communication is a “type of speech in which ties of union are created by a
mere exchange of words [… when people] aimlessly gossip” (Malinowski, Problem 315).
Phatic communication includes greetings, sociabilities, and “purposeless expressions of
preference or aversions, accounts of irrelevant happenings, [or] comments on what is
perfectly obvious” (316). Phatic conversation is not always purposeless or aimless
gossip. There is a functionality to phatic conversation, such as its use when we encounter
others in the course of our daily existence. Functional phatic communication would be
akin to Martin Buber’s I-It relationship. In the I-It encounter, one can only respond to the
other “fictitiously on the personal level – responding only in his [her] own sphere”
(Buber, I-Thou 117). We engage I-It encounters when we respond to the cashier at the
grocery story or the toll taker when driving on a toll road. We engage in small talk
conversation by utterances that would include, “Hello, how are you?” “It is a nice day
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today, isn’t it?” or simply, “Thank you and have a good day.” This phatic genre of
communication is necessary for one’s negotiation in the world.
Gossip, as posited by B. Malinowski, is purposeless. However, Jorge Bergman
identifies gossip as a genre of everyday communication (35). A communicative genre
demonstrates uniformity and can project a next step in the communicative event (27).
Gossip is chaotic and disruptive to social order (135). There are a variety of teleological
considerations inherent in the practice of gossip. Gossip aims to control social
construction, preserve social connections, provide management of information, and is a
form of social indiscretion (140-149). These considerations of the function of gossip in
human communication are viewed as negative or unethical behavior. In contrast to
Malinowki’s focus on the aimlessness of gossip, Bergman argues gossip does have an
aim, albeit, negative and sometimes ruthless.
Bronislaw Malinowski argued that phatic conversation develops in a context
similar how “savages” would use it (Problem 315). This study views phatic conversation
as a place where “acknowledgement” occurs. Michael Hyde defines acknowledgement to
be “communicative behavior that grants attention to others and thereby makes room for
them in our lives” (Life 1). Acknowledgment is “a moral act” (9). Acknowledgement
can be positive or negative. Positive acknowledgement makes people feel good because
people believe they are worthy to receive the acknowledgment of another (Hyde, Life 1).
Negative acknowledgment also creates a place for people to be noticed but does not make
people feel good. To the contrary, negative acknowledgment can make people feel bad
(2). Phatic conversation is a form of acknowledgment, positive or negative. Phaticity in
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acknowledgment allows people a superficial connection between one person and another
person.
Positive acknowledgment is a “life-giving gift” from one person to another
person. Negative acknowledgment can be a “life-draining force” in another person’s life
(Hyde, Life 2). The act of no acknowledgment is barren and cannot sustain life (2). The
distinction between acknowledgment, positive or negative, and no acknowledgment is
helpful to this discussion of phaticity. Phaticity can be either positive of negative
acknowledgment.
Like the ontological and rhetorical experience of acknowledgment, phaticity can
offer hope and creation (Hyde, Life 9). Acknowledgment announces one’s connection
with other human beings. Likewise, phaticity can make the same announcement.

An

overabundance of phaticity can also be a detriment to human communication, like no
acknowledgment. Phatic communication that becomes thoughtless, superficial, and
habituated reminds human beings of their invisibility among fellow human beings.
Long term reliance on phatic communication has negative consequences for
human communication. When ideas are not part of the conversation, the communicative
event may cease. Once human beings begin to relax and believe conversation is only one
thing, complacency sets in and the conversation becomes stagnant, settled, and taken for
granted. Phatic conversation is ‘flat’ in contrast to natural conversation, which John
Stewart notes is organic and responsive to the other (123). Good conversations are good
because of the connection between ideas and human interest.
In this historical moment, phatic conversation follows Richard Rorty’s idea that
most conversation does not continue because interactions are reduced to small talk.
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People are complacent and there is little or no attempt to contribute to idea-laden
conversation. Rorty would suggest that phatic communication cannot contribute
substantively to conversation (Mirror 371). One’s inability to contribute to conversation
risks silencing idea-laden conversation. Silence is not bad; it can and does have a
rhetorical significance in human communication. However, silence as a consequence of
phatic conversation is not functional to the development of the ideas in human
communication (Coupland, Coupland, and Robinson 211).
Richard Rorty’s concern for phaticity is that it negates ideas in human
conversation. John Laver found positive attributes of phatic communication or at least is
not as suspicious of it as Rorty (Laver 189). Phaticity has been defined as “dull and
pedestrian” (Leech 62), “empty” (Turner 212), and mere politeness (Aijmer 24). Phatic
communication becomes problematic when it becomes the normal mode of
communication. Phaticity in conversation “shows degrees of reticence or withheld
commitment to openness, seriousness, and truth. Prototypically, phatic discourse may
involve a suspension of commitment to a speaker’s own factuality” (Coupland,
Coupland, and Robinson 213). Divergent perspectives of phatic conversation suggest
that phaticity has power to shape and shift human communication.
In contrast to phatic genre of communication, small talk has been linked to
storytelling that provides information which aids in the development of rapport and
credibility between human beings (Bauman and Briggs 306-307). In this case
participants in small talk are “embodied conversational interface agents” (Bickmore and
Cassell 1). Phaticity responds to a social need for a relationship that is biologically or
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functionally necessary for existence. The function of small talk by these embodied
interface agents then remains limited to “social and task-oriented” occasions (1).
Hans-Georg Gadamer lamented about phatic communication in “Hermeneutische
Entwurf,” as “young people today grow up with very little confidence, without optimism,
and without an unqualified potential for Hope” (qtd. in Grondin 287). This lack of hope is
illuminated in the pervasiveness of phatic conversation.
Conversation is an art that is very difficult to initiate and continue (Wardhaugh
117). The difficulty is placed at the intersection of talking and acknowledging the other.
Once this connection happens, the conversation will organically move. Once the
conversation turns phatic, the conversation is at risk of its own demise (117). Human
communication risks cessation when the communicative environment is missing human
interest.
A conversation that is open and responsive to the element of human interest is a
“perfectly tuned conversation” (Tannen 19). When phaticity is less apparent
conversation comes together and settles into what participants perceive to be as a few
“moments cut off from instrumental tasks” (Goffman 14). The ability for conversation to
be distinct from instrumentality or functionality opens the communicative space for idealaden conversation. The imbalance of phatic communication is not the only threat
human communication. Self-talk can also hinder the regeneration of human
communication.
Erving Goffman argued that conversation that does not allow co-reactive human
connection is deemed unresponsive and considered “self-talk” (79-80). Self-talk as a
melting pot of impulsive, vocalized actions is an appropriate description (120). Self-talk
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happens when one person generates “full complement of two communication roles” (80).
Some cultures have taboos against talking to one’s self, which can be seen as a
perversion. Nevertheless, self-talk is not satisfactory because of the necessity to embed
conversation with the other. The inability to be embedded in conversation with the other
hinders the communicative situation and immobilizes any communicative possibility
(84).
Phaticity in conversation or solitary utterances of self-talk in interaction limits the
presence of the other. This degeneration exemplifies the contemporary state of human
communication as a communication eclipse discussed in chapter one. The human
communicative moral crisis is a crippling of authenticity in human communication where
‘false communication’ cripples public discourse. The crippling of communication
between human beings is revealed in a lack of trust that pervades human communication.
Phatic Conversation and Moral Crisis
Phaticity is pervasive in human communication. Phaticity in conversation
degenerates quality in communication. A consequence of phaticity is a communication
eclipse between people. Phatic communication has contributed to the development of
and continuance of the communication eclipse.
“Everyday conversations are pivotal to unfolding human relationships” (Step and
Finucane 93). Human beings depend on conversation as a means of connecting with
other human beings and developing of subjective “individual truths” (Change 27).
Personal truths shape how we engage the other and are essential to the ongoing
conversation.
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During the middle of the modern era, language was considered “an organism
which ‘grows’ or ‘evolves’ through definite stages and expresses the values or ‘spirit of
the nation’ which speaks it” (P. Burke 2). In a postmodern world when change is
constant and uncertainties flood the daily lives of human beings, communication is the
bridge that keeps human beings connected to each other. Without an emphasis on human
interest, crisis advances and resistance is foregrounded in human communication
(Change 28).
Ronald C. Arnett’s announcement of “existential homelessness” (Existential 229)
suggests a lack of human interest. Arnett argues that trust is a much needed foundation
for human communication. This mistrust and uncertainty has decreased the opportunity
for one human being to invite another human being into a communicative interaction
(Arnett, Existential 230). A common center can invite the opening to a conversation but
the lack of accessibility can impede a human being’s ability to participate or encounter
conversation (232).
Mistrust emerges when the loss of a common center cultivates a “haven for
emotivism” (Lasch, Narcissism 27) and a “survival impulse” (Arnett, Existential 232).
Once human beings encounter this decline in conversation, a directionless preference
inhibits communication (233). Therefore, if a human being approaches life through
emotivism and a survival impulse, the ability to turn toward the other in conversation is
obscured because the phenomenological focus of attention is on the self rather than on the
other or ideas. The condition of existential homelessness propagates a risk in the growth
of conversation because one might get hurt or be offended. This risk fuels the cycle of
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distrust and uncertainty between human beings. This continuance of distrust and
uncertainty leaves human beings conversationally impotent (Wardbaugh 3).
Narcissism, “a preoccupation with survival in the present” (Arnett, Existential
234), also does not invite potential conversation because the communicator is more
concerned with his or her present place than with the other or the idea. When this narrow
direction occurs “the common center for conversation ceases” (234). Being open to the
other perspectives, while not being in agreement with them requires trust between
participants. The lack of trust obscures the other perspective, reinforces narcissism, and
conversation ceases. The cessation of conversation impedes any rhetorical situation and
fuels the human communicative moral crisis.
Conversation that relies on phaticity is a consequence of “existential
homelessness” (Arnett, Existential 229) and a culture of narcissism (Lasch, Narcissism
27). The distrust, uncertainty, and lack of desire to acknowledge the other prohibits
conversation from regenerating in a fertile playground of ideas. Phatic conversation does
not contain or invite ground to sustain a conversation. Functional, superficial, and
sometimes unnecessary, the conversation is no longer a potentiality of ideas and cannot
harbor connections between human beings. Developing content and ideas for
conversation through leisure can provide the common ground necessary for enriched
idea-laden conversation. The next section explores how philosophical leisure enables one
to contribute to conversation.
Contributing to Conversation
Scholars writing in the modern era posited an epistemological approach to life.
This approach had preset terms or boundaries that served as guideposts. The teleological
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consideration of an epistemological framework was consistent with the modern metaphor
of progress. Rorty argued that this epistemological approach is no longer adequate in a
postmodern age. Rather, he considered an approach to life through an edifying
philosophy that does not preset terms or outcomes, but is open to growth and potentiality
in human communication. This openness enables one to contribute to the conversation
through a textured expression of ideas.
Edifying Philosophy
Richard Rorty claimed there is “pure” and “impure” philosophy of language
(Mirror 257). A pure philosophy of language considers problems in meaning and
reference but attempts to preserve the truth, meaning, necessity, and name, as fitting
together. There is no epistemological aspect to pure philosophy. Epistemology leads to
an impure philosophy of language because it attempts to provide a permanent ahistorical
framework for inquiry as a theory of knowledge (257). Rorty argues that an impure
philosophy of language does not allow for a person to play with intuitive meaning (257).
Impure philosophy of language impedes or ends the conversation because it offers no
connection between human beings. An impure philosophy does not allow or provide a
way for the conversation to be on-going. The art of conversation, for Rorty, would
engage pure philosophy of language which implicitly allows continuation of the
conversation. There is a distinct divergence in Rorty’s philosophy between hermeneutics
and epistemology. Rorty’s idea of hermeneutics:
[S]ees the relations between various discourses as those of strands in a
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possible conversation, a conversation which presupposes no disciplinary
matrix which unites the speakers, but where hope of agreement is never
lost so long as the conversation lasts. (318)
Epistemology, from Rorty’s perspective:
[s]ees the hope of agreement as a token of the existence of common
ground which, perhaps unbeknown to the speakers, unites them in a
common rationality […with] a special set of terms in which all
contributions to the conversation should be put – and to be willing to pick
up the jargon of the interlocutor rather than translating it into one’s own.
(318)
Rorty points out that for epistemology to be rational or routine, it must have a set of
“proper” terms from which one does not deviate (318). For hermeneutics to be rational
or routine, the route of inquiry is conversation (318). Conversation happens when human
beings gather together around a common theme, which is not necessarily a common goal.
This commonality keeps a creative conversation going but does not create boundaries in
which human beings must engage.
Richard Rorty sees culture as conversation “rather than a structure erected upon
foundations” (319). Culture can continue and grow but once confined within a limited
area, the possibilities or potentialities become restricted. This would serve to mute the
conversation. Rorty’s application of hermeneutics can inform our discussion of
philosophical leisure as a means to keep the conversation going. Edifying philosophy,
according to Rorty, is “the love of wisdom” (372). This love of wisdom is an “attempt to
prevent conversation from degenerating into inquiry” based on epistemology (371). An
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edifying philosophy never ends: it is always on-going and aims at continuing a
conversation rather than claiming to discover a truth and end the conversation (373).
Leisure as an edifying philosophy works the same way. Philosophical leisure keeps the
conversation going because the conversation is not an inquiry.
The action of ‘play’ is always on-going in philosophical leisure, which will not
allow a degeneration into inquiry (Rorty, Mirror 371). Philosophical leisure does not
begin with an objective goal. Philosophical leisure involves the play of ideas that
nourishes one’s soul as a by-product of the action of play. If one intentionally engages
leisure to nourish the soul, the intent destroys any possible transformation that will
nourish the soul. Human beings can disillusion themselves. Disillusionment happens
when the conversation turns into an inquiry, searching for objective truths. Like Buber’s
dialogic philosophy of the I-Thou, these moments are fleeting and unintentional, but they
occur (124). Dialogic moments are moments of genuine conversation but cannot be
contained within a predetermined framework guided by a set of terms. Buber warns that
one cannot make an I-Thou moment happen. If one tries, the event will not occur –
intentionality kills the dialogic possibility. In the same way, an intention to learn
objective truths already identified and accepted by a unifying consensus will kill the
conversational possibility. Intentionality is a self-imposed limit that can never meet
expectations because it is imposed rather than discovered. A conversation ought not be
an inquiry but a consummated discovery.
Misperceptions of philosophical leisure exist. More like an inquiry than a
conversation, people find themselves unsatisfied with their postmodern ideal of leisure.
This dissatisfaction is a consequence of the faulty approach to leisure activities, a forced
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intentionality of effect or goals that prohibit an experience of philosophical leisure.
Conversation is a play of ideas as a craft not as an epistemological game. Bakhtin’s
aesthetic rhetorical theory frames how human communication can be aesthetically and
rhetorically grounded, open to the play of philosophical leisure in human communication.
Mikhail Bakhtin’s Aesthetic Rhetorical Theory (ART)
Language is realized in the form of individual concrete utterances (oral
and written) by participants in the various areas of human activity. These
utterances reflect the specific conditions and goals of each such area not
only through their content (thematic) and linguistic style, that is the
selection of the lexical, phraseological, and grammatical resources of the
language, but above all through their compositional structure. All three
of these aspects-thematic content, style, and compositional structure-are
inseparably linked to the whole of the utterance. (Bakhtin, Problem 60)
This section briefly recounts Mikhail Bakhtin’s rhetorical theory and focuses on
the aspects of answerability and consummation, which make up the core of his dialogism.
Bakhtin’s theory is distinct from other rhetorical theorists. His dialogism is significant to
human communication because its aesthetic principle of “the ought” generates and
cultivates the ground of conversation (Bakhtin, Toward 4). Bakhtin’s dialogism shows
how one engages philosophical leisure and how philosophical leisure keeps the
conversation going.
Mikhail Bakhtin is considered one of the most important Soviet thinkers and
greatest theoretician of literature in the 20th century (Holquist, Speech ix). His thought
arose during the late formalist period, in which “[l]anguage, a socially constructed sign-
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system, is itself a material reality (Selden et al 38). Bakhtin’s rhetorical theory is not
abstract. In fact, Bakhtin argued that “verbal art can and must overcome the divorce
between abstract ‘formal’ approach and an equally abstract ‘ideological approach’
(Bakhtin, Discourse 259). He situated form and content as one social phenomenon, with
every word anticipating a reply (259). Since the placement of dialogism is the heart of
his rhetorical theory, the cornerstones of this theory are utterance, answerability,
heteroglossia, and consummation.
Utterance
Utterance is a speech act “made specifically social, historical, concrete, and
dialogized” (Bakhtin, Dialogic 433). Mikhail Bakhtin posited that each utterance is a
“living dialectical synthesis […] constantly taking place between the psyche and
ideology, between, the inner and outer” (Bakhtin, Discourse 433). In each speech act
“subjective experience perishes in the objective fact of the enunciated word-utterance,
and the enunciated word is subjectified in the act of responsive understanding in order to
generate […] a counterstatement” (Bakhtin, Dialogic 434). Each utterance is “an
unrepeatable, historically individual whole” (Bakhtin, Text 127). This means that each
complete utterance as whole can never be reproduced because utterances are related to
each other dialogically (128).
The “lack of a well-developed theory of the utterance as a unit of speech
communication leads to an imprecise distinction between the sentence and the utterance”
(Bakhtin, Problem 75). Bakhtin argued that “real-life dialogue […] is the simplest form
of speech communication” (75). He suggested that “a study of the utterance as a real unit
of speech communication will also make it possible to understand [...] the nature of
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language units (as a system)” (67). Therefore, the utterance is the key to Bakhtin’s
dialogism and a hermeneutic entrance into the cultivation of conversation.
Mikhail Bakhtin was concerned with relationships between utterances, words, and
sentences and how these relationships shape and continue dialogue. This relationship
provides for a better understanding of how to contribute to a conversation. Bakhtin
argued that “all real and integral understanding is actively responsive [...] and the speaker
himself/herself is oriented precisely toward an activity responsive understanding [...]
he/she expects response, agreement, sympathy, objection, execution” (Problem 69). This
connection of one’s utterance to the utterance of another person recognizes that this is a
complex and “organized chain of other utterances” (69). In other words, the utterance
connects to the next cornerstone of Bakhtin’s rhetorical theory, which is the notion of
answerability.
Answerability
Mikhail Bakhtin’s answerability rests on the notion of connectedness between
utterances. He stated the beginning of any utterance “is preceded by the utterances of
others, and its end is followed by the responsive utterances (or although it may be silent,
other’s active responsive understanding, or finally, a responsive action based on this
understanding)” (Problem 71). According to Bakhtin, the finalization of the “wholeness
of the utterance guarantee[s] the possibility of a response [or of a responsive
understanding], [and] is determined by three aspects (or factors) that are inseparably
linked in the organic whole of the utterance” (76). These aspects of utterance are the
semantic exhaustiveness of the theme, the speaker’s plan, and compositional form (77).
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Once these aspects are finalized there is a “capability of determining the active
responsive position” of the other, which is inherent in dialogue (82).
How does responsiveness occur? For Mikhail Bakhtin there is a third party,
referred to as the superaddressee (Text 126). This superaddressee has an “absolutely just
responsive understanding” either in a metaphysical sense or in a distant historical frame
(126). The superaddressee can be God, absolute truth, human conscience, the people,
science, or anything else. What it does is to nourish the responsiveness between the
speaker (author) and the addressee (second party). The two participants cannot fully
understand the other outside the superaddressee (126). Bakhtin’s intellectual position
depended upon the “sphere of a myth of truth and responsibility ‘above’ the concerns and
problems of historical, secular existence” (Hirschkop, Myth 581). Bakhtin aimed at truth
transcending “the fallible judgments of mortal human beings […] and at a perspective
from which every error would be forgiven” (582).
Mikhail Bakhtin argued that understanding “itself enters as a dialogic element in
the dialogic system and somehow changes its total sense” (Text 126). The author of the
utterance presupposes this higher superaddressee and can never “turn over his [her]
whole self and his [her] speech work to the complete and final will of addressees […] and
always presupposes […] some higher instancing of responsive understanding” (126).
For Bakhtin, all dialogue has this element of superaddressee which is a “constitutive
aspect of the whole utterance” (126).
Answerability implies consciousness; “for every person consciousness does not
appear as something we have and that others have in the same way we have it; it is
something which exists in two, absolutely distinct registers, consciousness is either our
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consciousness [..] or the consciousness of the others” (Hirschkop, Dialogism 585).
Answerability suggests a polyphonic conception of consciousness. We acquire
consciousness in the world differently from each other, another pointing toward
polyphony.
Heteroglossia
Mikhail Bakhtin’s rhetorical theory also includes his concept of heteroglossia.
Heteroglossia is described as “a completely new type of artistic thinking” (Bakhtin,
Dostoevsky 3). While utterances require form and responsibility, heteroglossia is that
which acknowledges multiplicity and diversity. Answerability governs the utterance, in
that it is the “base condition governing the operation of meaning in any utterance”
(Bakhtin, Dialogic 428). Within the orchestration of dialogue, these themes combine the
“totality of the world of objects and ideas […] by means of the social diversity of speech
types […] and by the differing individual voices” (Bakhtin, Discourse 263). Bakhtin
believed that this social relationship was essential for his rhetorical theory and his
aesthetics, which is why he found heteroglossia to be social rather than logical categories
of speech (Silverman 128). He argued that by keeping this a social phenomenon, it
would “have freed language from residual mentalism” (128). He described “dialogized
heteroglossia” as “always proliferate[ing] from the outside” (130). Heteroglossia was
Bakhtin’s attempt to “find a single name for variety” (Clark and Holquist 5). This was
Bakhtin’s way to look at sameness and hear differences as he “re[thought] the ways in
which heterogeneity has traditionally been assigned the appearance of unity” (5).
Heteroglossia, in musical terms, is polyphony – many voices, both individual and
collective, working together as a whole. In language terms, heteroglossia is “like mirrors
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that face each other, each reflecting in its own way a piece, a tiny corner of the world […]
more multi-leveled, containing more and varied horizons than would be available to a
single language or single mirror” (Burton 39). Bakhtin’s dialogue dwells among
heteroglossia, the backdrop to answerability between and among utterances, inter
homines (to be among human beings). Answerability is one aspect of contributing to a
conversation. Answerability cannot move in this direction without nourishment from the
superaddressee. The superaddressee is the nourishment pointed to by that Julia Kristeva ,
Josef Pieper, and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Regardless of what one calls it, the aesthetic of
human communication is how the ground for conversation becomes nourished. In
Bakhtin, the aesthetic of human communication happens in consummation.
Consummation
The aesthetic dimension of human communication concerns itself with issues of
consummation. Consummation describes how parts shape together to make a whole
(Holquist x). Wholeness is a creation and has an aesthetic value, whether of material
form or of emotional tone. Bakhtin’s aesthetic has little to do with beauty, rather it deals
more with concepts of isolation, outsideness, and consummation (Holquist xv). More
often, Bakhtin’s aesthetics deal with perceiving an object, text, or person as something
fashioned into a whole. This study considers consummation connected to philosophical
leisure and cultivating of the art of conversation. Bakhtin’s aesthetics bridge the link
between conversation and art, making conversation art, uniting rhetoric and aesthetics,
which cultivates conversation.
The idea of consummation considers the role of otherness. For Mikhail Bakhtin,
consummation is a first philosophy toward the other that drives the conversation. The
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triangulated convergence of author, hero, and the superaddressee is the consummation of
the event. It is always responsive and is never completely concretized. Consummation
invites the acknowledgement of the human element, the other.
Mikhail Bakhtin’s “aesthetic is found within the seeing, it is the creation or
process of the seer, within” (Art 75). To follow this further, the aesthetic seeing that
occurs is nourished and cultivated by the third party. Consummation occurs and
sensation is driven by the very act of aesthetics. The whole of experience and situation is
larger than each individual. Bakhtin visualizes voices, “he senses their proximity and
interaction as bodies” (Dostoevsky xxxvi). A voice is a point of view in the world and its
orientation is measured by the responses it evokes (xxxvi). This responsiveness is central
to Bakhtin’s theory of language. Responsiveness is subsumed by the presence of that
third party Bakhtin places between the participants. This consummated environment is
hardly possible in an unreflective world of accumulation and discontent. Bakhtin’s
consummation calls for a contemplative seeing focused ontologically rather than
teleologically. ‘Seeing’ calls forth the other.
Mikhail Bakhtin argued that form should aid the co-experiencing of
communication. Form does not consummate content, rather, form expresses it (Hero 67).
For consummation there needs to be a communicative nourishment. Without form there
can be no expression. Unconsummated form leads to the destruction of the whole of the
aesthetic object (Gadamer, Truth 135-140). Unconsummated form is like contemporary
misperceptions of leisure – flat, unreflective, temporal, and unsatisfying.
Mikhail Bakhtin’s rhetorical theory is also important to the ability to contribute to
a conversation. Utterance is primary because it is the object of inquiry. Intonation is
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important because for Bakhtin, intonation is how one plays at language and shapes
meaning. However, the most significant aspects of Bakhtin’s work are his ideas of
answerability and consummation, which conjoin his aesthetic/rhetorical theory. This
joining leads to the rediscovery of human interest in the ongoing conversation. Mikhail
Bakhtin’s aesthetic rhetorical theory is a playground for understanding how the ground
for conversation can be cultivated.
Play and Philosophical Leisure
Play is the action of philosophical leisure. Play is not only child’s play – or frolic
– but “the mode of being of play” (Gadamer, Truth 102). Play need not focus on the
object or outcome, rather it experimentally subjective (not objective). Subjectiveness
allows for the experience, which means all play has its own essence – independent of the
consciousness of the one who does it. Play occurs in a horizon which emphasizes the
experience of coming into being rather than the awareness of a particular object
(Gadamer, Truth 102). Play does not presuppose a spectator – it simply imagines
(Bakhtin, Author 74).
Subjectivity in play allows for a “to – and – fro” movement (Gadamer, Truth 103)
not tied to an end result but to an aesthetic consummation (Bakhtin, Author 75). The
movement of play “renews itself in constant repetition” (Gadamer, Truth 103). The actor
of the play is not important. The action of the play, its coming into being, is important as
nourishment for the soul. This nourishment is primary (104). Play is not daily work.
Play is focused on the idea of aesthetic nourishment of the soul and not physical
nourishment for the body. “The structure of play absorbs the player into itself and thus
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frees him [her] from the burden of taking initiative, which constitutes the actual strain of
existence” (105). Play is a natural process, essential for self-preservation (105, 108).
Play is the action of philosophical leisure, and includes self-presentation and self
potentiality (Gadamer, Truth 108). Play is dialogic because it takes place in between and
in response to a consummation. This in between does not necessarily refer to two
individual, rather the in between refers to ontological betweenness in the aesthetic realm.
The focus is not on a single player or the consciousness of two players, rather it is the
aesthetic place where the play “draws him [her] into its dominion and fills him [her] with
the spirit” (109). Like Bakhtin’s superaddressee that nourishes the conversation, there is
an aesthetic nourishment in the course of play that guides philosophical leisure.
Play opposes social institutionalization. Chamber music is not played to draw
consumers to buy a piece of the ‘play,’ rather, chamber music is played for the music
brought into being by the musicians/players (Gadamer, Truth 110). Like chamber music,
play as the action of leisure is not for spectators. Play as the action of leisure comes into
its being through consummation – transformation that emerges detached from the
representing activity – or objectification and consisting of the pure appearance of being
(110). This is like the “unforeseen elements of improvisation” (110). This focus of
coming into being is embedded within ergon (deed) and energia (fuel). Ergon and
energia, not the diminished seventh chord, are the structure of play.
As one plays, one learns the rules well. In understanding the rules, one has earned
the right to violate the rules. This is the serendipitous element coming into play. An
example of this would be modulation through keys that deviate from form. This play
brings into light what is otherwise constantly hidden and withdrawn (Gadamer, Truth
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112). The emergences of a philosophical leisure activity illuminate, through
contemplation and play, what is otherwise hidden (Pieper, Leisure 97). The activity of
play nourishes the soul.
Without nourishment for the soul, life is mere appearance or imitation. Therefore,
cultivation of the soul is necessary to move human communication away from these
imitators or imposters – toward an aesthetic non-differentiation where human
communication is authentic. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical play is the aesthetic
action of philosophical leisure. Aesthetic activity of philosophical play is a hermeneutic
clue to understand philosophical leisure as communicative praxis.
Aesthetics and Hermeneutics in Communication
The intersection of aesthetics and hermeneutics provides understanding of how
philosophical leisure can shape human communication. By enriching one’s ability to
engage conversation, the aesthetic activity of philosophical leisure invites interpretive
action of human interaction. This section will consider this intersection through a
discussion involving Kierkegaard and Gadamer.
Sören Kierkegaard’s Hermeneutics and Aesthetics
Sören Kierkegaard has often been disregarded as a philosopher (Strathern,
Kierkegaard 7). Kierkegaard questioned what it means to be alive (55). He wrote about
how human beings get along in the daily-ness of living, choosing, and being-in-theworld. Kierkegaard.
Three cornerstones of Sören Kierkegaard’s philosophy are helpful in considering
how philosophical leisure contributes to communication through aesthetic activity. The
aesthetical, the ethical, and the religious are central ideas in his thought (Either/Or 97).

Questioning the Rhetorical Eclipse of Philosophical Leisure

114

Kierkegaard’s distinction between the aesthetical and the ethical provides a framework
for considering how leisure can be situated as aesthetic activity. Kierkegaard’s work is
helpful to the understanding of philosophical leisure as aesthetic activity. But
Kierkegaard’s attitude toward the aesthetical might oppose the argument of this study.
Nevertheless, his understanding of the aesthetical provides a hermeneutic opening for this
study that announces the embeddedness of philosophical leisure in aesthetic activity and
communicative praxis.
The “aesthetical” was detestable to Sören Kierkegaard (Either/Or 83). The
aesthetical was equated to interruptions in the daily-ness of everyday living. Kierkegaard
connected the aesthetical with the biological, sensory, lowest form of living, because he
saw it as fulfilling the lowest levels of human physical needs (22, 24). The aesthetical
reduces action to a biological function. Kierkegaard warned the aesthetical could be a
trap for idleness (24). Kierkegaard tolerated this realm because he considered the
“aesthetical” as the place where one finds ground for interaction in the “ethical” (22).
Sören Kierkegaard pointed to two ways of seeing aesthetical. The first way of
seeing aesthetics is connected to the place of boredom, which can lead to evil actions.
The second way of seeing aesthetics as connected to the place of amusement, which can
lead to the play of thought (Either/Or 22). In the case of the latter, the aesthetical can
lead to a play of one’s thoughts, which leads to “rotation” (a change of field) or
cultivation of one’s mind that can provide fertile ground for one’s inventions or thoughts
(25). Conversational ground, regardless of fertility, is useless unless one moves to the
next level, the ethical, where human action occurs.
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The ethical is a place one takes action. Human action is a willing volition, which
ought to have a struggle otherwise there is no true volition (Kierkegaard, Either/Or 58).
Human action should involve an aesthetical consideration of ideas that play with
opposing tensions. Otherwise, for Sören Kierkegaard, there is no value to the action
taken. In philosophical leisure, as one engages the play of ideas ground, is cultivated,
unintentionally because the focus of attention is on the ideas. As a result, the ground on
which the human being rests is enriched. This rotation is enriched by philosophical
leisure can enhance human conversation, thus providing a place for ideas to emerge and
develop.
Sören Kierkegaard’s three realms are helpful in a discussion of philosophical
leisure as an aesthetic activity because leisure, according to Aristotle and others,
cultivates one’s mind, which enables one to contribute through conversation to the good
of the community. Leisure allows for the free play that Immanuel Kant and Kierkegaard
argue is needed to use reason or to make decisions. Philosophical leisure does not focus
on the specific decision at hand, rather it develops one’s ability to interpret and
understand the world. Complimented by Hans-Georg Gadamer, this study offers another
way of understanding aesthetics and hermeneutics of philosophical leisure.
Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics in Communication
Hans-Georg Gadamer posited that the “work of art […] speaks to most of us
directly” (Philosophical 95). Gadamer suggested that art is a form of “Absolute Spirit”
(95). This directness involves a familiarity between the work of art and the beholder of
the art. The work of art is an expression of truth of itself, instead of creator (95). The
encounter with art belongs within an integration of human life and tradition (96).
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Hermeneutically, the work of art communicates itself. In short, a ‘timeless present’
interpretation of the work of art and philosophical hermeneutics does not intend to be
understood historically but offers an absolute presence (96). The absolute presence does
not allow for comprehension, rather, it is open to possibilities for comprehension (96). If
there is one prescribed understanding or one set of text with which to gain understanding,
conversation will shut down. Because of this ongoing openness, the intersection of
aesthetics and hermeneutics occur in a space of subjectivity as communicative praxis.
Aesthetic play affords an opportunity to cultivate one’s soul (Gadamer, Truth
140). Philosophical leisure is the play that occurs in the aesthetic of human
communication. A life without leisure is all ‘work’ and Gadamer would see this as a life
of “plastic arts” (34). Gadamer argues that human beings can overcome the trap of
plastic arts through aesthetic differentiation by engaging in philosophical play (134).
Play is the aesthetic activity that removes subjectivity from the ontological understanding
of a thing, or in this case, of leisure. Philosophical leisure is important to Gadamer’s
theory of aesthetics because leisure is play removed from subjectivity. Philosophical
leisure is an intellectual activity that moves toward interhuman communication. The
movement shaped by aesthetic differentiation is more significant to interpretation than
aesthetic consciousness. Understanding philosophical leisure as an aesthetic activity can
counteract the misconceptions held by persons who consider leisure to be recreation or
entertainment. Philosophical leisure as an aesthetic activity allows for the possibilities of
communicative praxis. Unlike recreation and entertainment, which are merely social
practices, philosophical leisure is the aesthetic dimension of human communication.
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Conclusion
Sören Kierkegaard and Hans-Georg Gadamer each offer a distinct way of
thinking about aesthetic activity as it occurs in communicative praxis. Kierkegaard
separates the realms of contemplation (aesthetical) and action (ethical), yet these realms
are not mutually exclusive. They require each other to engage in ethical human
communication. Philosophical leisure occurs in the aesthetical realm for Kierkegaard.
Engagement of philosophical leisure would be one way for Kierkegaard to find the
ground for which to take an ethical action in his ethical realm. Gadamer offers an
aesthetic action of philosophical leisure through aesthetic play, similar to the play in
Kierkegaard’s aesthetical realm. Gadamer’s aesthetic differentiation is the hermeneutic
opening that occurs in the play of philosophical leisure. An inquiry about the relationship
between aesthetics and hermeneutics leads this study to the final chapter that argues the
aesthetic activity of philosophical leisure is an application of communication praxis.
Additionally, Calvin Schrag’s work with communicative praxis is considered through an
examination of transversal rationality and new humanism. Communicative praxis
reintroduces the significance of the relationship with the philosophical other. An
example of philosophical leisure is offered through a discussion of music in the southern
black communities before and during the civil rights movement of the mid-twentieth
century in the United States. Implications of philosophical leisure are considered through
concepts of rhetorical interruption and the distinction between spectator and participant.
Lastly, a set of metaphorical maps are offered that summarize this work and point
communication scholarship in a new direction.
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Chapter 5
Aesthetic Experience of Philosophical Leisure and Implications for
Communicative Praxis
This study has considered how philosophical leisure enriches human
communication. This chapter first situates philosophical leisure as aesthetic experience
of communicative praxis. Second, the relationship between communicative praxis and
the philosophical other is discussed. Third, an example of music in the southern black
communities, during the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s, portrays
philosophical leisure as an aesthetic experience that nourished conversational ground.
Fourth, implications and significance of philosophical leisure are discussed through
concepts of the “rhetorical interruption” (Hyde, Call 77) and the distinction between
spectator and participant (Sennett, Fall 209). Fifth, a set of metaphorical maps are
offered to summarize this work and invite the communication discipline to continue this
rhetorical journey by encountering philosophical leisure. Finally, dimensional overtones
of this work are offered. Philosophical leisure as communicative praxis opens this
discussion.
Communicative Praxis
Philosophical leisure is an approach that one may take to living-in-the-world and
to engage others. Philosophical leisure is an application of an aesthetically consummated
experience of communicative praxis. Philosophical leisure invites one to enter the
aesthetic space of communicative praxis.
In Calvin Schrag’s perspective, communicative praxis is a ‘place’ where
communication happens “by someone, about something, and for someone” (Praxis 179).
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The subject is an embedded agent rather than a decentered subject, which allows for the
interpreted communicative event. The aboutness of communication suggests that
meaning equals content. Aboutness is enriched when ideas are interpreted within the
rhetorical environment of communicative praxis.
Calvin Schrag posits three aspects of communicative praxis: distanciation,
idealization, and recollection (Praxis 53). These three aspects of communicative praxis
are components of the architectonic of philosophical leisure. Distanciation allows for a
distance when entering a conversation (53). The reflection of the distances allows for
new understandings to emerge. Distance is important for philosophical leisure because it
provides opportunity to experience aesthetic differentiation. Idealization suggests that
distance invites the possibilities of ideas (54). In idealization, conversation is enriched
through new ideas and responsiveness to ideas. Recollection is an embodied knowing
that is reflective and not one dimensional (64). Recollection is an aesthetic activity that
allows one to make sense out of things. Distanciation, idealization, and recollection work
together with Schrag’s three coefficients of “transversal rationality” (Communication
126) to enable communicative praxis. Philosophical leisure invites distance, idealization,
and recollection to occur in human communication.
This section considers communicative praxis through Calvin Schrag’s
“transversal rationality” and “new humanism.” The rhetorical environment of
communicative praxis is open to the interaction of transversal rationality.
Transversal Rationality
Transversal rationality is what happens in the space of communicative praxis
(Schrag, Communication 126). Transversal rationality involves three coefficients at play
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(131). The coefficients at play are like a matrix spinning a web that is the interface of
communicative praxis.
The first coefficient, involved discernment, is an evaluative coefficient of
communicative praxis (Schrag, Communication 132). Involved discernment involves a
deconstruction or reflective contemplation of the transaction between human beings
because it is communal and happens situationally. This co-efficient involves
contemplative action because communication calls for reflection, not haphazard
consideration.
The performative coefficient of communicative praxis, engaged articulation, may
interplay with involved discernment. Engaged articulation focuses on the “relationality”
of engagement and articulation of perspectives between human beings (Schrag,
Communication 133). Relationality continues and shapes the art of conversation.
Inherent to this interplay is the aesthetic movement that keeps the conversation going.
The aesthetic movement necessarily acknowledges human interest.
Encountered disclosure is the third coefficient that also interplays with the first
two. Encountered disclosure’s pathetic appeal “forces us beyond the system of signs,
outside the bonds of textuality, and out of the difficulties of narrativity […] determining
our discursive and nondiscursive practices as elicited by, and being about, something, as
solicited by, and being with, someone” (Schrag, Communication 133). The serendipitous
happens in conversation, guided by the idea of answerability. In encountered disclosure
it is being in the “situated play of similarities and differences, [that] this incursion into
intentionality is the ongoing pathos of alterity in practice” (133). The interplay of these
three co-efficients is the consummation of the communicative event, never fully whole,
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always open to possibilities. The transversal rationality of these co-efficients is
significant to Calvin Schrag’s call for a new humanism to guide human communication.
New Humanism
Calvin Schrag’s theory of communicative praxis calls for a “new humanism” in
which communicators engage the space of human communication as embedded agents
(Praxis 197). Schrag argues that humanism as a “philosophical position and as a cultural
attitude” (197) is approached cautiously. This caution is due primarily to the saturation
of technology in our society and the questioning of human values (197). Humanism has
traditionally been understood as the custodian of moral values. Schrag offers a
redefinition of humanism which remedies the suspicion-laden understanding.
New humanism resituates a decentered subject in the space of communicative
praxis as an embedded agent, one that regains subjectivity “as a multiplex persona within
the hermeneutical space of praxis” (Schrag, Praxis 210). He argues “this new humanism
no longer promises invariant definitions of a foundational subject, but instead moves
about in a hermeneutical play of perspectival descriptions of the life of discourse and
action” (214).
Calvin Schrag calls for a “new humanism” to frame how human beings
communicate responsively toward one another (Praxis 197). He calls new humanism a
dialogical consciousness that consists of “the interplay of discourse and action” (159).
Central to this new humanism is the distinction between human agency and embedded
agents. The focus in human agency is the speaker him or herself. The focus in
embedded agents is not the self rather it is the embeddedness of the agent to the horizon
in which one is situated. The embedded agent recognizes the larger picture of
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relationships rather than considering only one’s standpoint (201-214). A decentered self
has no place in Schrag’s new humanism, which “moves about in a hermeneutical play of
perspectival descriptions of the life of discourse and action” (214). Distinguishing
agency from embeddedness and how communication is impacted by both, Schrag
suggests that agency can cause disillusionment and have pervasive influence upon others
(214).
This distinction can also be considered in relation to leisure. Postmodern
disillusionment of leisure would be a place where human agency flourishes, disregard for
one’s place in one’s horizon. Philosophical leisure provides a playground for embedded
agents. Interplay, contemplation, and involved discernment can be nourished in this
realm.
For Calvin Schrag, an embedded agent can keep the conversation going. An agent
driven by human agency can impede conversation because human agency cannot
contribute to the ongoing story (Praxis 213-214). Schrag considers how one is situated
within a given story. For example, visualize two agents both who are message receivers
and both can be persuaded by each other and the historical moment. There are multiple
dimensions of communication that allow for a textured communication rather than a flat,
agent-driven communication.
Calvin Schrag’s new humanism is essential for the movement of philosophical
leisure into the public realm. While philosophical leisure begins as a private action, it is
foregrounded through public discourse and human interaction. Serendipitous
communication occurs as all three co-efficients encounter and overlap each other. The
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exchange of transversal rationality occurs between embedded agents. The event is
consummated by a co-constructing of meaning.
Philosophical leisure is engaged in this communicative space. Contemplation,
innerplay/interplay, and serendipity happen when one approaches life through
philosophical leisure. Philosophical leisure is a reflective, inward intellectual play that
allows content to manifest outside the individual in conversation driven by ideas. The
rhetorical turn that Calvin Schrag presents repostures rhetoric within the space of
communicative praxis (Praxis 179). Philosophical leisure invites rhetoric of ideas to
participate in discourse.
Philosophical leisure differentiates phatic conversation from communicative
praxis. As the co-efficients are at play within and between individuals, the ground of
conversation is cultivated. The philosophical play of leisure opens relational
possibilities. Postmodernity calls for a different responsiveness toward the other.
Postmodern differentiation seeks acknowledgment, answerability, and responsiveness to
ideas between human beings. Postmodern differentiation foregrounds the aesthetic play
that enhances human conversation.
An example of communicative praxis is offered by David Engen’s communicative
imagination (41). Communicative imagination is a way of seeing things, a “state of mind
making [human beings] especially atuned to both [the] significance and complexities of
the meaning” in social interaction (41). Engen’s teleological insight of the
communicative imagination invites effective and humane participation in complex social
worlds (41). Communicative imagination invites one to see oneself outside one’s work.
Philosophical leisure cultivates this communicative imagination. A by-product of this
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cultivation is the enhancement of human communication. Philosophical leisure as
communicative praxis is an aesthetic experience.
Aesthetic Experience of Communicative Praxis
Aesthetic experience and philosophical leisure provide content that drives
communicative praxis. What allows communicative praxis to be aesthetic is the
consummation of the experience that is an “extra-esthetic” (Dewey 329). The
consummation invites a social relationship that is not only beautiful but it is also a fully
whole engagement of the other. John Dewey and his idea of the “extra-esthetic” (329)
and Mikhail Bakhtin’s idea of “aesthetically valid” (Author 59) situate their aesthetic
understanding to extend to a social relationship. This study considers John Dewey’s
“extra-esthetic” essential to understanding aesthetic experience and philosophical leisure
as communicative praxis. The work of Mikhail Bakhtin is necessary for this study
because Bakhtin’s “aesthetically valid” condition of human communication is illuminated
through the ‘doing’ of philosophical leisure.
The idea of philosophical leisure as aesthetic experience is consistent with the
philosophies of John Dewey and Mikhail Bakhtin. Both of these scholars describe an
aesthetic experience as consummated experience. Their work is consistent with Calvin
Schrag’s theory of communicative praxis. Aesthetic experience of practicing
philosophical leisure informs communicative praxis by revealing content for idea-laden
conversation. Aesthetic experience is a social experience or an experience outside of the
limits of the self that invite a connection with a philosophical other. Communicative
praxis is the home for Schrag’s new humanism, which argues that human beings ought to
communicate as embedded agents rather than individual, separate entities. John Dewey,
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Mikhail Bakhtin, and Calvin Schrag offer a seamless understanding of how the aesthetic
experience of philosophical leisure is a necessary but not sufficient condition of
communicative praxis. It is necessary to find one’s ground for conversation but not the
only component of communicative praxis. This discussion begins with the philosophy of
John Dewey.
John Dewey
John Dewey (1859-1952) notes a distinction between art experience and scientific
experience. Dewey states that an aesthetic experience fully engages an individual in the
world as a consummated engagement (326). Scientific experience focuses on
epistemology, thus, compartmentalizes experience and separates the engagement from a
consummation (Dewey 3). Aesthetic consummation can not occur in scientific
experience. Compartmentalization offers an understanding within limits because the
experience is not fully engaged.
For a person to have a fully engaged experience is to be an aesthetic experience.
Aesthetic experience is one in which the engagement of the whole human being is
reached in a meaningful way. An aesthetic experience is consummated in that it allows
possibilities to exist and shape the communicative event (Dewey 3). Experience is
aesthetic as participants “enter into an ordered rhythmic movement toward a
consummation” (326). An aesthetic experience is a “manifestation, a record and
celebration of the life of a civilization, a means of promoting its development, and it is
also the ultimate judgment upon the quality of a civilization” (326). When a subject is
separated from “both conditions of origin and operation in experience,” a wall renders
almost opaque their general significance (Dewey 3). When this separation occurs, the
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ability to have a consummated understanding is limited. An aesthetic experience
provides opportunity for consummated understanding. Scientific inquiry limits the
aesthetic consummation of an idea or experience.
A gestalt understanding of an aesthetic experience suggests the aesthetic
experience is a consummated experience of the practical, the social, and the educative
(Dewey 327). Consummation of the aesthetic experience allows for a broader
understanding of ‘how’ an aesthetic experience is understood. Dewey suggested that a
life devoid aesthetic experience can kill an individual and a civilization (328). An
individual or civilization may cease to exist when “instead of connecting arts with an
expression of the life of the community, the beauty of nature and of art [is] regarded as an
echo and a reminder of some supernal reality that had its being outside social life” (328).
The social relationship that allows the consummation of experience is necessary for the
existence of an aesthetic experience. In human interaction, the aesthetic consummation
happens when the participants encounter each other in the space of communicative
praxis. John Dewey described this gestalt understanding of art as “extra-esthetic” (329).
Philosophical leisure is an experience that rests in the “extra-esthetic.” While
John Dewey’s work provides insight for understanding the aesthetic, his work does not
speak directly about aesthetic experience and philosophical leisure. However, Dewey’s
“extra-esthetic” offers a clearer understanding of philosophical leisure. Contemplative
engagement characterizes philosophical leisure and provides cultivation and development
of ideas for conversational contribution. Mikhail Bakhtin extends John Dewey’s “extraesthetic” (Dewey 329) theory with the architectonics of dialogism and permits
application of “extra-esthetic” (Bakhtin, Author 59) to human communication.
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Mikhail Bakhtin
Human interaction occurs continuously “because the interaction of live creature
and environing conditions is involved in the very process of living (Dewey 35). This
process is not characterized as a scientific hypothesis, method, compartmentalized
experience, and end. Instead, the process that is “extra-esthetic” is not a cessation but
rather a flow that is marked by “continuous merging” with no “holes, mechanical
junctions, [or] dead centers” (Dewey 36). The aesthetic experience is an “interaction
between a live creature and some aspect of the world in which one lives” (Dewey 44). In
application, Mikhail Bakhtin offers the method of experiencing this “extra-esthetic” in
human communication. Bakhtin stated:
There is one thing that, indubitably, has essential significance for us here:
the actual, concrete axiological experiencing of another human being
within the closed whole of my own unique life, within the actual horizon
of my own life, has a two-fold character, because I and others – we move
on different planes of seeing and evaluating (not abstract, but actual,
concrete, evaluating), and in order to transpose us to a single unified
plane, I must take a stand axiologically outside my own life and perceive
myself as an other among others.” (Author 59).
Bakhtin’s concept of being outside one’s place of experience can inform how the
consummated experience of Dewey’s “extra-esthetic” can be applied to human
communication. The experience outside oneself invites the communicative event to be
“aesthetically valid” (Bakhtin, Author 59).
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An aesthetic understanding of consummated human communication is central to
Mikhail Bakhtin’s life-in-the-world. Consistent with Calvin Schrag’s communicative
praxis, Bakhtin opposed a compartmentalized understanding of human interactions that
separated a human being from consummated experience. Bakhtin argued, “to abstract
myself from my unique place in being, in order to understand the world fully as an
ongoing event and in order to orient myself in the world as in an open and once-occurrent
event” (Author 58-59) is an “extra-esthetic” consummated understanding of dialogism
governing conversational ground.
Understanding philosophical leisure as an application of John Dewey’s “extraesthetic” and Mikhail Bakhtin’s “aesthetically-valid” experience situates philosophical
leisure as aesthetic experience of communicative praxis. Revisiting communicative
practice as the interactive space of subjectivity where human communication occurs in
transversal rationality suggests that the aesthetic consummation, which is “extra-esthetic”
and “aesthetically-valid” experience happens in an idea-laden environment. The
phenomenological focus of attention is on ideas, rather than agency.
Phenomenological focus of attention is the heart of aesthetic experience and
necessary for aesthetic consummation. Philosophical leisure shifts one’s
phenomenological focus of attention to the idea, not to the self or to the end result. The
key to philosophical leisure as an aesthetic application of communicative praxis involves
the shifting of the phenomenological focus of attention from the self-in-the-world to the
ideas that emerge as human interaction exists. Once the phenomenological focus of
attention shifts toward this idea-laden experience, the aesthetic consummation unfolds as
the intersubjective space is encountered between human beings. The space where the
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aesthetic consummation occurs cannot exist without the phenomenological shift through
contemplative engagement.
Communicative praxis and the philosophical other have an important relationship.
Because the aesthetic experience in communicative praxis involves human engagement,
the relationship between communicative praxis and the philosophical other12 is discussed.
Communicative Praxis and the Philosophical Other
The real benefit of philosophical leisure gives one something to talk about –
public human interest that is not private – yet connected with interest for the other. This
is public communication that is content driven not driven by private emotivism. Turning
toward the other shifts one’s focus of attention from the present and from the self to an
acknowledgement of the other. Philosophical leisure is one way to develop opportunity
for common ground to emerge between human beings. In this study the focus of
attention toward the other is not meant as a therapeutic approach to understanding the
other. Rather, in this context, the other is mirrored after Emmanuel Levinas’ Other and
Mikhail Bakhtin’s I-Other relationship.
Emmanuel Levinas is concerned with the ethical relationship between the Self
and the Other. Mikhail Bakhtin is concerned with the primacy of the utterance and his
responsive ethics of answerability in the I-Other relationship. Both Levinas and Bakhtin
suggest an ethical responsibility toward the other. Levinas’ philosophical approach and
Bakhtin’s rhetorical approach can provide this study with the frame to understand how

When this study refers to the “Other,” it refers the philosophical Other of the
philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas or Mikhail Bakhtin. The use of “other” by this author
refers to the general other of human communicative encounters.
12
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human interest can enrich human communication in the aesthetic space of communicative
praxis.
Emanuel Levinas’ Other and Communicative Praxis
When Emmanuel Levinas described the ethical self-other relationship, he referred
to it as an “unlimited responsibility” that existed “prior to or beyond essence” (Otherwise
10). However, there is no demand for the Other to return a response back to the Self.
Levinas called this null demand a “peculiar inequality” (Reader 286). As Levinas
considered the Self-Other relationship he suggested it is an “openness of the self to the
other” (Otherwise 181). The “presentation of the face” places the self in relation with the
other (Totality 212). This openness refers to a relationship that reveals meaning only in a
relationship with the Other (Otherwise 181; Totality 212). This relationship is where “the
‘I’ finds identity in response to the Other” (Arnett, Responsive 39). Arnett refers to this
relationship as derivative of the other because the “self emerges as a by-product, a
responsive derivative construction” (39). Levinas referred to the relationship with the
Other as an inspiration that transcends the self (Otherwise 182).
A relationship with the Other has implications for human communication (Arnett,
Responsive 49). We are reminded by the face of the Other that we have a responsibility
to live our lives beyond “self-occupation” (49). In other words, Levinas reminds us that
by looking toward the face of the Other, we turn toward the interhuman communicative
action. According to Ronald C. Arnett, Levinas’ ethical responsibility toward the Other
is a “philosophical starting place” for encountering the other (49).
Alterity is the consummation of the Self-Other relationship. This consummation
occurs when there is human interest or an “interestedness” (Levinas, Otherwise 183).
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Interestedness manifests in “inter-human speaking,” which means “entering into the
thought of the other” (Levinas, Entre Nous 162). Derrida explained this interestedness
through the hermeneutic clue, ‘welcome.’ “To dare to say welcome,” one is implying that
one is at home, one knows what it means to be at home, and one offers hospitality
(Derrida 15). Derrida suggested that welcoming the other also can appropriate oneself
over the other (15). ‘Welcome’ should not be the usurpation of one human being over
another human being, rather, a ‘welcome’ is hospitality.
Jacques Derrida posited that ‘welcome’ implies a “tending toward the other,
attentive attention, intentional attention […] intentionality, attention to speech, welcome
of the face, [and] hospitality” (22-23). Derrida’s understanding of a Levinasian welcome
includes intentionality that holds an infinite opening toward the other (23). There is an
ethical relation in the receptivity of receiving and welcoming/hospitality (25). To
welcome, to be called into existence by the face of the Other, is a first gesture in the
direction of the Other (25). The welcome or turn toward the face of the Other reinforces
human interest in conversation.
The phaticity of conversation in this historical moment is a “decay of human
relations” (Levinas, Alterity 107). However, Emmanuel Levinas found that, “goodness is
possible” (107) in this decay. The goodness is revealed in the Self-Other relationship
(109). This is where human interest can prevail and cultivate an ongoing conversation.
Human interest is nourished by the goodness in the relationship and the goodness does
not succumb to the elements of narcissism and “existential homelessness” (Arnett,
Existential 229).
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The experience of human interest is infinite and “occurs in the relationship with
the other (Autrui)” (Levinas, Philosophy 108). In this relationship the Other “overflows”
the Same as it breaks the “inward play of the soul” (112). When a human being is at play
in his or her soul, a philosophical cultivation occurs. This cultivation by philosophical
leisure begins with the interiority of one’s soul and moves toward the consummation of
the Self-Other relationship. In this consummation human interest cultivates the art of
conversation – in the interplay of souls. Mikhail Bakhtin’s aesthetic approach to human
interest compliments Levinas’ I-Other relationship.
Mikhail Bakhtin’s I-Other Relationship and Communicative Praxis
A living experience can never rest in one’s self. To be consummated, the
experience has obligations outside of itself (Bakhtin, Author 125). Thus, conversation
needs self and other in order to continue. The self is obligated to continue the experience
or risk missing communicative meaning (125). A consummation of this communicative
experience is revealing and innovative (Biancofiore 110). Consummation of this event is
communicative praxis.
Mikhail Bakhtin’s perspective suggests that meaning in life cannot emerge from
within one, rather meaning is found in motion from outside oneself. Meaning emerges in
the interplay of experience outside an individual with the Other (Bakhtin, Author 127).
Bakhtin argued “the other coincides with himself [herself] and through this integrating
coincidence that consummates him [her] positively, I enrich the other from the outside
and he [she] becomes aesthetically significant” (129). This aesthetic significance is the
art of conversation. This interplay of experience requires the cultivation of human
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interest. Without consummation of the I-Other relationship conversation might die or
simply remain overall phatic in nature.
Mikhail Bakhtin also considered this ethical I-Other relationship through
“answerability” (Toward 75). Bakhtin considered answerability to be the “highest
architectonic principle” (75) because it lays out the consummation of the I-Other
relationship. Consummation is ethically driven and the only way to cultivate the ground
of conversation. Bakhtin scholars consider the I-Other relationship to be an aesthetic
transcendental experience (Tiupa 96). The element of the aesthetic is significant because
the social relationship that plays with ideas is pleasant and satisfying, not in the sense of a
personal agreement but rather the interplay of the social relationship itself. The
enrichment and regeneration of conversation is ontological and that in itself is aesthetic
(Gadamer, Truth 101). The aesthetics of an emerging conversation is transformative to
individuals and to the relationship. In aesthetics there is a nourishment of the soul
cultivates the ground of conversation.
The element of human interest enriches human communication by cultivating the
ground of conversation. Cultivated conversation, driven by ideas generated by human
interest and not social function, can reduce the risk of conversational cessation. When
ideas drive conversation it becomes ongoing, much like Kenneth Burke’s parlor metaphor
(Burke, Philosophy 110-111). Individualism has shaped conversation to a negate the
other. “Conversational narcissism” (Derber 65) allows the individual to seek attention
for the self in face to face conversations. Enhancing human interest in human
communication can play off one’s attempt to engage narcissistic tendencies in
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conversation. The space of communicative praxis welcomes a turning toward the other in
human interest.
Philosophical Leisure and Engaging the Other
Philosophical leisure invites communication that engages the other by providing
the content for engagement. As one begins the aesthetic experience of philosophical
leisure in the private sphere, the ground for one to find content for human engagement is
nourished. Philosophical nourishment for a ground of ideas enables one to move into the
public realm and engage the other with idea-laden communication. The ideas enrich the
experience and provide opportunity for the experience to grow and develop into a larger
communicative occurrence. The growth of the occurrence is responsive to the
engagement of the other.
Philosophical leisure invites interest in the other. Martin Buber’s Hasdic tales
posit that in order for an individual to engage the other, the individual must first begin
within one’s self (Buber, Way 28). In other words, to be at peace with the other the
individual must first be at peace with herself or himself. The way to be at peace with
one’s self is through “accessory elements of his [her] own self” (29). This is done
through contemplation which is central to philosophical leisure. Conversation can be
cultivated only after attention to one’s self. The innerplay of philosophical leisure
enables an interplay in human relationships. As the conversation unfolds, ideas are
regenerated – seemingly from the souls of the participants.
Relationships have an “inside, a dynamic center, from which all operation has its
source and to which all that is received” (Pieper, Leisure 81). The inside of the
relationship is cultivated through philosophical leisure. Philosophical leisure can create a
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“sense of place” that is socially constructed through communication (Stokowski 368). A
“sense of place” is not only a geographic location but it can be “fluid, changeable,
dynamic social interaction and memory” that creates common ground (368). People
create these places through human interest and interaction with others. Philosophical
leisure is a catalyst for the ideas of these conversations that shape the sense of place
(372). These places do not exist until the human interaction occurs (372). This author
asserts these places are first contemplated in the individual at play in philosophical
leisure.
Once individual nourishment begins, the ground of conversation begins to
regenerate (Pieper 81). Conversation works through social activity and requires people to
exhibit trust in others (Wardbaugh 5). Trust in the other is the cornerstone of social
living (6). Human beings are social animals and trust helps to nourish the social
relationship. Conversation without trust dwarfs the possibility for regeneration of ideas
and impedes a serendipitous response that is needed for idea-laden human
communication.
In periods of swift social change, established norms and stereotypes are called
into question as human beings try to make sense out of the changes. Linguistic confusion
reflects the social disorder (Wardbaugh 17). As a result of this confusion, conversation
quickly reduces to phatic communication or self-talk. To contribute to a conversation, an
individual must first reflect upon herself or himself and then reflect upon others to “keep
the cooperative enterprise going” (138). Beginning with one’s self is consistent with
Buber’s Hasidic tales. These stories point out that in order to turn toward an other, one
must first turn within and reflect upon one’s self. Philosophical leisure can assist a
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human being to turn toward the other because leisure begins with a turning toward the
inside. The turning toward the inside is deep and reflective, grounded in contemplation.
Josef Pieper considers contemplation to provide the ultimate gratification of
human beings (Pieper, Contemplation 18). Through contemplation, human beings can
reach satiation of happiness (18). Contemplation is the play of the imagination through
reason (81). That play is a “form of knowing arrived at by not thinking but by seeing,
intuition” (74). Therefore, understanding contemplation is necessary to realize leisure is
not relaxation. To contemplate one’s soul enables one to engage other souls – in play.
The contemplation of one’s soul and the element of human interest penetrates the
interplay of ideas and invites the serendipitous response for nourishment the ground of
conversation. This play in human interest allows the phenomenological focus of
attention to be on ideas and not on simple events or people (gossip).
The connection between turning toward the self, the development of human
interest, and the cultivation of conversational ground is supported historically. Aristotle’s
ethics would not allow for conversation to be reduced to small talk or self-talk because
ethically engaging conversation in the polis requires focusing on the common good.
Cultivation of human interest occurs when a human being is at home with herself or
himself in philosophical leisure (Crick 310). Seneca also notes turning toward the other
enriches human conversation by cultivating the ground for nourishment of the soul (II.1).
An example of the aesthetic experience of philosophical leisure as communicative praxis
emerged out of the music of the civil rights movement.
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Example: Music Engaged as Philosophical Leisure
Aesthetic experience of philosophical leisure provides an opportunity for
encountering the other in the interaction of communicative praxis. Understanding
philosophical leisure as a consummated aesthetic experience directs this author toward an
exemplification of the argument in this project. This work argues that southern black
communities in the middle of the 20th century engaged music as philosophical leisure,
which enabled development of conversational ground that transformed social justice in
the United States. While music has always demonstrated a role in the black community,
this study limits inquiry to the 1950s and 1960s, some of the most active years of the civil
rights movement in the United States.
Martin Luther King Jr.’s dream included a social conversation between black and
white communities. King wanted social change so that minority voices had equal access
to communicative opportunities. During the 1950s and 1960s, King and other emerging
leaders spoke out on behalf of an oppressed black people. King’s message included the
call for turning toward the other, regardless of color (4). Southern black communities
experienced significant violence and resistance to their attempt to participate in
conversation with the other, the white community. This section discusses how music for
the individual black person and music in the collective black churches is an application of
the aesthetic experience of philosophical leisure as communicative praxis.
The civil rights movement did not begin as a political movement. Instead, the
civil rights movement was born out of southern black church leadership calling for an end
to oppression of one human being over another human being. Individuals in the southern
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black community engaged the consummated aesthetic experience of philosophical leisure
when they sang their “freedom songs” (King 48). In the words of Martin Luther King Jr.:
An important part of the mass meetings [church] was the freedom songs.
In a sense the freedom songs are the soul of the movement. They are more
than just incantations of clever phrases […] I have heard people talk of
their beat and rhythm, but we in the movement are inspired by their words
[…] we sing the freedom songs today for the same reason the slaves sang
them, because we too are in bondage and the songs add hope to our
determination […] that we shall overcome someday. (48)
Martin Luther King, Jr. described music in the black communities as giving black people
hope for social change and the ability to pursue this social change. Music unified the
black voice and provided the ground upon which they could articulate ideas to achieve
social justice (King 49).
Martin Luther King Jr. referred to entering conversational ground with the white
community as a “negro revolution” (1). The revolution was “generated quietly” (King 2)
through individual engagement of ideas. King argued for nonviolent resistance and
peaceful responses to violence (67). King argued the ability to remain civil upon entering
a conversation in opposition to the status quo is primary to keeping the conversation
going. King argued if the conversation does not allow their participation, their call for
social justice will remain a monologue (68).
The ability to keep the conversation going rests in the engagement of ideas with a
focus of attention on the idea of social change, not agency. King understood the value
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and the role of music in the southern black communities. His understanding helped to
nourish conversational ground that advanced the civil rights cause.
In the PBS video, We Shall Overcome, Pete Seeger discussed the power of music
as not to win over an enemy but to find a friend on common ground where conversation
occurs. Music that nourished the black southern communities represented an individual’s
struggle to enter the conversation. Black individuals were kept from entering
conversation about rights and freedom by white majority. For the black community,
music was a response to their inability to participate in human conversation that directly
impacted daily existence. During the beginning of the civil rights movement and through
the height of it, music opened almost every meeting and occurred at almost every protest
(Graetz 66).
Music engaged as aesthetic experience of philosophical leisure was not for
entertainment but it was for gathering people to become involved. Prior to the civil rights
movement, during the 1940s, labor movements used music to announce struggle and a
call for change in labor practices and laws (We). Songs like “We Shall Overcome”
opened conversation because freedom songs announce a struggle and unite people to
advance a resolve. This requires the ability to engage in an idea-laden conversation.
Many of the freedom songs from the civil rights movement were taken from days of
slavery in America. In any situation where oppressed people seek a voice, music can
give confidence and the framework for a philosophy of nonviolence (We).
“We Shall Overcome” represents the significance of music as an aesthetic
experience of philosophical leisure. The words of “We Shall Overcome” express a social
relationship with the other:
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1. We shall overcome
We shall overcome
We shall overcome some day
Chorus:
Oh deep in my heart
I do believe
We shall overcome some day
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4. We are not afraid
We are not afraid
We are not afraid today
Chorus:
5. We are not alone
We are not alone
We are not alone today
Chorus:

2. We'll walk hand in hand
We'll walk hand in hand
We'll walk hand in hand some day
Chorus:

6. The whole wide world around
The whole wide world around
The whole wide world around some day
Chorus:

3. We shall all be free
We shall all be free
We shall all be free some day
Chorus:

7. We shall overcome
We shall overcome
We shall overcome some day
Chorus: (We)

Pete Seeger suggested the significance of music, and specifically “We Shall
Overcome” rests in the social relationship of “We.” He argued that human beings will
either “make it together or we are not going to make it at all” (We) This author argues
music that drove the civil rights movement was an “extra-aesthetic” experience (Dewey
329) that brought together individual contemplation and collective social action. The
consequences of this “extra-esthetic” (Dewey 329) experience forged social justice and
transformation of a country. In the words of Mikhail Bakhtin, music that came out of the
civil rights movement was “aesthetically valid” (Author 59) because the human
connection emerged outside the self in a consummated experience.
Considering music during the civil rights movement as a consummated aesthetic
experience can be demonstrated by the genre that shaped it. Music that drove the civil
rights movement was folk music, often in protest to particular situations. The key word
here is ‘folk’ music, which means, music of the common people. Music provided a way
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for individuals to nourish their souls by uniting people and shifting the focus of attention
from fear for themselves to strength for the collective community. Music enabled the
southern black community, which at the time was the heart of the civil rights movement,
to focus attention on the issues and ideas. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s exhortation for a
nonviolent response helped to cultivate the conversational ground from which freedom
and equality would eventually grow. Music enabled the black community to focus on the
ideas and not on their own fear (Thomas 10).
Music like “We Shall Overcome” belongs to human beings in struggle. To
nourish the soul of human beings in struggle (Thomas 13), the individual engages
philosophical leisure and shifts one’s focus of attention toward ideas. The individual is
then able to enter a public conversation in the spirit of social change. Focusing on inward
reflection first can help to overcome dehumanizing experience. Focusing on the broader
issues and ideas invites human interest of the other and enriches the content for human
conversation. Music reaches into the soul of the musician (We). During the civil rights
movement these musicians were common, everyday people living a struggle and fighting
for a chance to enter the human community through conversation.
Music enabled the oppressed black community to embrace their human condition
at a time when the daily toil of life was no longer tolerable. As people sang these
freedom songs, souls were aesthetically nourished and strengthen. Strength afforded the
black community with the ability to enter into a conversation and respond confidently.
Music may not have taken the fear out of taking action but music did provide the
sustenance to guide southern blacks in entering the conversation and advancing social
justice.
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Music of the civil rights movement, during the 20th century in the United States, is
an application of this argument that aesthetic experience of philosophical leisure enters
Calvin Schrag’s space of communicative praxis. Through inward reflection of the human
condition, outward expression through song, and the responsiveness within the southern
black community, music of the civil rights movement as aesthetic experience of
philosophical leisure is communicative praxis. The next section offers implications of
this work and a set of metaphorical maps that remind the reader of the ideas encountered
in this work and point the reader toward a new direction for communication scholarship.
Implications
The crisis of philosophical leisure is not new to this historical moment. Early
Roman writers, such as Seneca, and Renaissance philosophers, such as Petrarch and
Rousseau, captured the same concern as this study. The fear that human beings would
begin to unreflectively engage philosophical leisure and turn it into a marketable
commodity emerged throughout history as social change altered the way human beings
engage daily existence. A return to the classical understanding of philosophical leisure
often emerges when there is a need, which is represented by the voluminous writings
about classical leisure. There is an ethical mandate for this work when recreation,
relaxation, or entertainment has generated this moral crisis. Philosophical leisure
provides redemptive action. In this historical moment, ethics and philosophy merge
together in a turn toward philosophical leisure. The emergence of concern regarding
philosophical leisure is established through this rhetorical journey and the issue of
capacity and opportunity is also co-present.
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The question of capacity and opportunity pervades the discussion of philosophical
leisure. Like Aristotle, some scholars might critique philosophical leisure as being
limited to those who have the capacity to understand the difference between
philosophical leisure and recreation. Perhaps the question of intellect arises that might
disqualify some individuals from this capacity. Josef Pieper’s understanding of
philosophical leisure as a contemplative action would offer a perspective unshared by
critics of capacity.
Contemplation is not a learning, rather, it is a knowing, a revealing of something
already present (Pieper, Happiness 73). Contemplation does not limit because of
intellect. Instead, contemplation allows all intellects to have the capacity for engagement
of philosophical leisure because at any level, the capacity is already present. Therefore,
the engagement of philosophical leisure is not limited based upon intellectual level.
However, the limiting of philosophical leisure does occur today.
Today, human beings limit themselves by choosing not to reflectively or
contemplatively encounter ideas. Any limit placed upon the engagement of philosophical
leisure does not exist due to capacity, rather limits exist from individual volition. The
choice to not be reflective or contemplative is an active choice where one chooses
deliberatively to engage life superficially because it is easier, quicker, and requires less
commitment. The question of capacity for the engagement of philosophical leisure is a
question of whether a human being is a spectator or a participant (Sennett, Fall 209).
Those who are spectators must prepare to witness action through the act of “selfsuppression” (Sennett, Fall 209). The spectator often does not know how to express her
or himself in public (Sennett, Fall 209). Due to theatre, television, and the internet,

Questioning the Rhetorical Eclipse of Philosophical Leisure

144

human beings are reduced to spectators as they witness, think, and feel what they are told.
This often disables volition to choose reflective or contemplative engagement.
Consistent with Neil Postman’s work and Richard Winter’s work in their critique of rapid
technological advances, it is easier for human beings to be spectators today. Human
beings have the capacity to engage philosophical leisure and this study reminds human
beings of that capacity.
When a human being engages philosophical leisure, he or she becomes a
participant, one who chooses the opportunity to be an active agent. Richard Sennett
considers this active agent as “play” (Fall 266). Play as a social-aesthetic relation is
easier for children and more difficult for adults (Sennett, Fall 266). Play is not difficult
for children because they do not limit their creative social experiences. Adults have often
been limited by impressions of technology and epistemological foundations that thwart
their ability to play (267). Play often contradicts the governance of adult life (315).
Therefore, human beings have the volition to engage philosophical leisure and can be
participants rather than spectators.
The inability to play as an adult is not new to the lower socioeconomic class of
people. Hard work and long work days have always impeded the opportunity for
engagement of philosophical leisure. The middle and upper middle socioeconomic
classes of people often embrace recreation, relaxation, and entertainment for show.
These activities are confused with the idea of leisure. The emphasis on what they deem
as leisure is the main focus of Thorstein Veblen’s critique of the leisure class. The
problem is found in the inability to be satisfied with any type of activity because nothing
is quite good enough for these classes of people. The addiction to technology and the
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therapeutic framework that has given rise to a culture of narcissism is the first step in a
middle class of people learning that their leisure time is not what they believed it to be.
This eclipse of leisure or one’s ability to play is new to the middle classes. This study
offers a remedy to the realization of this communicative problem.
The first step of relearning to play is to understand the fundamental difference
between philosophical leisure and recreation, relaxation, and entertainment. This study
offers that first step of recognition. To deny the distinction between philosophical leisure
and recreation, relaxation, and entertainment would be the “corrosion of character”
(Sennett, Corrosion 33). The choice or will to engage philosophical leisure depends upon
the action of the individual not on natural predestination. An individual must choose to
be a spectator or a participant. This choice invites a rhetorical interruption that allows
play and nourishment to cultivate ideas for conversation.
A “rhetorical interruption” acts as a response to a particular historical moment
(Hyde, Call 77). It calls forth ideas and is rhetorical because it invites a change or new
perspective that is open to possibilities for transformation. Philosophical leisure can be a
rhetorical interruption for a narcissistic culture or a human being’s sense of existential
homelessness. Once engaged, philosophical leisure as a rhetorical interruption can be
referred to as “habits of the heart” (Tocqueville 116; Bellah et.al. 37). “Habits of the
heart” are notions, opinions, and ideas that help to shape “mental habits” and the sum of
“moral and intellectual disposition” (Bellah et.al. 37). Philosophical leisure, as a “habit
of the heart” can bring human beings together through idea-laden conversation.
Philosophical leisure broadens one’s world to move from an individualistic perspective to
a perspective embedded in community and ideas. Philosophical leisure can shift
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language of “therapeutic individualism” (56) to a language that invites the other into the
conversation, rather than isolating the self in individualism (Arnett and Arneson 262).
Philosophical leisure as a “habit of the heart” (Bellah et.al. 37) can recuperate human
beings dependent upon an individualistic vocabulary and invite idea-laden conversation.
Philosophical leisure can be considered portable “habits of the heart” because
philosophical leisure is not limited to a particular space, rather it is an activity that human
beings can participate in anywhere.
The implications for philosophical leisure as a “rhetorical interruption” (Hyde,
Call 77) and as a “habit of the heart” (Bellah et.al 37) provides a new depth of
understanding philosophical leisure within a classical perspective. Philosophical leisure
offers enrichment and recuperation to human communication, as well as a new avenue of
study within the communication discipline. Understanding the implications for
philosophical leisure to the communication discipline includes understanding this
rhetorical interruption or these habits of the heart as aesthetic activity.
The main argument of this work is the aesthetic experience of philosophical
leisure provides the content for engagement of communicative praxis. An interesting
tension is revealed through the advance of this argument. The aesthetic experience of
philosophical leisure provides content for conversation, which invites human interest
toward the other and builds a social relationship. The social relationship can be
transformative to the individual and the human community. The mirror image of this
argument suggests the relationship that meets the other and fosters human interest enables
development of content through philosophical leisure and the aesthetic experience. The
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key to enriching human conversation is embracing philosophical leisure in one’s
approach in life.
This section reminds the reader of salient philosophical aspects which inform this
inquiry. Through an offering of two metaphorical maps this section considers the
eminence of this work linked to human communication and implications to the
communication discipline.
Metaphorical Maps of Eminence
A synthesis of this work can be considered in two metaphorical maps. The first
metaphorical map posits the problem in human communication. The second
metaphorical map advances a renewed understanding of philosophical leisure through
rhetoric of this historical moment. These maps guide the reader though an in depth
examination of human communication and embark the reader toward one possible
pathway that is a recuperative response to the communication eclipse. This journey
begins with the metaphorical map of the human communicative problem.
As a starting place, this study considers the rise of psychologism through a
therapeutic culture and the saturation of technology that has rapidly changed existence for
all human beings in the Western world. These swift changes have shifted the focus of
attention in human communication. The shift is described as a communication eclipse
between human beings. An inability to communicate ideas with another human being is
masked by an over abundance of phatic communication. A society driven by phatic
communication is rendered impotent in the exchange of ideas. Impotence in human
communication points toward a moral crisis, which is a debilitation of human
communication due to false communicators or communication imposters. False
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communication is represented through the Western world’s “culture of narcissism”
(Lasch, Narcissism 27) and the sense of “existential homelessness” (Arnett 229).
Narcissism and existential homelessness suggest there is less certainty in human
communication and in one’s negotiation of daily life.
When uncertainty pervades our lives and relationships, phaticity in human
communication increases. The inability to find ground upon which one is able to
communicate in idea-laden conversation is pervasive in the Western world. Phaticity is
the absence of content in communication that is often superficial conversation. While
phaticity is necessary for daily functional movements between human beings, it can also
be deadly to human relationships. An abundance of phaticity, in place of enriched
conversation, impedes one’s attention to ideas. The focus instead becomes task-oriented,
self-oriented, people-oriented, gossip or small talk. If these are the only topics for human
communication, atrophy sets in – which is a broader problem that cripples human
relationships.
The moral crisis in human communication is proliferated by linguistic confusion
of the terms; leisure, recreation, relaxation, and entertainment. Using these terms
synonymously creates a diversion that causes confusion in the meaning of the terms. To
consider leisure equal to recreation, relaxation, and entertainment, human beings become
helpless in their pursuit of ground for conversation. Recreation, relaxation, and
entertainment are driven by the self, they are short-term, and considered a mere
interruption of one’s daily work-a-day activities. Recreation, relaxation, and
entertainment are framed by Hannah Arendt’s social realm, where one is not really
engaged in the private or the public realm, rather, one is in a realm skewed by blurred
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boundaries, rendering nourishment of the soul an impossibility. Human beings often
recreate, relax, or entertain without reflection, as conspicuous consumption, and often for
pecuniary emulation. Human communication in this realm falls under posturing or
communication imposters. It is with in this context that human communication
represents suffering from a moral crisis. The metaphorical map that has reminded the
reader of the human communicative problem now shifts in a new direction on a path of
recuperation for human communication.
The redemptive approach to the moral crisis in human communication begins
with a new understanding of leisure as philosophical leisure. Through a distinction
between leisure, recreation, relaxation, and entertainment, this study advances a linguistic
shift toward philosophical leisure. This work posits a new term, philosophical leisure, as
the hermeneutic entrance that announces this renewed understanding and significance of
philosophical leisure to human communication. Philosophical leisure shifts one’s focus
of attention from closed-ended topics, such as people, tasks, gossip, or small talk, to the
infinite realm of ideas. Philosophical leisure edifies the ground for conversation.
Through the engagement of philosophical leisure human beings contemplate and
play with ideas that emerge from the inneraction and interaction. These ideas develop
depth and become topoi (topics) for conversation between human beings. Philosophical
leisure begins with the inward contemplative act of ideas at play. Conversation becomes
ongoing and dynamic – open to serendipitous thought. A consequence of philosophical
play is a transformation of the inner individual and often the individual’s connection
outside of him or herself. The transformation happens as the consummated aesthetic
experience of play cultivates the inner playground of ideas that embed the player in an
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ongoing story. Conversation at this deeper level becomes idea-driven instead of selfdriven. Conversation void of this depth is flat and phatic – ultimately saying nothing and
leaving human beings with nothing left to say.
The aesthetic playground that cultivates ideas for conversation occurs through
utterances at play with ideas and other utterances in answerability. Aesthetic play begins
with inward contemplative thought that offers one ground to stand upon in the
communicative space of subjectivity, where one encounters the other. The play that one
engages is that of an embedded agent, one who cares about the ideas and the continuing
conversation. The social relationship of human communication is an “extra-esthetic”
(Dewey 329) activity or “aesthetically valid” (Bakhtin, Author 59) because the
experience is fully consummated. Consummation of ideas situates the activity as
communicative praxis.
Philosophical leisure provides communicators with content for conversation.
Philosophical leisure as action of communicative praxis demonstrates how human beings
can pragmatically engage philosophical leisure in every day living and in communication
between human beings. Philosophical leisure is a consummated aesthetic activity. The
metaphorical journey points to an aesthetic approach to understanding human
communication.
Dimensional Overtones of this Project for the Communication Discipline
Aesthetically informed human communication can enhance civic virtue and
performance (Mattson 107; Greene 190). Aesthetic communication can “push us to reach
for interpretive meanings we cannot quite capture” (Pillow 197). The beauty of coming
to this virtue and performance happens through one gaining ground, having a conviction,
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found through aesthetic activity (Mattson 107). Once ground has been found, a
standpoint has been taken, or the ground for conversation is idea-rich, “language is the
medium in which Spirit or social subjectivity exists” (Hegel 575). Philosophical leisure
is the aesthetic activity that inwardly enhances the ground for civic engagement or human
conversation, which then manifests outside the human being – and occurs between
human beings.
Philosophical leisure is necessary to have enriched human communication. The
aesthetic play of philosophical leisure transcends time and removes the dailyness of life
experience (Gadamer, Truth 102). The shift of one’s phenomenological focus of
attention invites one’s deliberation into eternity (102). Being at play occurs in a world
determined by the play not the existentialness of living. The ontological moment of
coming into being happens and removes time as a measurement and time as eternity
becomes space that situates Leisure. Gadamer refers to this as “timelessness” (121).
Philosophical leisure, as ontologically a priori and as a pragmatic action-lived-in-theworld-experience, both encounter a dialectical antithesis.
Aesthetic activity of leisure does occur in a time that is measurable but that time
is antithetical to the sacredness of the act of coming into being. This is a suprahistorical
time in which the present measurable time or the “existential” temporality is present and
they co-exist (121). This existence is eternity not an historical time. Philosophical
leisure as aesthetic experience of communicative praxis offers a rediscovered approach to
engagement in the world. Scholarship that focuses on philosophical leisure can also
provide new avenues of research in the communication discipline
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In summary, philosophical leisure informs communication theory and offers an
alternative approach to the enhancement of human communication. This study offers
four points of significance that legitimize the continued scholarly inquiry of philosophical
leisure. First, few communication scholars consider the engagement of philosophical
leisure as an approach to the enhancement of human communication (Welch 8).
Negation of philosophical leisure in scholarly literature is not exclusive to the
communication discipline.
Second, there is linguistic confusion between the terms, leisure, relaxation,
recreation, and entertainment. Often these are used interchangeably when they mean
very different things. A linguistic misunderstanding occurs, which consequently creates
a negation of philosophical leisure’s nexus to human communication.
Third, the study of philosophical leisure can broaden understanding of
sophisticated philosophical ideas that are often overlooked in current communication
scholarship. For example, philosophical leisure informs understanding of Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel’s aesthetic ‘reduplication’ (Hegel 3). ‘Reduplication’ suggests that a
human being brings herself or himself into her or his own consciousness through
thinking. From this thinking (theoria) the human being realizes herself or himself by
reshaping external things through setting the “seal of his [her] inner being” upon them –
thus, endowing and imprinting the thing with her or his own characteristics (Hegel 3-4).
Aesthetic activity, such as philosophical leisure, is a human-made sensuous thing and a
“true work of art” (Hegel 4), brought into being through the mind, reduplicating or
making overt what was once covert or hidden within. Philosophical leisure is
communicative praxis of reduplication and the action of Hegel’s rhetorical aesthetics.
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‘Reduplication’ is a communicative act and can enrich philosophical inquiry from a
communication perspective.
Fourth, philosophical leisure can contribute to the hermeneutic inquiry of the
rhetoric and aesthetic interface. Communication scholarship often focuses on the
scientific inquiry of human communication. Yet, the aesthetic experience exists in
human interaction but is often overlooked. This author suggests that the interface of
rhetoric and aesthetics open new avenues for communication scholarship. There have
been studies concerning philosophical inquiries dealing with the nature of aesthetics
(Mattson 88). However, there are few communication scholars publishing in this area.
The emphasis on epistemology in the study of human communication in the early
twentieth century shifted to an emphasis on hermeneutics in the study of human
communication in the later part of the twentieth century. This study suggests that the
relationship between aesthetics and rhetoric ought to be pursued from a communication
perspective because the next shift in the study of human communication is in the
direction of aesthetics.
Considering aesthetics as a social relationship consummated through
answerability informs how communication scholars study human communication. The
interface of rhetoric and aesthetics within a hermeneutic setting allows the study of
human communication to be viewed as a multidimensional architectonic of humanities
research. Considering the study of human communication in this light protects the
discipline from the epistemological confinement that is found in the social sciences. We
confine the discipline by asking “what is this?” and we open the discipline by asking
“why is this …?” or “how does this …?” An aesthetic approach to the study of human
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communication is grounded in the questions “why…how?” Without the aesthetic
approach to human communication, the content of what is studied may be limited.
This study has re-illuminated the idea of philosophical leisure, identified a
communication eclipse in human communication and offered philosophical leisure as one
remedy that can enrich human communication. A postmodern world is open to
competing narratives and stories that can divert one’s attention-in-the-world.
Philosophical leisure is one alternative that enables human beings to regain a focus of
attention in their world, which can better prepare them for civic engagement and
everyday human communicative encounters.
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